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Management review
In 2009, Finnish nuclear power plants caused no danger to the plant environment or 
employees. Radioactive emissions into the environment were very low. The collective doses 
of employees at both plants continue to show a decreasing trend. The primary reason for 
the low dose in the year under review lies in the short durations of annual maintenance 
and the smaller than usual amount of work performed during  maintenances.
In the year under review, the plants operated in compliance with the safety requirements 
imposed on them. The factors behind the events in the operating year relate mainly to 
unintentional human error and aging or wear and tear on equipment parts. Functional 
tests performed on a regular basis revealed that the outer containment isolation valves 
of the steam lines did not operate in a normal way, which is a noteworthy issue for the 
safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. There are two successive valves of different 
types on each steam line and no failure was detected in the inner containment isolation 
valves. It was found out that the reason for the valve failure was damage to the small gears 
on the actuators. At worst, the damage could have prevented a valve from closing in an 
emergency condition requiring the isolation of the containment building. The gears were 
replaced. At the Loviisa power plant, STUK called attention to continuing operations and 
ensuring the safety of the plant in a situation when an oil leak in a reactor coolant pump 
requiring repair had been detected. Ensuring safety and maintaining plants require that 
the organisation operating the plant is constantly alert and maintains its competence.
At Loviisa and Olkiluoto, modifications required for safety improvement continued to be 
carried out in plant systems, equipment and structures and in operating models. At the 
Loviisa power plant, plates preventing vortices were installed in the intake pipes of the 
emergency makeup water tanks with a view to obstructing air suction into the reactor 
emergency injection system. The presence of air in the pumps would jeopardise their 
functioning and reactor cooling in accident conditions. The first phase of the Loviisa I&C 
systems upgrade (LARA) was implemented during annual maintenance at Loviisa 2. 
During the first phase, part of the I&C system controlling and limiting reactor power and 
its control room user interface were upgraded. The modifications turned out well. The 
most demanding phases of the upgrade have proven to be more challenging than expected 
both in terms of design and safety regulation, and it is not possible to implement the 
modifications in the originally planned sequence. The power company decided to postpone 
modifications to be made in the most safety-important systems to future years.
TVO carried out the periodic safety review required by STUK at the Olkiluoto power 
plant in 2008, when ten years had passed from the renewal of the operating licence and 
the previous extensive review carried out in conjunction with it. STUK inspected the 
periodic safety review during the year under review. The conclusion was that the safety 
of the nuclear power plant units is sufficient and that the practices employed by TVO 
are adequate to enable continuous operational safety. In STUK’s opinion, however, it is 
still possible to improve plant safety. The most important thing is to find out whether it 
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is possible to ascertain safety measures by means of different systems supplementing 
the current systems. Operators’ ability to control exceptional situations can be improved 
through the elaboration of emergency procedures.
The organisations at both power companies underwent restructuring. The responsible 
director at the Loviisa power plant changed as a result of the changes in Fortum’s 
organisation. The impact of the changes on the safety of the Loviisa power plant was 
assessed by Fortum, and the findings of the assessment were submitted to STUK for 
their information. In STUK’s opinion, both power companies still have to invest in their 
personnel’s competence and in securing sufficient resources in particular for modifications 
carried out at the plants.
Radioactive waste generated in operational processes at the nuclear power plants 
accumulated as anticipated. Its processing and final disposal in underground facilities took 
place in a controlled manner.
Construction of the new nuclear power plant unit at Olkiluoto has proceeded without major 
quality deviations. However, STUK has not been able to approve the plant design as it is. 
The most important unsettled issues relate to I&C design, for which the plant supplier and 
TVO have not been able to demonstrate how the independence of different I&C systems 
has been ensured. Guidance and supervision of subcontractors at the construction site 
and manufacturing sites require continuous improvement by the plant supplier and TVO. 
STUK observed deficiencies in the supervision of work and application of instructions at 
the site in October when the welding of pipes started. In France, the plant supplier and the 
power company observed that a subcontractor had carried out minor repair welding on the 
reactor coolant pipes without making records of it as necessitated by the requirements. In 
both cases work was interrupted to carry out clarifications and take corrective actions. It 
is a challenging and continuous task for the organisations involved in the project to create 
and maintain the safety culture which is necessary for ensuring the top priority of safety 
and quality. The plant supplier launched an on-site safety culture campaign which aims 
to ensure that the workers understand the safety significance of their work. TVO created 
a procedure for evaluating safety culture on site. In the year under review, STUK paid 
particular attention to TVO’s installation  supervision procedures. Design, construction, 
manufacturing and installation supervision procedures were further elaborated during the 
year under review. Inspection activities at Olkiluoto increased. STUK added its own and 
outside resources in order to fulfil the regulation obligations within a reasonable time.
Three new separate projects aimed at the construction of a nuclear power plant in Finland 
proceeded towards a political decision-in-principle on whether the projects are in line with 
the overall good of society. In the year under review, STUK issued a statement of these 
projects to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. STUK assessed the safety of the 
proposed plant alternatives, the ability of the applicant’s organisation to implement the 
project and the suitability of the proposed plant locations with regard to nuclear power 
plant operation. Based on a preliminary safety assessment, STUK stated that, in terms 
of safety, there are no obstacles to making a positive decision-in-principle on any of the 
applications.
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STUK’s work input in the regulatory oversight of each of the operating nuclear power 
plants was equivalent to over 11 person-years. The work input has been approximately 
the same for the past five years, or during the period that most of the regulatory resources 
have been occupied with the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently under construction. Before 
the construction project started, the amount of human resources used for the regulatory 
oversight of operating plants increased to some extent each year, and the reduction 
compared with the situation in previous years has been 2-3 person-years for each of 
the power plants. The objectives set for regulation were, however, attained. Altogether, 
34 person-years were used for overseeing the design, component manufacturing and 
construction of the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which is about 5 person-years more than in previous 
years. The amount of work will remain at least the same in 2010 and 2011, which will see 
a lot of component manufacturing and installation operations. STUK used about three 
person-years on overseeing the new projects. The current financing practice for regulatory 
operations, i.e. direct invoicing from the licensees according to STUK’s actual costs, has 
proven to function very well, and thanks to this operations could be increased to meet the 
actual needs.
As part of the preparation for the nuclear power plant projects mentioned above, STUK 
continued the revision of its YVL Guides. In the new guides STUK will present detailed 
requirements for safety and safety regulation. The requirements will be updated so that 
the essential requirements needed for any invitations to tender will be known by summer 
2010. Meticulous work planning and guide work prioritisation have served as preparation 
for the revision of the guides in early 2010.
Posiva Oy continued the construction of the research facility needed for the development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel by excavating the tunnel leading into the facility, 
as well as the shafts. Excavation proceeded close to its final target in 2009. STUK oversaw 
the work, preparing for the possibility that the tunnel and the shafts will, in due course, 
lead to the actual repository. Proving the safety of final disposal will primarily be based on 
the reliability of the barrier structures preventing the spread of radioactive substances. 
These structures will consist of a gas-tight copper canister and surrounding bentonite clay. 
As the focus of the final disposal project shifted towards technical design and construction, 
STUK hired a number of experts in various fields and intensified the operations of the 
team of international experts directly supporting the regulatory oversight. In addition, 
the international team consisting of European nuclear safety authorities evaluated 
the effectiveness and correctness of direction of STUK’s nuclear waste management 
safety regulation. The team provided useful recommendations, based on which STUK is 
improving its operations.
A lot of experience was gained of nuclear safeguards according to the amended nuclear 
non-proliferation agreement and, in particular, of the division of tasks between the IAEA, 
the EU and national regulatory authorities. STUK made an active contribution towards 
finding an optimal division of task between the parties concerned and attempted to show 
the way to achieving well-functioning procedures ensuring an adequate level of confidence. 
A model of nuclear safeguards suitable for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel was 
developed further, in tandem with the excavation of the tunnel leading to the final disposal 
facility.
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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear energy which 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once a year to 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to Section 121 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Environment, the Finnish 
Environment Institute, and the regional environmental authorities of the localities in 
which a nuclear facility is located.
The regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2009 included the design, construction and 
operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear materials. 
The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as nuclear non-
proliferation, concern two STUK departments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear 
Waste and Material Regulation.
The first parts of the report explain the basics of the nuclear safety regulation included 
as part of STUK’s responsibilities, as well as the objectives of the operations, and 
briefly introduce the objects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and 
implementation of legislation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as 
well as the progress of STUK’s YVL Guide revision. The chapter also includes a summary 
of the application of the updated YVL Guides to nuclear facilities.
The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains an overall safety 
assessment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the 
nuclear facilities currently in operation, the chapter describes plant operation, events 
during operation, annual maintenance and observations made during regulatory activities. 
Data and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on 
ensuring the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and 
components. Summaries are included for the development of the plants and their safety, 
and nuclear waste management. The report also includes a description of the oversight 
of the operations and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational 
experience feedback activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation 
safety of nuclear facilities is examined using the employees’ individual doses, the collective 
doses, and the results of emission and environmental radiation monitoring. For the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently under construction, the report includes descriptions of 
the regulation of design, construction, manufacturing, installation and commissioning 
preparations, as well as regulation of the operations of organisations participating in the 
construction project. At the end of the chapter on the regulation of nuclear facilities there is 
a summary of new plant projects and the regulation of the research reactor.
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The chapter concerning the regulation of the final disposal project for spent nuclear 
fuel describes the preparations for the final disposal project and the related regulatory 
activities. In addition, the oversight of the design and construction of the research facilities 
(Onkalo) under construction in Olkiluoto, as well as the assessment and oversight of the 
research, development and design work being carried out to further specify the safety case 
for final disposal are included on the report.
The section concerning nuclear non-proliferation describes the nuclear non-proliferation 
control for Finnish nuclear facilities and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, as well as 
measures required by the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, it 
describes the control of the transport of nuclear materials and the oversight of the nuclear 
test ban.
In addition to actual safety regulation, the report describes safety research, regulatory 
indicators and regulation development, as well as emergency preparedness, communication 
and STUK’s participation in international nuclear safety cooperation.
Appendix 1 presents a detailed study of the safety performance of the nuclear power plants 
by means of an indicator system, Appendix 2 includes a summary of employees’ doses at 
the nuclear power plants, and Appendix 3 describes exceptional operational events at the 
nuclear power plants.
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory oversight by STUK is 
based on the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory oversight 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of physical protection and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards of nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation.
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facillities; from strategy to implementation.
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STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety.
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licences under the Nuclear Energy Act, over-
sees compliance with the licence conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and oversees 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public.
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory 
activities is to ensure the safety of nuclear 
12
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facilities, so that plant operation does not cause 
radiation hazards that could endanger the safety of 
workers or the population in the vicinity, or cause 
other harm to the environment or property. The 
most important objective is to prevent a reactor 
accident that would cause a release of radioactive 
substances, or the threat of a release. Another ob-
jective is to maintain public confidence in regula-
tory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with the requirements.
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory activi-
ties that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements.
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutually-
redundant functional and structural levels. This 
approach is called the “defence in depth” principle. 
Safety-ensuring functions may be divided into pre-
ventive, protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent any 
deviations from the plant’s normal operational 
state. Accordingly, high quality standards apply to 
component design, manufacture, installation and 
maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into an accident.
If the first or second level functions fail to stop 
the progress of an accident, its consequences must 
be mitigated. In such a case, the main thing is to 
ensure the integrity of reactor containment and the 
operation of its associated systems.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe use 
of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed 
by the Government and functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of office is three years. The 
Commission was appointed on 1 October 2006, 
and its term of office ended on 30 September 2009. 
The new Commission was appointed on 1 October 
2009, and its term of office will continue until 30 
September 2012.
The Chairman of the new Commission is 
Customer Manager Seppo Vuori (VTT, Technical 
Research Centre of Finland) and the Vice-
Chairman is Professor Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki 
(Lappeenranta University of Technology). The 
members are Customer Director Rauno Rintamaa 
(VTT), Managing Director Timo Okkonen (Inspecta 
Tarkastus Oy), Senior Researcher Ilona Lindholm 
(VTT), Senior Inspector Miliza Malmelin 
(Ministry of the Environment) and Dr. Sc. (Tech.) 
Antero Tamminen. Professor Jukka Laaksonen, 
Director General of STUK, is a permanent expert 
to the Commission. Former members Director Ulla 
Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa Regional Environment 
Centre), Branch Manager Runar Blomkvist (the 
Geological Survey of Finland) and Dr. Sc. (Tech.) 
Antti Vuorinen left the Commission. 
The three Committees established by the 
Commission early in the year for preparatory 
work were the Reactor Safety Committee, Nuclear 
Waste Committee and Emergency Preparedness 
and Nuclear Material Committee. The role of 
committees was reconsidered in conjunction with 
appointing the new Commission, and the deci-
sion was taken to revise their duties. From now 
on, the Commission will have two Committees, the 
Reactor Safety Committee and the Nuclear Waste 
Safety Committee. Foreign and Finnish experts 
will be invited to join the Committees. English will 
be the working language in the Committees, and 
questions of principle, more extensive than before, 
will be brought to them for preparation. At the end 
of the year, the Committees were yet to convene, but 
the work of finding the experts to be invited to join 
them had already begun. It is to be expected that 
the Committees will convene a few times a year. 
The members of the actual Commission also par-
ticipate in the work of the Committees.
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Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives.
STUK ensures, by means of inspections and over-
sight, that the operational preconditions and op-
eration of the licensee and its subcontractors and 
the systems, structures and components of nuclear 
facilities are in compliance with the regulatory 
requirements. STUK’s operations are guided by 
annual follow-up plans, presenting the key items 
and activities for inspection and review. STUK car-
ries out inspections of plans for nuclear facilities 
and other documents that the licensee is obliged 
to request STUK to do. The compliance of activi-
ties with the plans is verified through inspections 
carried out at the plant site or at subcontractors’ 
premises. In addition to these inspections and re-
views, STUK has separate inspection programmes 
for periodic inspections of operating plants and in-
spections during construction. STUK also employs 
resident inspectors at the plants, who supervise 
and witness the construction, operation and condi-
tion of the plant and the operation of the organi-
sation on a daily basis and report their observa-
tions. An overall safety assessment is conducted 
annually on each nuclear facility, dealing with the 
attainment of radiation protection objectives, the 
development of defence in depth, and the operation 
of organisations constructing or operating nuclear 
facilities and providing services to them.
STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facilities starting from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, inter-
mediate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal 
facility require a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. The safety assessment will state, in particu-
lar, whether any issues have been discovered that 
would indicate that the necessary prerequisites for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in com-
pliance with the Nuclear Energy Act do not exist. 
In connection with the application for the decision-
in-principle, the applicant also presents a report on 
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act prescribes that the users 
of nuclear energy must have a liability insurance 
policy, or other financial guarantee, for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
have prepared for damage from a nuclear accident 
as prescribed by law by taking out an insurance 
policy for this purpose, mainly with the Nordic 
Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of an accident, the funds available 
for compensation come from three sources: the 
licensee, the country of location of the facility and 
the international liability community. In 2009, 
a total of 300,000,000 SDR was available for 
compensation from these sources. SDR refers to 
Special Drawing Right, an international reserve 
asset defined by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), whose value is based on a basket of key in-
ternational currencies. In 2009, the average value 
of the SDR was 1.10 euro. As a result of interna-
tional negotiations completed in 2004 concerning 
the renewal of the Paris/Brussels nuclear liability 
agreements, funds available for compensation will 
be more than tripled compared with the current 
situation in the near future. Finland has also deci-
ded to enact a law laying down unlimited licensee 
liability. The legislative amendment has not taken 
effect as yet, but is pending the entry into force of 
the relevant international agreements. 
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance arrangements in Finland 
belongs to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the 
transport of nuclear materials. STUK ascertains 
that all nuclear material transport has had li-
ability insurance approved by the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority or in accordance with the 
Paris Convention and approved by the authorities 
of the sending state.
14
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the environmental impact assessment. When an 
application for a construction or operating licence 
for a nuclear facility has been submitted to the 
Government, STUK issues a statement on it and 
encloses its safety assessment. 
STUK regulates nuclear facility 
design and construction stages
The principles and detailed approach of STUK’s 
oversight and inspection activities are described in 
the YVL Guides issued by STUK. Guide YVL 1.1 
describes the oversight and inspection procedures 
at a general level, while the detailed procedures 
are described in other YVL Guides. The purpose 
of oversight and inspection activities regarding 
plant projects is to allow STUK to verify that the 
prerequisites for performance of a high standard 
exist, that the plans are acceptable before the im-
plementation begins and that the implementation 
is compliant with regulations before the operating 
licence is granted. 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the li-
censee must ensure safety. Through its oversight, 
STUK ensures that the licensee fulfills its re-
sponsibilities. STUK oversees and inspects the 
implementation of the plant and the organisations 
participating in its implementation and operation. 
STUK does not oversee and inspect every detail; 
instead, the oversight and inspections are focused 
on the basis of the safety significance of each sub-
ject. To this end, the plant is divided into systems, 
structures and equipment, which are further clas-
sified according to their importance to plant safety. 
The safety classification of the plant is reviewed by 
STUK at the stage of applying for the construction 
licence. STUK inspects and oversees the design 
and manufacture of equipment and structures 
that are most critical from the safety point of view. 
Inspection organisations approved by STUK have 
been trusted with the inspection of equipment and 
structures with lower safety significance. STUK 
oversees the operations of these inspection organi-
sations.
In plant projects, STUK ensures proactively 
with its oversight and inspections proactively that 
the power company planning to build the plant and 
the plant supplier responsible for its implementa-
tion, and its main sub-contractor, have the neces-
sary capabilities for a high-quality implementa-
tion. 
During the construction licence stage, the plant 
design and quality assurance of implementation 
are evaluated in order to make sure that the plant 
can be implemented in compliance with high qual-
ity standards and Finnish safety requirements. 
During construction, inspections and oversight are 
deployed in order to ensure that the plant is imple-
mented in compliance with the principles approved 
at the construction licence stage. The review and 
inspections are based on detailed documentation 
delivered to STUK and on site inspections at the 
suppliers’ premises. Before the manufacture of 
equipment and structures may commence, STUK 
reviews both the respective detailed plans and the 
capabilities of the manufacturing organisations to 
produce high-quality results. During manufacture 
and construction, STUK carries out inspections in 
order to verify that the equipment and structures 
are manufactured in compliance with the plans 
approved by STUK. Regarding the installation of 
equipment and structures, STUK carries out in-
spections in order to verify that the installations 
are made in compliance with the approved plans 
and that the requirements set out for installations 
are fulfilled. Approval by STUK after inspection 
is a prerequisite for commissioning of the equip-
ment. After that, STUK inspects the results of the 
commissioning before the actual turnover to opera-
tions.
Before operating the plant, STUK must be pro-
vided with documentation proving that the plant 
was designed and implemented in compliance with 
Finnish safety requirements. In addition, STUK 
has to be provided with evidence verifying that the 
prerequisites exist for safe operation of the plant. 
These include personnel that have been trained 
and verified to be competent, the instructions and 
procedures required for operating the plant, secu-
rity and emergency preparedness arrangements, 
maintenance programme and staff as well as ra-
diation protection staff. Having verified that the 
implementation is safe and the organisation has 
the required capabilities, STUK prepares a safety 
assessment and statement required for the operat-
ing licence. Obtaining the operating licence is a 
prerequisite for loading the reactor with fuel. 
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Comprehensive safety assessment 
is a prerequisite for extending 
the operating licence
In Finland, operating licences are granted for a 
fixed term, typically 10 to 20 years. A comprehen-
sive safety assessment is required for renewing 
the operating licence. If the operating licence is 
granted for a period exceeding 10 years, an interim 
safety assessment is carried out during the licence 
period. The scope of the interim assessment is simi-
lar to that carried out in conjunction with renewing 
the operating licence. During the assessments, the 
state of the plant is investigated, paying particular 
attention to the effects of ageing on the plant and 
its equipment and structures. In addition, the ca-
pabilities of the operating personnel for continued 
safe operation of the plant are assessed. 
Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operation of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety 
of nuclear power plants by carrying out inspec-
tions on plant sites and at component manufactur-
ers’ premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory YVL Guides, 
deterministic safety analyses refer to the analyses 
of transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear power 
plants. The licensees update these analyses in con-
nection with the renewal of operating licences, pe-
riodic safety reviews and any significant modifica-
tions carried out at the plant. 
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions. The licensees employ 
PRA for the maintenance and continuous improve-
ment of the technical safety of nuclear facilities.
STUK reviews the deterministic safety analyses 
and probabilistic risk analyses related to construc-
tion and operating licences and the operation of a 
nuclear power plant. When required, STUK has 
its own independent comparison analyses made in 
order to verify the reliability of results. 
STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
Various modifications are carried out at nuclear 
facilities to improve safety, replace aged systems or 
components, facilitate plant operation or mainte-
nance, or improve the efficiency of energy genera-
tion. STUK inspects the plans for the extensive or 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on site or at manufacturers’ premises. 
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents that describe 
the plant’s operation and structure – such as the 
Technical Specifications, the Final Safety Analysis 
Report and the operating and maintenance proce-
dures – have changed. STUK supervises the docu-
ment revisions and generally follows the updating 
of plant documentation after the modifications.
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The power companies are obliged to report any 
operational transients and any matters that may 
compromise safety. STUK assesses the safety sig-
nificance of the incidents and the power company’s 
ability to detect safety deficiencies, take action and 
rectify them.
The licensees submit event reports to STUK on 
operational events at nuclear facilities, compris-
ing so called special reports, operational transient 
reports and scram reports. In addition to event re-
ports, the facilities submit daily reports, quarterly 
reports, annual reports, outage reports, annual en-
vironmental safety reports, monthly individual ra-
diation dose reports, annual experience operational 
feedback reports and safeguards reports to STUK.
Internal processing and reporting is also re-
quired for events or near-misses not subject to a 
special or operational transient report. Reports on 
such events are submitted to STUK for information 
Operability of the plant is overseen during 
operation and annual maintenance
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down in 
the Technical Specifications, and overseeing an-
nual maintenance outages, plant maintenance and 
ageing management, fire safety, radiation safety, 
physical protection and emergency preparedness.
Technical specifications
The Technical Specifications of nuclear facilities 
lay down the detailed technical and administra-
tive requirements and restrictions concerning the 
plant and its various systems, equipment and 
structures. The licensee is responsible for keeping 
the Technical Specifications up-to-date and ensur-
ing compliance with them. STUK oversees compli-
ance with the plants’ Technical Specifications by 
witnessing operations on site. Special attention is 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the Technical Specifications. 
When annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
with the Technical Specifications prior to start-
up. Any changes to and planned deviations from 
the Technical Specifications must be submitted 
to STUK for approval in advance. In addition, the 
licensee is responsible for reporting to STUK with-
out delay all situations deviating from the require-
ments under the Technical Specifications. In the 
report, the power company presents its corrective 
action for approval by STUK. STUK oversees the 
implementation of corrective actions. 
Oversight of operation, operational events 
and reporting the operation to STUK
STUK oversees the safe operation of plants through 
regular inspections and reports submitted by the 
power companies. In addition, STUK’s resident 
inspectors working on plant sites oversee the op-
eration on a daily basis. The resident inspectors 
evaluate faults and oversee their repairs, as well as 
tests of safety-critical equipment. The inspections 
on operations contained in the periodic inspection 
programme focus on major faults, incidents and 
progress of corrective actions, as well as on operat-
ing procedures. The inspections are based on the 
regular reports submitted by power companies and 
walkdown inspections conducted on site.
The majority of radioactive substances cre-
ated during the operation of a nuclear re-
actor are contained in the nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, radioactive substances are contained in the 
reactor cooling system, as well as in the related 
purification and waste systems. The liquid and 
atmospheric effluents from the plant are purified 
and delayed so that their radiation impact on the 
environment is very low compared with the im-
pact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The emissions are carefully measured 
to ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits.
Radioactive emissions from a nuclear 
power plant into the air and sea are veri-
fied through comprehensive radiation monitoring. 
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
power plant comprises radiation measurements 
and determination of radioactive substances, con-
ducted to analyse the radioactive substances ex-
isting in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plant and to the na-
tional radiation-monitoring network.
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if the event is or may be relevant to nuclear or ra-
diation safety or STUK’s communication activities.
Annual maintenance
The work that cannot be done during plant opera-
tion is carried out during annual maintenance of 
nuclear power plants. These include refuelling, pre-
ventive equipment maintenance, periodic inspec-
tions and tests, as well as fault repairs. These actions 
ensure the preconditions for operating the power 
plant safely during the following operating cycles. 
STUK is responsible for overseeing and ensur-
ing that the nuclear power plant is safe during the 
annual maintenance and future operating cycles, 
and that the annual maintenance does not cause a 
radiation hazard to the workers, the population or 
the environment. STUK ensures this by reviewing 
the documents required by the regulations, such as 
outage plans and modification documentation, and 
by performing on-site inspections during annual 
maintenance. 
Plant maintenance and ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the ageing 
management of operating nuclear facilities, STUK 
oversees the plants’ ageing management strategy 
and its implementation ensuring the maintenance 
of sufficient safety margins for safety-significant 
systems, components and structures throughout 
their lifetime. The organisation of the licensee, the 
prerequisites for the organisation to carry out the 
necessary actions, and the condition of components 
and structures important to safety are subject to 
inspections and reviews. Regulatory oversight and 
inspections ensure that the power companies have 
the ageing management programmes in place that 
enable them to detect potential problems in time. 
In addition, corrective action must be carried out 
in a way that ensures the integrity and operability 
of safety-significant components and structures so 
that safety functions can be executed at any time.
STUK oversees ageing management through 
inspections of the periodic inspection programme 
and inspections related to modifications and annu-
al maintenance. The key issue in operation licence 
renewal and periodic safety reviews is the manage-
ment of plant ageing.
Every year, the power companies provide STUK 
with reports on the ageing of electric and I&C 
equipment, mechanical structures and equipment, 
as well as buildings. These reports describe the 
most salient ageing phenomena to be monitored, 
observations related to the ageing process and 
actions required for extending the service life of 
equipment and structures.
The licencee must carry out periodic inspec-
tions of safety-critical equipment and structures 
(such as the reactor pressure vessel and reactor 
coolant system). STUK approves the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections and oversees 
the inspections and their results on site. The final 
result reports will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval after the annual maintenance. 
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by in-
specting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation meas-
urements, radiation protection procedures, radia-
tion conditions and radiation protection arrange-
ments for work processes at each facility. The dosim-
eters used for measuring the occupational radiation 
doses undergo annual tests carried out by STUK. 
The test comprises irradiating a sample of dosim-
eters at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory 
and reading the doses at the power plant. In addi-
tion, STUK oversees the meteorological dispersion 
measurements of radioactive substances, release 
measurements and environmental radiation moni-
toring, and also reviews the relevant result reports.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK oversees the preparedness of the or-
ganisations operating nuclear power plants to act 
in abnormal situations. The inspection focuses on 
the training of emergency response organisation, 
premises of the emergency response organisation, 
securing of the connections used for the plant data 
transfer of meteorological measurements and ra-
diation monitoring of the surrounding environ-
ment during an emergency situation, as well as 
the development of internal alerting procedures 
at the power plant. Emergency exercises test the 
operation of the emergency response organisation, 
the functionality of the emergency response guide-
lines and the usability of the emergency response 
organisation’s premises in practice, which are de-
veloped on the basis of the feedback received from 
the exercises. STUK oversees the actions of power 
companies during these emergency drills.
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Oversight the operation of organisations 
is part of ensuring plant safety
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and training 
of the staff of nuclear facilities and operational 
experience feedback activities. The aim is to ensure 
that the organisations of the power company as a 
whole and its key suppliers operate in a manner 
that ensures the safety of the plant at all levels 
and in connection with safety-related actions.
Training and qualifications of personnel
STUK oversees the training and qualifications of 
personnel through inspections included in the peri-
odic inspection programme, by assessing the suit-
ability and approving the appointment of certain 
key personnel and by assessing the ability of the 
power company to ensure safety in conjunction 
with incidents and annual maintenance opera-
tions. The key persons whose appointment must be 
approved by STUK are the responsible manager in 
charge of the construction and safe operation of the 
nuclear facility, the operators working in the plant 
control rooms and the persons in charge of, secu-
rity, emergency preparedness and nuclear materi-
als. In addition, STUK’s approval is required for 
personnel carrying out certain integrity checks on 
materials. In case events reveal fl aws in the opera-
tion of organisation, number of personnel or their 
competence, STUK will require the power company 
to take corrective action as required.
Operational experience feedback
According to Government Decree (VNA 733/2008), 
the advancement of science and technology and 
operating experiences must be taken into account 
for the further enhancement of the safety of nu-
clear power plants. This principle is not limited 
to operational experiences from Finnish nuclear 
power plants, but feedback from abroad must also 
be analysed systematically, and action must be tak-
en to improve safety as necessary. STUK oversees 
and ensures that the power companies’ operational 
experience feedback activities effectively prevent 
the reoccurrence of problematic events. STUK pays 
particular attention to the power companies’ ability 
to detect and identify the causes of the events and 
to remedy the underlying operational weaknesses. 
In addition, STUK analyses Finnish and foreign 
operational experience data and, as necessary, lays 
down requirements to enhance safety.
STUK oversees the operational experience feed-
back activities by reviewing the event reports 
submitted by the licensee and the annual sum-
mary of operational experience activities. During 
inspections included in the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, the operational experience feedback ac-
tivities of the plant and utilisation of international 
experience are reviewed.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as 
planned during an event or when the event is es-
timated to lead to significant modifications to the 
plant’s technical layout or procedures. A STUK in-
vestigation team is also set up if the licensee has not 
adequately clarified the root causes of an event. 
Pressure equipment critical to nuclear 
safety are overseen by STUK
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. The pres-
sure equipment of other safety classes is inspected 
by inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations author-
ised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities, and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
Regulatory oversight of nuclear non-
proliferation is a basic requirement 
for using nuclear energy
Oversight of nuclear non-proliferation ensures 
that nuclear materials and other nuclear commodi-
ties remain in peaceful use in compliance with 
the relevant licences and notifications, and that 
nuclear facilities and the related technologies are 
only utilised for peaceful purposes. Licensees are 
responsible for managing the nuclear materials 
in their possession, accounting for them and re-
porting on plant sites and their activities relat-
ing to the nuclear fuel cycle to STUK and the 
STUK-B 118
19
European Commission. Some of the data is for-
warded to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). STUK maintains a national control system 
as referred to in Section 118 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree. Its purpose is to carry out the safeguards 
for the use of nuclear energy that are necessary for 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK 
verifies the correctness of the licensees’ operation 
reports, accounting and reporting through on-site 
inspections. STUK also participates in all inspec-
tions carried out by the IAEA and the European 
Commission and, at the same time, carries out its 
own independent inspection.
Another objective of the oversight of non-pro-
liferation is to ensure that appropriate security 
arrangements are in place for nuclear materials. 
In this context, the expression ‘security arrange-
ments’ refers to the control, prevention and de-
tection of illegal activities related to nuclear and 
other radioactive materials and responses to such 
activities, as defined by the IAEA under the head-
ing ‘Nuclear Security’.
The National Data Centre based on the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty analy-
ses the gamma ray spectrums sent by measuring 
stations located around the world. The Centre 
also participates in the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in Vienna to 
establish a cost-effective organisation that is func-
tional from the Finnish perspective.
Oversight of nuclear waste management 
extends from planning to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste manage-
ment is to ensure that nuclear waste is processed, 
stored and disposed of safely. The control of nuclear 
waste processed at plant sites is part of the regulatory 
oversight of operating plants mentioned above. STUK 
oversees the nuclear waste management of nuclear 
power plants through document reviews and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. In ad-
dition, STUK approves the clearing of waste from con-
trol and reviews plants’ nuclear waste management 
and decommissioning plans, on the basis of which the 
licensees’ nuclear waste management fees are deter-
mined. 
The final disposal project for spent fuel requires 
special attention. STUK inspects and reviews 
Posiva Oy’s plans and research work for project im-
plementation and is oversight the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also being used to test suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The plan is to 
later convert the research tunnel into an entrance 
for the repository.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May1977 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Tyyp pi,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) toimittaja
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 979 890/860 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 890/860 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted about 1,600 (net) PWR,
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oy owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the Olkiluoto 3 
plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo 
Posiva Oy is constructing an 
underground research facility 
(Onkalo) in Olkiluoto, where 
bedrock volumes suitable for 
final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock research 
at the planned final disposal 
depth is a requirement for 
granting a construction 
licence for the final disposal 
facility. Posiva has designed 
Onkalo to function as one of 
the entrance routes to the 
planned final disposal facil-
ity, so STUK is applying 
the same regulatory proce-
dures to the construction of 
Onkalo as those of a nuclear facility. 
The underground research facility consists of a 
drive tunnel, three shafts and a research gallery 
quarried to a depth of 437 m. Posiva started con-
structing Onkalo in 2004. By the end of 2009, the 
excavation of the drive tunnel had reached a depth 
of 400 m, and the length of the tunnel was 4000 m. 
In addition, all three shafts had been quarried us-
ing raise boring techniques to a depth of 290 m. 
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
•  TRIGA Mark II research reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
• Fuel of the core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA reactors have a unique fuel type; 
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
Figure 2. Plan of the underground rock characterisation facility (Onkalo) and 
status of the construction on 11 March 2010 (Posiva Oy).
FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The reac-
tor is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maxi-
mum thermal power is 250 kW. It began operations 
in March 1962, and its current operating licence 
will expire at the end of 2011. The reactor is used 
for the fabrication of radioactive tracers, activa-
tion analysis, student training and Boron Neutron 
Capture Therapy (BNCT) treatment of tumours, as 
well as the development of therapeutic methods.
Poistoilmakuilu
–290 m
Henkilökuilu
–290 m
Tuloilmakuilu
–290 m
Ajotunnelin pituus
4200 m
Ajotunnelin syvyys
401 m
TIlAnne 11.3.2010
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3 Development and implementation 
of legislation and regulations
Upper level regulations are up-to-date  
In the year under review, there were nuclear safety 
legislation revision projects falling within STUK’s 
mandate. The revision of the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Nuclear Energy Decree and its supplementary 
Government Decrees on the safety of nuclear pow-
er plants (733/2008), on safety arrangements in the 
use of nuclear energy (734/2008), on preparedness 
arrangements at nuclear power plants (735/2008) 
and on the safety of the final disposal of nuclear 
waste (736/2008) were completed in 2008. In con-
sequence of the revisions, Finnish nuclear energy 
legislation is well up to date. 
YVL Guide updates were implemented
The preparation of implementation decisions for 
YVL Guides which were published earlier contin-
ued in 2009. Guides issued in 2008 were taken 
into effect by preparing implementation decisions 
for them. YVL guides are detailed safety regula-
tions for nuclear facilities, issued by STUK on the 
basis of the Nuclear Energy Act and the relevant 
Government Decision. In addition to requirements 
for the safety of nuclear facilities, the guides de-
scribe STUK’s regulatory procedures as well. STUK 
issues a separate decision on how a new or revised 
YVL guide applies to operating nuclear facilities, 
or those under construction, and to licensee opera-
tions. 
In the implementation decision for Guide YVL 
1.15, STUK stated that the new guide must be ap-
plied as is to the operating activities of TVO’s and 
Fortum’s nuclear facilities and in Posiva’s activities. 
In the implementation decision for Guide YVL 
5.3, STUK stated that the new guide requires an 
update of plant procedures concerning valve units 
at both TVO’s and Fortum’s nuclear facilities. With 
regard to both power companies, the decisions 
stated that it is not necessary to take into account 
the new requirements of the YVL Guide for valve 
condition monitoring in its entirety. As for Posiva, 
STUK did not consider it necessary to grant excep-
tions to the application of the new guide. 
In the implementation decision for Guide YVL 
5.7, STUK stated that the new guide requires the 
update of plant procedures concerning pump units 
at both TVO’s and Fortum’s nuclear facilities. With 
regard to both power companies, the decisions stat-
ed that it is not necessary to take into account the 
new requirements of the YVL Guide for pump unit 
condition monitoring in its entirety. As for Posiva, 
STUK did not consider it necessary to grant excep-
tions to the application of the new guide.
In the implementation decision for Guide YVL 
3.7, STUK stated with regard to TVO’s nuclear 
facilities that it is not necessary to comply with the 
new requirement for furnishing pressure equip-
ment fittings with individual identification infor-
mation retrospectively in case of equipment which 
is already installed. In other regards, the Guide 
was carried into effect as it was. With regard to 
Fortum’s nuclear facilities, STUK stated in its deci-
sion that Fortum has already submitted to STUK 
the plant procedure updates required by the new 
Guide and that the Guide will be carried into effect 
as it is.
The implementation decisions for Guide YVL 
5.8 were under preparation at the turn of the year 
2009-2010 and being examined by Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation. 
STUK did not continue to prepare YVL Guide 
updates in their present form. In future years, YVL 
Guides will be published and grouped in a new way 
in line with the overall revision of the guide sys-
tem, and each Guide will be outlined in a new way 
in terms of its content. 
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Table 1. Implementation decisions of YVl guides issued by STUK per nuclear facility in 2009.
Guide
Loviisa 
1&2
Olkiluoto 
1&2 Olkiluoto 3 Posiva
FiR 1  
research 
reactor
YVL 1.15 Mechanical equipment and structures of nuclear facilities. 
Construction inspection, 28.4.2008
• • • •
YVL 5.3 Nuclear facility valve units, 28.4.2008 • • • •
YVL 5.7 Nuclear facility pump units, 28.4.2008 • • • •
YVL 3.7 Pressure equipment of nuclear facilities. Commissioning 
inspection, 26.9.2008
· • • •· ·
The revision of YVL guides is progressing 
The structural revision of the YVL guides was ini-
tiated in 2005 by assessing the existing guides and 
defining the development objectives. The overall 
objective is to improve the internal consistency 
of the regulations and, in particular, to clarify the 
requirements laid down in the guides. The require-
ments will be numbered to make it easier to find 
the individual requirements in the guides. This 
will also enable the guides to be amended with re-
gard to individual requirements. The objective is to 
have the new set of YVL Guides completed by the 
end of 2011. 
A working group was appointed to support 
STUK’s experts in the preparation work for each 
new guide. In addition to STUK, the following or-
ganisations are represented in the working group: 
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj, Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy, Fennovoima Oy and Posiva Oy. The working 
groups will discuss the main content of the guides 
during their preparation, thus improving the open-
ness of regulatory work and reducing the overall 
period of time spent in their preparation. A follow-
up group set up for the entire project, composed of 
representatives of the above organisations, con-
vened twice in 2009. 
In 2009, the preparation of the guides of the 
new type continued. The plan is to prepare a total 
of 37 of these new guides, half the number of cur-
rent YVL Guides.
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A Safety manage-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
B Plant and system 
design
C Radiation safety 
of a nuclear facility 
and environment
D Nuclear materials 
and waste
E Structures and 
equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.1 Regulatory control 
of the safe use of 
nuclear energy
B.1 Design of the 
safety systems of a 
nuclear facility
C.1 Structural 
radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility
D.1 Regulatory control 
of nuclear non-prolif-
eration 
E.1 Manufacture and 
use of nuclear fuel
A.2 Siting of a nuclear 
facility
B.2 Classification of 
systems, structures 
and equipment of a 
nuclear facility
C.2 Radiation protec-
tion and dose control 
of the personnel of a 
nuclear facility
D.2 Transport of 
nuclear materials and 
waste
E.2 Construction 
plan of the mechani-
cal components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.3 Management 
systems of a nuclear 
facility
B.3 Safety assess-
ment a NPP
C.3 Control and 
measuring of radioac-
tive releases to the 
environmental of a 
nuclear facility
D.3 Handling of spent 
nuclear fuel
E.3 Regulatory control 
of the mechanical 
components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.4 Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear 
facility
B.4 Nuclear fuel and 
reactor
C.4 Radiological 
control of the environ-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
D.4 Handling of low- 
and intermediate-level 
waste and decommis-
sioning of a nuclear 
facility
E.4 Verification of 
strength of pres-
sure equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.5 Construction of 
a NPP
B.5 Reactor coolant 
circuit of a NPP
C.5 Emergency 
preparedness arrange-
ments of a NPP
D.5 Final disposal of 
nuclear waste
E.5 In-service inspec-
tions of the mechani-
cal components and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.6 Operation and 
accident management 
of a NPP
B.6 Containment of 
a NPP
E.6 Buildings and 
structures of a nuclear 
facility
A.7 Risk management 
of a NPP
B.7 Preparing for the 
internal and external 
threats to a nuclear 
facility
E.7 Electrical and 
I&C equipment of a 
nuclear facility
A.8 Ageing manage-
ment of a nuclear 
facility
B.8 Fire protection of 
a nuclear facility
A.9 Reporting on the 
operation of a nuclear 
facility
A.10 Operating experi-
ence feedback of a 
nuclear facility
A.11 Security arrange-
ments of a nuclear 
facility
Collected definitions of YVL-guides: a part of the regulations, but a separate document.
Figure 4. Structure of the new YVl guides.
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4 Regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities and results in 2009
from the Technical Specifications. There were more 
events than in the previous years, but they did 
not have any substantial impact on the radiation 
safety of the plant or its environment. The events 
related to unintentional human errors. None of the 
events led to a reactor trip. One event was classi-
fied as an operational transient. System and equip-
ment failures had a minor safety implication for 
the plant. Risks caused by plant operation, how-
ever, have slightly increased compared with previ-
ous years which, among other things, is due to the 
large number of air conditioning system failures. 
Annual maintenance was implemented as planned 
in terms of nuclear and radiation safety.
During the year, several modifications were 
implemented which improve plant safety. Plates 
preventing vortices were installed in the intake 
pipes of the plant unit emergency makeup water 
tanks with a view to obstructing air suction into 
the reactor emergency injection system pumps 
when the tank water level drops (before the tank is 
drained intake would be shifted to the floor drains 
of the reactor building). The first phase of the I&C 
upgrade (LARA) was implemented during the an-
nual maintenance outage at Loviisa 2, when part 
of the I&C system controlling and limiting reactor 
power and its control room user interface were re-
equipped. The modifications turned out well. The 
stage designation of the I&C upgrade was changed 
in 2009 from the original four stages to three stag-
es combining stages two and three, which will be 
implemented at Loviisa 1 in 2010–2012. The modi-
fied stage designation will set challenges to the 
planning of work to be performed at the following 
stage and to that of annual maintenance, as well as 
to inspection and regulatory activities by STUK.
The Safety and Technology units at the Loviisa 
power plant were restructured in 2009. The licen-
see conducted an assessment of the restructuring 
which was submitted to STUK. As a result of the 
assessment and its examination, it was stated 
4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment 
of the Loviisa NPP
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power 
plant and assessed its organisation and personnel’s 
competence in different areas by means of review-
ing materials provided by the lincensee, carrying 
out inspections in line with the periodic inspection 
programme and by overseeing operations at the 
plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, 
STUK can state that plant operation did not cause 
a radiation hazard to the workers, population or 
environment. Occupational radiation doses and 
radioactive releases into the environment were 
low and clearly below the prescribed limits. The 
licensee has operated the Loviisa power plant in a 
safe manner and in compliance with YVL Guides. 
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa power 
plant complies with the requirements.
According to the tests and inspections car-
ried out, the condition of the containment and 
the primary circuit which prevent the release of 
radioactive material into the environment are in 
compliance with requirements. Minor fuel leakage 
was detected at both units in 2009. The volume and 
trend of the leakages at the plant are monitored 
on a regular basis. The detected leakages are in-
significant for the radiation safety of the environ-
ment, because the radioactivity is contained in the 
primary circuit and inside the containment. The 
leakage at Loviisa 2 was located during annual 
maintenance in 2009, and the fuel element with 
the leaking rod was removed from the reactor. The 
leakage at Loviisa 1 was detected after annual 
maintenance in October 2009. The fuel element 
will be removed from the reactor during annual 
maintenance in 2010.
Plant operation has been systematic and safe. 
Six exceptional events with safety implications 
were reported. Five of these involved deviation 
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that the changes do not deteriorate the operating 
capability of the plant organisation. Furthermore, 
significant organisational restructuring measures 
and personnel changes took place in Fortum Power 
& Heat Oy’s nuclear energy functions in the au-
tumn of 2009. They aimed to improve the organisa-
tion’s efficiency and clarify profit responsibility, as 
well as simplifying the organisational structure. 
These changes did not have any direct effect on 
the organisational structure of the Loviisa power 
plant but they did clarify, among other things, 
the plant’s procurement activities  and the use of 
resources by Technical Support (formerly Fortum 
Nuclear Services). The most important personnel 
change was the transfer of the responsible director 
of the Loviisa power plant to another position in 
the Fortum Group and the appointment of a new 
responsible director from among the personnel of 
the power plant’s safety unit.
Based on its oversight, STUK determined that 
the procurement activities and the regulatory pro-
cedures concerning the suppliers for the Loviisa 
power plant need to be further elaborated. STUK 
also required that the power plant prepare a plan 
for improving the follow-up of the closing of open 
issues and for the development of project plan-
ning and resource management. The Loviisa power 
plant has launched a development project aimed 
at improving project activity planning and the co-
ordination of human resources. STUK expects the 
Loviisa power plant to pay attention to sufficient 
induction training provision for personnel and 
to the realisation of basic training programmes. 
STUK will follow the progress of the above-men-
tioned issues in 2010.
STUK reviewed the decommissioning plan for 
the Loviisa power plant based on the assumption 
that both Loviisa power plant units will be closed 
after 50 years of operation in 2027 and 2030. 
Decommissioning will start immediately after the 
closing and it will last until 2035. In its statement 
submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, STUK concluded that the decommission-
ing of the power plant and provisions for it can be 
implemented on the basis of the plan.
4.1.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with the Technical 
Specifications
The Technical Specifications of the Loviisa power 
plant are up-to-date and clear. Fortum submitted 
to STUK for approval nine amendment proposals 
for the Technical Specifications. The amendments 
result from modifications carried out at the plant 
such as the I&C upgrade (LARA), modifications 
Table 2. Events at the Loviisa plant units subject to special reports by the power company. The table shows 
events due to which the plant unit was in non-compliance with the Technical Specifications. All events subject to 
reporting are discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1). Appendix 3 describes events subject to special reports in 
more detail.
Event Non-compliances with the 
Technical Specifications
Special  
report
INES  
rating
Inoperability of the external containment spray system at Loviisa 1 • • 0
Loss of magnetic loads of the pilot valves of pressurizer safety valves at 
Loviisa 2
• • 0
Erroneous loss of power supply to the control valve of the standby emergency 
feedwater line at Loviisa 2
• • 0
Failure to complete the preventive maintenance operations to the flow rate 
meters of emergency feedwater lines at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2
• • 0
Irregularities regarding the fuel levels in diesel generator fuel tanks • • 0
Fire of the power supply unit of emergency feedwater pump at Loviisa 2 • 0
Figure 5. IneS classified events at the loviisa plant 
(IneS level 1 or higher).
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Events non-compliant with the 
Technical Specifications
At Loviisa 2, the power supply to the magnetic 
loads of the pilot valves of both safety valves of the 
pressurizer blowdown line was lost in conjunction 
with a repair operation. The pressurizer safety valves 
prevent the pressure in the primary circuit from ris-
ing in a transient situation. If overpressure occurs, 
the spring-loaded safety valves open. The purpose of 
the magnetic loads was to ensure the leak-tightness 
of the pilot valves and to ensure the operation of the 
pilot valve at the correct pressure. When the magnetic 
loads were lost, the pilot valves began to leak. In or-
der to prevent the unnecessary opening of the safety 
valve, the decision was taken at the plant to switch the 
magnetic loads to manual control. This will not make 
the safety valves inoperable but it increases the pres-
sure at which they open. It would have been possible 
to cancel manual control if required. Manual control 
was switched on for 16 minutes until the power supply 
of the solenoids was restored at the plant. 
At Loviisa 1, both trains of the external contain-
ment spray system were temporarily out of order due 
to an error in the management of maintenance opera-
tions. The cooling fan of the electrical switchgear feed-
ing the other train of the external containment spray-
ing system was isolated for periodic inspection, even 
though an inspection of the spraying pump motor of 
the other train was in progress at the time.
At Loviisa 2, the fuel level in the fuel tank of the 
diesel generator was found to be low when the diesel 
generator was being tested. The fuel level had already 
sunk below the minimum level in conjunction with 
the previous tests. This diesel generator backs up the 
power supply to the electrical system of the Serious 
Accidents Management (SAM) system. The fuel level 
was also checked in the respective tank at Loviisa 1, 
and was also found to be low. The event only has 
minor safety implications because it is unlikely that 
these diesel generators actually have to be operated 
for longer periods, and there will be time to fill up the 
fuel tanks.
At Loviisa 2, the control valve of the standby 
emergency feedwater line was inoperable for a time 
when electricity was incorrectly isolated during annu-
al maintenance at Loviisa 1. The standby emergency 
feedwater system of Loviisa 1 was disabled for sched-
uled maintenance and modification work so that the 
electricity supply to the standby emergency feedwater 
line control valve of the steam generator of Loviisa 
2 (that was in operation) was isolated instead of the 
motor-actuated isolation valve. The erroneous isola-
tion was detected after completing the work, when the 
system operation was restored. The electricity supply 
isolated for the work was reconnected so that the oper-
ability of the valve at Loviisa 2 was restored.
At Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, all flow rate 
measurement systems of emergency feedwater pumps 
were not calibrated during annual maintenance. 
These calibrations are part of the preventive mainte-
nance operations that are required by the Tech Specs 
and carried out every 12 months. Flow rate measure-
ments ensure the operation of emergency feedwater 
pumps during different plant conditions. The event 
only has minor safety implications because the incor-
rect operation of pump flow measurements would have 
been detected in conjunction with testing the standby 
emergency feedwater system.
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
relating to securing the final heat sink (ESCO) 
and new boron content measurements, opting for 
a new type of fuel and modifications relating to 
the water chemistry of the reactor coolant system. 
New requirements were set for power supply dur-
ing the annual maintenance outage and for reactor 
power measurement. STUK has approved eight 
amendments. One amendment is currently being 
assessed.
The power company applied for permission 
from STUK for seven planned deviations from the 
Technical Specifications. Two of these related to 
fault repairs, two to the change of mode of plant op-
eration during fault repair in annual maintenance, 
and three to the I&C upgrade. STUK approved 
six applications because the deviations had no 
significant safety implications for the safety of the 
plant or the environment. One of the applications 
was not approved by STUK because the deviation 
application concerned I&C upgrade-related work 
which STUK had not approved yet.
In 2009, five events in addition to the approved 
deviations took place at the plant during which 
the plant was not in a state compliant with the 
Technical Specifications. The events had no signifi-
cant safety implications for the nuclear or radia-
tion safety of the power plant.
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Operation and operational events
Plant operation has been systematic and safe. No 
events with significant safety implications took 
place in plant operation. Six exceptional events 
were reported and one event classified as an opera-
tional transient took place. During the year, there 
were no events resulting in a reactor trip.
In 2009, the risks caused by the detected com-
ponent malfunctions, preventive maintenance and 
other events at the Loviisa plant were about 4.3% 
and about 3.0% of the expected value of the an-
nual accident risk calculated using the plant’s risk 
model for Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, respectively. The 
values are slightly higher than in 2008, but of the 
Operation and operational events
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 96%, while that 
of Loviisa 2 was 95.4%. One event was classified 
as operational transient (indicator A.II.1). The 
production losses due to failures (indicator A.I.g)
were small at both plants. The most significant 
event was an oil leak in the motor of the main cool-
ant pump observed on 12 January 2009. It was 
repaired during the period from 17 to 19 January 
2009.
At Loviisa 2, a fire occurred in the electrical 
supply unit of the emergency feedwater pump dur-
ing annual maintenance. On 13 September 2009, 
the personnel noticed smoke coming from the 
400 V switchgear. The electrical supply unit of the 
emergency feedwater pump was identified as the 
source of smoke. After that, the switchgear power 
was cut off and the fire was extinguished by the 
fire brigade. The emergency feedwater pump was 
switched off from the main switch for the duration 
of maintenance, as planned. Incorrect wiring of 
the pump main switch resulted in the power sup-
ply contactor coil overheating and catching fire. 
The wiring had been modified in 2006 when the 
main switch was replaced with a new type.
At Loviisa 2, the throttles restricting the 
flow in the triggering network of aerial trigger 
valves of the fire extinguishing system of the tur-
bine were found to be of the wrong size. It was 
found in conjunction with testing the sprinkler 
alarms of the turbine lubrication oil tank that 
the regional sprinkler triggering valve does not 
trigger automatically or become re-activated after 
forced triggering. Because of this fault, local fire 
extinguishing at the lubrication oil tank would 
probably have failed to operate. The regional trig-
ger valve was opened and the throttle of the trigger 
network was also inspected. The inspection re-
vealed that the throttle diameter was 6 mm when 
it should have been 3 mm. After this discovery, 
all regional trigger valves in sprinkler system of 
the turbine lubrication oil tanks of Loviisa 2 were 
inspected, and three examples of too large throttles 
were found. The throttles were replaced and the 
systems were successfully tested. 
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
Figure 7. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa 
plant in 2009.
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Figure 6. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
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same order of magnitude as in the early 2000s.  A 
few individual component malfunctions and the 
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preventive maintenance of the subsystems of the 
auxiliary feed water system were the most signifi-
cant in terms of accident risk. Eight of the 15 most 
significant failures in terms of risk concerned air 
conditioning. STUK will investigate the air condi-
tioning system failures during 2010.
Annual maintenance outages
Annual maintenance at the Loviisa plant units 
was carried out safely and all maintenance work 
was completed in the planned scope. At the Loviisa 
power plant, special attention has been paid to work 
planning and induction training of contractors. The 
most important event during annual maintenance 
was that one absorber rod was not transferred 
to the reactor during refuelling at Loviisa 1. The 
missing absorber was detected during the inspec-
tion performed after refuelling. The absorber was 
not transferred because of a human error which 
occurred during refuelling. The missing absorber 
was mounted. The event was examined with the 
personnel before refuelling at Loviisa 2 and it was 
ensured that a similar event would not occur.
STUK used a total of 237 person days for over-
seeing the annual maintenance outages. In addition, 
two resident inspectors worked regularly on site.
4.1.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
No significant failures were observed during the 
year in the plant’s safety functions nor in the sys-
tems, equipment and structures executing them.
In conjunction with assessment of international 
operational events, the Loviisa power plant became 
aware of the fact that, in certain situations, air 
can be sucked into the emergency injection system 
pumps from the emergency injection water tank. 
When the pumps are running, the water level in 
the tank drops and a vortex can develop above 
the intake pipe leading to the pumps. Air can be 
sucked from this vortex into the piping leading to 
the pumps. Air in a pump reduces the pump’s ca-
pacity and can cause damage to the pump. In order 
to solve the problem at the Loviisa power plant, 
plates were installed in the injection water tanks 
above the pump intake pipes. When the tank water 
level drops, these plates prevent vortex develop-
ment and air suction into the piping. Plates were 
installed on both units during the 2009 annual 
maintenance outage.
During the 2009 annual maintenance outage at 
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 1 
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 1 was a short re-
fuelling outage. The plant unit was shut down for 
annual maintenance on 23 August 2009 and con-
nected back to the national grid on 9 September 
2009.
The main focus during the outage was on 
refuelling and its associated dismantling and 
reassembly work. Extra work was caused during 
the outage by the problems surfacing in refuelling 
and the related diagnostic work. The gripper of the 
refuelling machine jammed during the refuelling 
operation. The gripper had to be detached from 
the new fuel bundle using special procedures after 
which the gripper had to be replaced. Inspection of 
the gripper mechanism revealed signs of wear and 
shear in the gripping surfaces; these had prevented 
the mechanism from operating properly.
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 2 
Loviisa 2 had a short refuelling outage. The out-
age began on 12 September 2009 and ended on 30 
September 2009. A fuel leak had been detected at 
Loviisa 2 during the operating cycle which is why 
all fuel in the reactor was inspected. The search for 
the leaking bundle went according to plan during 
the refuelling operation. The leak was found to be 
in a fuel bundle that had been in the reactor for 
two years. This bundle was replaced during the 
annual maintenance. 
The most extensive modification work com-
prised the installation work of the first phase 
of the I & C system revision project (the LARA 
project) at the Loviisa plant and the commission-
ing of the control automation of reactor control 
rods. The work was successful as it was possible to 
utilise the experience gained from the 2008 annual 
maintenance of Loviisa 1. The plates preventing 
the vortex phenomenon were also installed in the 
inlet pipe of the emergency injection water tank at 
Loviisa 2.
A small leak was detected in the sealing water 
line of one main coolant pump during plant start-
up. In addition, a fault was detected in the diesel 
engine when the emergency diesel generator was 
being tested. The leak in the main coolant pump 
sealing water line and the diesel engine fault were 
rectified before continuing the start-up procedure. 
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Loviisa 1, fuel assemblies of a new type were load-
ed into the reactor. In these assemblies, burnable 
absorber (Gd2O3) has been added to six fuel rods. 
The uranium enrichment level is higher in the new 
fuel, which has a bearing on the reactor shutdown 
margin. With a view to ensuring the reactor shut-
down margin, Fortum suggested tighter control rod 
position limits. STUK approved the changes.
At the end of 2008, STUK requested the Loviisa 
power plant present an analysis of the effects of 
long periods of undervoltage in the grid on the 
power plant’s equipment. The request was based 
on the calculations made for the Oskarshamn 
power plant, according to which it is possible that 
the pump motors of safety systems overheat in an 
undervoltage situation. The analysis was delayed 
until early 2010. Similar analyses have been pre-
pared before, and this new one is mainly intended 
to chart the current situation of plants.
4.1.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
No significant faults or signs of wear were detected 
during 2009 in the integrity of equipment or struc-
tures critical to plant safety. The follow-up of flaws 
detected earlier in the integrity of structures con-
tinued during annual maintenance. A small fuel 
leak was detected at both units. They are insignifi-
cant for the radiation safety of the environment, 
because the leaked radioactive substances were 
contained in the primary circuit and inside the 
containment. Because of the malfunctions detected 
in the emergency diesel generators and the scant 
stock of their spare parts and the poor availability 
of parts, STUK required the power company to 
prepare a reliability analysis and to secure the pro-
curement procedure for critical spare parts.
In earlier years, cracks have been detected in 
the seal slots of the flange faces of reactor pres-
sure vessels at both Loviisa plant units. The deep-
est cracks have been repaired by welding. The 
inspections at Loviisa 1 indicated that the earlier 
detected fault indications have not increased sub-
stantially; new ones were not detected. Two new 
indications were observed at Loviisa 2 in dye pen-
etrant tests. The earlier detected fault indications 
have not increased substantially. In addition, one 
seal out of four successive seals was out of its slot 
by a distance of 600 mm. The current plan is to re-
condition the seal faces at Loviisa 1 in 2010 and at 
Loviisa 2 in 2012.
A fuel leak was detected at Loviisa 2 in 
November 2008 releasing small amounts of fission 
products into the reactor coolant. Analyses indi-
cated that this is probably a case of a minor leak 
in one fuel rod. The leak has been monitored at the 
plant through normal routines by on-line measure-
ment of the gamma activity of the reactor coolant 
and sampling by the laboratory. The radioactivity 
of the fission products dissolved in water remained 
stable during the whole operating cycle, which in-
dicated that the fuel leak did not increase during 
operation. All the fuel assemblies in the reactor 
were inspected during the 2009 annual mainte-
nance outage at Loviisa 2. One leaking fuel rod was 
found. The fuel assembly with the leaking rod was 
removed from the reactor.
Slightly increased activity concentrations were 
detected in the reactor coolant water at Loviisa 1 
in October 2009, which indicated a fuel leak. The 
fuel leak was small and has not increased since it 
was detected. The plant monitors the leak by water 
analyses of the reactor coolant at regular intervals. 
Because of the fuel leak, all fuel assemblies in the 
reactor will be inspected during the 2010 annual 
maintenance of Loviisa 1, and the fuel assembly 
with the leaking rod will be removed from the reac-
tor.
In conjunction with its inspections and regula-
tory activities, STUK has called attention to the 
numerous failures of the emergency diesel genera-
tors and the scant stock of their spare parts and 
the poor availability of parts. In October, STUK re-
quested Fortum prepare a report on the issue. The 
power company submitted the reliability analyses 
of the diesel generators and their risk-significance, 
data on major failures for the last four years, and 
an account of the spare parts stock of critical com-
ponents. According to the reliability analysis no 
significant change has taken place in usability or 
reliability. The power company will start procure-
ment of some of the critical spare parts because 
certain spare parts have a long delivery time. 
In order to verify the functionality of the engine 
manufacturer’s quality system and the availability 
of spare parts, the power company will conduct an 
audit of said manufacturer’s quality system and 
delivery capacity in early 2010.
The periodic inspections of registered pressure 
equipment were implemented according to plans 
for both plant units. There were 33 inspections at 
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Loviisa 1 and 19 at Loviisa 2. Because the pressure 
equipment to be inspected belongs to safety classes 
3, 4 and EYT, the inspections were carried out by 
an inspection organisation. STUK oversaw the op-
erations of the inspection organisation.
4.1.5 Development of the plant and its safety
The first round of modifications for the I&C 
upgrade were carried out at Loviisa 2
Fortum will revise the I&C systems controlling 
the systems and equipment of both plant units in 
Loviisa. The control rooms of the plant will also 
be re-equipped in stages. The power company has 
changed the stage designation of the revision from 
four to three stages, which will be implemented 
mainly during annual maintenance outages.
The upgrade involves replacing the control, 
steering, protection and detection systems imple-
mented using conventional hard-wired technology 
with software-based technology. The modification 
also applies to the control room interfaces, where 
screen-based control is introduced as the main 
method. The intention is to keep most of the exist-
ing field instrumentation unchanged. During the 
first phase of the I&C upgrade, part of the I&C 
system controlling and limiting reactor power and 
its control room user interface were re-equipped 
during the annual maintenance outage at Loviisa 
2. According to the inspections carried out by 
the power company and STUK, the modifications 
turned out well.
The reliability of I&C functions against internal 
and external hazards will be improved by improv-
ing the independence of redundant functions or 
back-up functions. Two new buildings have been 
built for both plant units to accommodate the 
new systems. The main supplier of I&C systems 
is a consortium formed by Areva NP GmbH and 
Siemens AG. They also perform the installation 
work.
The second stage of the I&C upgrade at Lovii-
sa 1 is due to be implemented 2010–2012. Due to 
the new stage designation, stage two has been ex-
tended by accident management functions from the 
former stage three. These modifications concerning 
higher safety classes will be implemented at the 
same stage. This will reduce the number of tempo-
rary connections between the old and new I&C sys-
tems. Modifications concerning lower safety classes 
will be implemented in the third stage.
Construction and commissioning of a 
liquid waste solidification facility
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. 
The solidification facility processes the radioactive 
evaporation residues generated at the power plant 
and the radioactive ion exchange resins from the 
purification filters. Prior to commissioning the so-
lidification facility, a test programme will be car-
ried out and approved to ensure that the solidifica-
tion facility systems function as planned. The tests 
are to ensure, among other things, the functioning 
of the I&C system, the correctness and adequa-
cy of the information transmitted by the process 
measurement devices, and waste package activity 
determination. The power company initiated the 
commissioning phase of the solidification facility 
construction project (LOKIT) during 2006 by carry-
ing out system- and plant-level tests using inactive 
substances. STUK approved in 2008 the results of 
the pre-operational tests carried out using radioac-
tive evaporation residues.
The power company started pre-operational 
tests using radioactive resin waste in May 2009. 
The pre-operational tests were not approved be-
cause the level measurement of the proportioning 
tank did not operate reliably. The pre-operational 
tests with resin waste will continue in 2010 after 
the level measurement is fixed and operates as 
required.
Pressure equipment manufacturers, and 
inspection and testing organisations 
STUK approved, pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, one manufacturer of nuclear pressure vessels 
for the Loviisa plants on application by the Loviisa 
power plant of Fortum Power and Heat Oy.
In addition, STUK approved, on application 
by the Loviisa power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy and pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, 
four testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures. Testing operatives from two different 
testing organisations were approved to carry out 
periodic tests of mechanical equipment and struc-
tures pursuant to YVL 3.8. 
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Modification of storage, waste 
and repair shop facilities
Low- and intermediate-level waste management at 
the Loviisa power plant will be improved by intro-
ducing centralised facilities for waste processing, 
activity determination and interim storage. The cur-
rent machine and electrical repair shops in the non-
controlled area will be converted to these purposes. 
These shops will be moved to a new building. This 
new building was completed in 2009 and renovation 
work in the existing power plant facilities moved 
ahead. The new waste management facilities are 
due to be commissioned in 2010.
4.1.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
STUK inspected, in accordance with the periodic 
inspection programme, the low- and intermedi-
ate-level waste management and final disposal of 
waste materials at the Loviisa power plant. The in-
spection of reactor waste management focused on 
the situation of the construction and reorganisa-
tion project for the storage, waste and repair shop 
facilities, the arrangements at the liquid waste so-
lidification facility, waste accounting, organisation 
and instructions. The inspection concerning the 
final disposal facility for low- and intermediate-
level waste focused on the maintenance procedures 
for the concrete and rock structures of the final 
disposal facility. No significant issues with safety 
implications requiring rectification were observed 
in the inspections.
The processing, storage and final disposal of 
low- and intermediate-level waste (so-called op-
erating waste) at the Loviisa power plant were 
carried out as planned. No events with safety im-
plications for the safety of the power plant or the 
environment took place. The volume and activity 
of low- and intermediate-level waste in relation to 
generated electrical power remained relatively low 
compared with most other countries. Contributing 
factors include the high quality requirements for 
nuclear waste management and nuclear fuel, the 
planning of maintenance and repair operations, 
decontamination, component and process modi-
fications, as well as waste monitoring and sort-
ing, which enable some of the waste with a very 
low radioactive substance content to be cleared 
from control. In 2009, quantities of maintenance 
waste below the activity limits and scrap metal 
were cleared from control at the power plant, with 
STUK’s approval. In addition, the power plant em-
ploys efficient procedures for reducing the volume 
of waste subject to final disposal.
It was not possible to complete the pre-opera-
tional tests of the liquid waste solidification facility 
in 2009 (see 4.1.5), which is also why the commis-
sioning of the underground repository was put off.
A couple of minor groundwater seepages have 
been present in the repository ceiling. During the 
periodic inspection carried out by STUK in june, 
a new, larger groundwater seepage was detected. 
Fortum undertook to monitor it. The chemical 
properties of groundwater can be detrimental for 
the long-term safety of final disposal. During the 
filling of the repository, groundwater seepage will 
be controlled so that water will not come into con-
tact with the disposed of waste.
In 2009, Fortum installed high-density fuel 
racks in one storage pool of the spent fuel interim 
storage, which increased the storage capacity by 
444 positions. At the end of 2009 the power plant 
had spent fuel storage capacity for 5,854 fuel as-
semblies. It is necessary that one of the storage 
pools can be drained if needed, which restricts the 
number of fuel assemblies to be stored to 4,881 as-
semblies.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
STUK reviewed the documents on the financial 
provision made for the costs of nuclear waste man-
agement referred to in Section 90 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and submitted statements on them 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
In its statement, STUK assessed the technical 
plans and cost estimates on which the financial 
provision is based. Fortum’s extent of liability is 
€913 million at 2009 prices. A total of €44.1 million 
Volumes of nuclear waste
The volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site 
at the Loviisa power plant at the end of 2009 
was 3,961 assemblies (477 tU), an increase of 
192 assemblies (23 tU). The volume of low- and 
intermediate-level waste was 3,180 m3 at the end 
of 2009. The total increase of volume from 2008 is 
30 m3. Approximately 62% of the waste has been 
finally disposed of.
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has been reserved for regulatory oversight costs. 
Fortum’s share of this sum is €189 million.
Decommissioning plan for 
Loviisa power plant
Fortum submitted an updated decommissioning 
plan for the Loviisa power plant to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy at the end of 2008. 
STUK reviewed the plan in 2009, and submitted a 
statement on them to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy. The plan is based on the assump-
tion that both Loviisa power plant units will be 
closed after 50 years of operation in 2027 and 2030. 
Decommissioning will start immediately after the 
closing and it will last until 2035. A spent fuel 
storage facility will remain on the plant site until 
all spent fuel has been transported to the final dis-
posal facility now under construction in Olkiluoto. 
It has been estimated that the cost of decommis-
sioning will be €312 million at late 2008 prices. 
The amount of work is about 2,955 person years. 
The volume of waste for final disposal will amount 
to about 27,800 m³. In STUK’s opinion, the decom-
missioning plan is sufficiently comprehensive and 
detailed at this point.
Other plans for nuclear waste management
In accordance with Section 74 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, Fortum submitted a report on the plans for 
the implementation of nuclear waste management 
activities to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy at the end of September. The report con-
tains a detailed plan for the next three years and 
a general account of the measures planned for the 
next six years. The detailed plan covers the period 
at the end of which those liable for waste manage-
ment are prepared to submit a construction per-
mit application for a disposal facility. The Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy requested that 
STUK issue a statement on the material by the end 
of September 2010. The statement will be prepared 
in connection with the processing of preliminary 
construction permit materials for Posiva’s disposal 
facility.
4.1.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that, with a view to 
ensuring safety, the Loviisa power plant organisa-
tion has operated in a systematic and development-
oriented way. Modifications aimed at improving 
safety have been implemented in plant systems, 
structures and equipment, and in the organisa-
tion’s operations as well. The Loviisa power plant 
builds up its personnel’s competence and it has 
started to evaluate the effectiveness of the training 
courses provided at the power plant. The procedure 
for evaluating the organisation’s function has been 
developed so that more personnel participate in 
self-assessment. The current evaluation procedure 
covers human resources and safety culture issues.
Regulatory activities also revealed needs for 
development in plant management. In order to as-
certain that development programmes and projects 
are successfully completed, the availability of suf-
ficient human resources should be ensured at 
the planning stage. Attention should be paid to 
timely and effective closing of open deviations and 
corrective actions. Induction and basic training 
programmes for personnel and subcontractors are 
in place, but it is essential to ensure that they are 
carried out as planned. In particular it must be 
ensured that adequately in-depth radiation protec-
tion training materials and training programmes 
for different professions are available. As more 
and more outside services and products are used 
in maintenance and modification work, regulatory 
procedures concerning procurement and subcon-
tractors must be further developed. The target-
ing and scope of internal inspections, which are a 
fundamental part of the verification of the man-
agement system’s functioning, must be assessed 
at Loviisa with a view to ensuring the review of 
different areas in the long term. The Loviisa power 
plant has prepared plans for improving its func-
tions regarding the detected development needs; 
STUK will follow the realisation of the plans.
The Safety and Technology units at the Loviisa 
power plant were restructured in 2009. The li-
censee conducted safety related assessments of 
the restructuring which was submitted to STUK. 
As a result of the assessment and its evaluation, 
it was stated that the changes do not deteriorate 
the operating capability of the plant organisation. 
Furthermore, significant organisational restruc-
turing and personnel changes took place in Fortum 
Power & Heat Oy’s nuclear energy functions in 
autumn 2009. The changes aimed to improve the 
organisation’s efficiency and clarify profit respon-
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sibility, as well as simplifying the organisational 
structure. These changes did not have any direct 
effect on the organisational structure of the Loviisa 
power plant but they did clarify, among other 
things, the plant’s procurement activities and the 
use of resources by Technical Support (formerly 
Fortum Nuclear Services). The most important per-
sonnel change was the transfer of the responsible 
manager of the Loviisa power plant to another po-
sition in the Fortum Group and the appointment of 
a new responsible manager from the power plant’s 
safety unit.
STUK participated in examinations of shift per-
sonnel where the operators working in the control 
rooms prove that they are conversant with all sali-
ent matters related to plant operation and safety. 
STUK approved 15 operator licences in 2009.
4.1.8 Operating experience feedback
Regarding operating experience feedback, STUK 
evaluated the investigation methods applied for 
Loviisa power plant events. According to STUK’s 
evaluation, the power company has handled techni-
cal issues well, but there is scope for improvement 
in dealing with human and organisational fac-
tors, and in making good use of the events. During 
2009, the Loviisa power plant elaborated its proce-
dures and created new ways to investigate events. 
Operating event reports have been assessed by a 
cross-scientific working group consisting of experts 
from different units of the organisation. A root cause 
analysis was performed on three events. Towards 
the end of 2009, the power plant unit responsible for 
operating experience feedback enhanced its exper-
tise in human and organisational factors.
Procedures for utilising international operating 
experience feedback were checked for functioning 
with the aid of events from abroad which STUK 
had selected in advance. Based on the check it 
could be stated that the utilisation of foreign op-
erating event reports had further improved. The 
amount of reports reviewed, (IRS reports in par-
ticular) has been increased by means of changes 
in screening and operating models, and adding 
resources. Fortum itself conducts pre-screening of 
the reports coming from various sources, mainly 
via the IRS system maintained by WANO and 
IAEA/NEA. The selection criterion for events to 
be taken to the International operating experience 
team is their safety significance for the Loviisa 
power plant. The most significant events for the 
plant are those from similar power plants; they are 
always assessed.
4.1.9 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and environment
Occupational radiation safety
In the autumn of 2009, STUK carried out a radia-
tion protection inspection according to the periodic 
inspection programme at the Loviisa plant, focus-
ing on occupational dosimetric surveillance and 
radiation measurements in particular. Based on 
the inspection, it was stated that dosimetric sur-
veillance functions in an acceptable way and in 
accordance with the power plant’s quality system 
instructions. STUK required a separate report to 
be prepared on the results of the surface doses 
(skin dose) reported to STUK’s Dose Register for 
the 2009 annual maintenance outage because the 
dosimeter’s surface dose reporting included a calcu-
lation error. The Loviisa power plant corrected the 
factor that had caused the calculation error and 
submitted correct surface dose results to STUK’s 
Dose Register. On the basis of the reports, it could 
be stated that the deviations had no effect on the 
employees’ health.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protec-
tion inspections during the annual maintenances 
at both plant units in Loviisa. In the inspections, 
STUK assessed the radiation protection person-
nel’s operations and radiation protection methods. 
At the same time, the operations of employees in 
radiation work were assessed. It was concluded 
that radiation protection at the plant units mainly 
functions well. During the inspections it was con-
cluded that, in order to cut down radiation doses, 
It was detected at Loviisa 1 in April 2009 
that one of the two flow meters at the plant unit 
vent stack for exhaust air had been showing low 
flow rate values smaller than the actual flow since 
2006. The meter was repaired. Due to the incorrect 
reading of the flow sensor, the values which had 
been reported for the atmospheric emissions from 
Loviisa during 2006–2008 were too low. During 
that period, the emission figures had been about 
five per cent too low compared to the corrected 
readings.
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the plant should still increase task-specific practi-
cal training before starting actual radiation work. 
This concerns all work areas with a high annual 
employee turnover rate. Further, in order to cut 
down radiation doses, tools and working methods 
should be designed to ensure smooth and trouble-
free work.
In order to ensure employees’ radiation safety, 
sufficient human resources in the radiation protec-
tion unit are fundamental. The Loviisa power plant 
should pay attention to this issue, in particular in 
annual maintenance outages, which are demanding 
in terms of radiation protection, so that unforeseen 
and exceptional situations can be appropriately 
taken into account in work arrangements.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 0.42 
manSv at Loviisa 1, and 0.34 manSv at Loviisa 2. 
According to STUK guidelines, the limit value for 
one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over two 
successive years is 2.5 manSv per gigawatt of net 
electrical power. This means a collective dose value 
of 1.22 manSv per Loviisa plant unit. This limit 
value was not exceeded at either plant unit.
The aggregate collective dose of the Loviisa 
plant units was the second smallest among the 
doses during the operation of the plant. The col-
lective occupational radiation doses at the Loviisa 
plant units were lower than the average of PWRs 
in OECD countries in 2009. Taking into account 
the scope of the annual maintenance, the radiation 
doses have continued to decrease since 2001.
Occupational radiation doses of NPP workers 
mostly accumulate in work carried out during an-
nual maintenance outages. The collective radiation 
dose due to operations during the outage at Loviisa 
1 was 0.38 manSv, and the collective radiation dose 
due to operations during the outage at Loviisa 2 
was 0.28 manSv. The highest individual radiation 
dose incurred during the outage amounted to 6.51 
mSv at Loviisa 1, and to 6.99 mSv at Loviisa 2. The 
highest aggregate radiation dose was 8.45 mSv.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants in 2009 is given in Appendix 2.
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Figure 8. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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Figure 9. Annual radiation doses to the critical groups since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. Over the recent years, the doses to the critical groups has remained below one percent of the set limit, 
0.1 milliSv.
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Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
The Finnish Meteorological Institute submitted to 
STUK a statement raising the issue of whether the 
monitoring devices of the Loviisa weather mast are 
up to date. The Finnish Meteorological Institute 
states that the current weather monitoring meth-
ods do not represent the best available technology. 
The stability of air, which is used in calculating 
the dispersion of radioactive substances, should be 
determined using ultrasonic measuring technology 
measuring wind turbulence. Present determination 
is based on temperature differences measured be-
tween different heights on the weather mast. The 
method based on temperature measurements is not 
precise enough for determining air flow stability. 
STUK has earlier required the Loviisa plant to as-
sess not only the development of the weather mast 
system on-site, but also that of off-site real-time 
additional measurements and the related predic-
tive models with regard to the spread of any atmos-
pheric releases. STUK, the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute and the power company have continued 
to investigate the issue. STUK granted Fortum an 
extension of time until the end of 2011 to prepare a 
conceptual design plan completing the areal scope 
of the Loviisa weather measurement system.
The external radiation monitoring network of 
the Loviisa NPP surroundings was implemented in 
the 1990s. With the exception of occasional failures 
it has functioned well, but with regard to the preci-
sion of its measurements and external data trans-
mission, it is not as good as the equipment of the 
upgraded national radiation monitoring network. 
In its inspection, STUK required that Fortum 
should consider possible upgrade of the monitoring 
network.
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant were well below 
authorised annual limits in 2009. Releases of radi-
oactive noble gases into the air were approximately 
8.0 TBq, which is approximately 0.04% of the au-
thorised limit. The releases of radioactive noble 
gases were dominated by argon-41, i.e. the activa-
tion product of argon-40, in the air space between 
the reactor pressure vessel and the main concrete 
shield. The releases of radioactive iodine isotopes 
into the air were about 26.3 MBq, i.e. approximate-
ly 0.01% of the authorised limit. The emissions 
through the vent stack also included radioactive 
particulate matter amounting to 122 MBq, tritium 
amounting to 0.4 TBq and carbon-14 amounting to 
approximately 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, 21 TBq, was less than 14% of the 
release limit. The total activity of other nuclides 
released into the sea was about 1.8 GBq, which is 
0.2% of the plant location-specific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.45 µSv per annum, i.e. less than 0.5% of 
the set limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). The av-
erage person living in Finland receives the equiva-
lent radiation dose from natural and spatial radia-
tion sources in about three and a half hours.
A total of 280 samples were collected and ana-
lysed from the terrestrial and aquatic environment 
surrounding the Loviisa power plant during 2009. 
External background radiation and the exposure 
to radioactivity of people in the surroundings are 
also measured regularly. Extremely small amounts 
of radioactive substances originating in the nuclear 
power plant have been observed in some of the ana-
lysed environmental samples. The amounts are so 
small that they are insignificant in terms of people’s 
radiation exposure.
4.1.10 Emergency preparedness
STUK monitors the readiness of the organisations 
operating nuclear power plants to act in abnor-
Table 3. Radioactive nuclides found in 2009 in the environmental samples in Loviisa, originating from the Loviisa 
power plant.
Type of sample
Number of environmental samples containing radionuclides originating from the NPP 
(several different nuclides may be found in the same sample)
H-3 Mn-54 Co-58 Co-60 Ag-110m Te-123m Sb-124
Fallout – – – 6 2 – –
Aquatic plants – – 1 4 3 1 2
Sedimenting materials – 1 – 4 1 – –
Seawater 5 – – – – – –
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mal situations. No such situations occurred at the 
Loviisa power plant in 2009.
The emergency preparedness arrangements at 
the Loviisa power plant fulfil the key requirements; 
this was established during emergency prepared-
ness inspections as part of the periodic inspection 
programme. The objects of inspection included the 
commissioning of the re-organised preparedness 
premises and related training and exercises during 
the spring of 2009, revision of the content and struc-
ture of the emergency response instructions and 
securing of connections used for plant data transfer 
during preparedness situations. A national rescue 
exercise at the Loviisa power plant was rescheduled 
from November 2009 as the authorities prepared for 
the H1N1 epidemic. The exercise will be carried out 
in early 2010. A personnel mustering exercise was 
organised at the Loviisa power plant on 4 December 
2009. The aim of the exercise was to test the loud-
speaker system and the personnel’s operations in 
an evacuation situation. Both nuclear power plants 
also organise fire training and drills, with the fire 
brigade of the plant and the fire and rescue services 
of the surrounding municipalities participating.
The Loviisa power plant, STUK and Eastern 
Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services maintain pre-
paredness for the eventuality of a nuclear accident 
at Loviisa. A training programme for the members 
of the preparedness team was launched in 2009 by 
organising visits to the sites and presentations on 
the actors’ tasks and co-operation in a nuclear ac-
cident.
4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
A comprehensive safety assessment of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant was made during the year as 
STUK reviewed the periodic safety review submit-
ted by TVO at the end of 2008. The assessment is 
required in the terms and conditions of the operat-
ing licence valid until 31 December 2018. Based 
on the examination of the periodic safety review, 
STUK stated that the safety of the nuclear power 
plant units is at a sufficient level and that the 
practices employed by the licensee are adequate to 
enable continuous operational safety.
In addition to examining the periodic safety 
review, STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto 
power plant and assessed its organisation and per-
sonnel’s competence in different areas by means 
of reviewing materials provided by the licensee, 
carrying out inspections in line with the periodic 
inspection programme and by overseeing operation 
at the plant. On the basis of this regulatory over-
sight STUK can state that plant operation did not 
cause a radiation hazard to the workers, popula-
tion or environment. Occupational radiation doses 
and radioactive releases into the environment were 
low and clearly below the prescribed limits. The li-
censee has operated the Olkiluoto power plant in a 
safe manner and in compliance with YVL Guides.
According to the tests and inspections carried 
out, the condition of the fuel, containment and 
primary circuit which prevent the release of ra-
dioactive materials into the environment are in 
compliance with requirements. No fuel leaks have 
occurred at the power plant in 2009.
Plant operation has been systematic and in 
compliance with the Technical Specifications and 
guidelines. During the year, there were no events 
resulting in a reactor trip. Three exceptional events 
with safety implications were reported. The most 
significant events in 2009 included the isolation 
valve actuator failures which deteriorated the 
reliability of the main steam lines shut-off, and 
the jamming of a spent fuel element in the refuel-
ling machine when transfering fuel during annual 
maintenance.
During the year, several modifications were 
implemented for plant safety improvement. A so-
called outage building was built between the plant 
units. This improved access to the controlled areas 
of the units and occupational radiation measure-
ments.  The replacement of the shutdown cool-
ing system’s inner isolation valves which start-
ed in 2006 was completed when the last valve 
was replaced during the annual maintenance of 
Olkiluoto 2. Continuing multi-year projects in-
cluded the upgrading and repair of the fine screen-
ing units in the seawater screening system, and 
the renewal of the plant radiation measurement 
systems. The latter also included the renewal of 
measurements related to the control of releases 
into the sea. TVO also made preparations for an 
extensive upgrade starting in 2010 in which the 
inner isolation valves on the main steam lines will 
be replaced, among other things.
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Thanks to the new steam dryers, the radiation 
levels in the turbine building have decreased, and 
this has also reduced the occupational radiation 
doses of turbine plant workers. Emergency prepar-
edness at the Olkiluoto power plant is in compli-
ance with requirements.
STUK reviewed the decommissioning plan for 
the Olkiluoto power plant based on the assump-
tion that both Olkiluoto power plant units will be 
closed after 60 years of operation in 2038 and 2040. 
Decommissioning will start 30 years after the ter-
mination of monitored storage. In its statement 
submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, STUK concluded that the decommission-
ing of the power plant and provisions for it can be 
implemented on the basis of the plan.
In the inspection of management and safety 
culture, STUK noted that among the results of 
the safety culture survey which TVO conducted 
at the end of 2008, strengths such as the person-
nel’s motivation and sense of responsibility could 
be demonstrated. Areas for development include 
ensuring competence, handling of personnel’s wor-
ries related to safety and project management in 
modifications.
As there is a generation change going on in 
TVO’s organisation, STUK has stressed in its in-
spections the importance of work induction and 
ensuring competence. It was required in the in-
spection of human resources that TVO must assess 
the competence assurance activities as a whole and 
draw up a development plan to make the activities 
more systematic and to improve quality.
Periodic safety review of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units
The operating licence for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units is valid until 31 December 2018. According 
to the licence conditions, the licensee must carry 
out an intermediate safety assessment covering 
the Olkiluoto NPP by the end of 2008. Since the 
operating licence was granted, STUK has revised 
the Guide YVL 1.1, which sets out more detailed 
requirements regarding the contents of periodic 
safety reviews. The purpose of the assessment pre-
pared by the licensee is to ensure that the plant 
has been operated safely during the current oper-
ating licence period and that the licensee has fore-
seen the status of plant safety and its development 
during the remaining licence period.
TVO submitted its assessment to STUK for 
review at the end of 2008. STUK’s reviewing work 
was based on the inspections of matters and docu-
ments related to the periodic safety review, as well 
as the results of continuous regulatory oversight. 
The key areas for review comprised aging manage-
ment, plant safety, safety analyses, issues related 
to plant operation and the safety culture, as well as 
environmental and nuclear waste-related issues. 
STUK presented to TVO the findings of the review 
and requests for further information in its deci-
sions of 27 February 2009 and 1 April 2009. TVO 
submitted further information to STUK during the 
spring and summer. STUK requested a statement 
from the Ministry of the Interior on emergency 
preparedness and physical protection, and a state-
ment from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Safety on STUK’s draft safety assessment.
STUK made a decision on the periodic safety 
review on 30 October 2009. The decision’s appen-
dices included the safety assessment, the review of 
documents according to section 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and the statement of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety. The decision ap-
proved the periodic safety review prepared by TVO 
as a safety review referred to in to the operating li-
cence condition of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units and in Guide YVL 1.1. STUK stated in 
its decision that the safety of the nuclear power 
plant units is sufficient and that the practices 
employed by the licensee are adequate to enable 
continuous operational safety.
The objective during the operation of Olkiluoto 
plant units 1 and 2 has been to continuously im-
prove plant safety. Substantial upgrades have been 
carried out at the plant units since their commis-
sioning, and extensive modifications have been im-
plemented in several systems in order to improve 
safety. Work for the improvement of plant safety 
will continue further during the current operating 
licence period. TVO has presented STUK with ac-
tion plans concerning the improvement areas iden-
tified in the course of the periodic safety review. 
In its decision, STUK imposes requirements for 
completing the action plans; the requirements are 
related to compliance with the requirements of the 
Government decrees that were revised in 2008 on 
nuclear plant safety and physical protection.
Regarding the revised decree on the safety 
of nuclear facilities, STUK stated that Olkiluoto 
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Operation and operational events
The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 97.0%, while that 
of Olkiluoto 2 was 95.1%. The annual maintenance 
outages caused the most significant reductions in the 
load factor. The outage at Olkiluoto 1 lasted for 8½ 
days, while that of Olkiluoto 2 lasted for 16½ days. 
The losses in gross energy output due to operational 
transients and component malfunctions were 0.29% 
at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.14% at Olkiluoto 2.
At Olkiluoto 1, the pump of the shutdown service 
water system stopped during periodic testing when 
the LED signal lamp indicating its operating status 
became faulty and caused a short-circuit in the pump 
control circuit. Similar pump tests are performed at 
four-week intervals but this was the first occurrence 
of any faults. 
At Olkiluoto 1, the testing of the isolation valve 
of the containment spray system using a portable die-
sel generator could not be successfully done during the 
periodic tests. The contactor installation plates had 
been replaced during annual maintenance in 2008 for 
the switchgear outputs controlling this isolation valve 
and three other valves. In that modification opera-
tion, two separate connectors on top of each other had 
been incorrectly connected together. This erroneous 
construction would have prevented opening the valves 
when supplied by a portable diesel generator. 
At Olkiluoto 1, malfunctions were observed in 
the outer isolation valves of the steam lines during 
tests carried out after annual maintenance. The mal-
functions were caused by a gear in the actuator open-
ing and closing the valve. It had failed due to fatigue 
from its long history of use. 
At Olkiluoto 2, the refuelling machine had a 
malfunction during annual maintenance when spent 
fuel was being transferred out of the reactor. The 
spent fuel element had already been lifted completely 
out of the reactor when an excessive need for lifting 
force triggered the overload limiter of the refuelling 
machine and prevented the lifting operation from be-
ing continued. It was found that the malfunction was 
caused by the compressed air hose of the refuelling 
machine jamming between the tubes of the telescopic 
mast of the refuelling machine.
At Olkiluoto 2, the actuator of strainers in the 
shutdown service water system failed during an-
nual maintenance. The actuator was replaced and the 
faulty device was inspected. Wear was detected in the 
planetary gear of the device which was found to be 
the reason for the malfunction. TVO will inspect all 
similar actuators during 2009–2010. Similar faults 
were not detected in inspections carried out by the end 
of 2009. 
The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 fulfil the re-
quirements set for operating facilities. The require-
ments presented in the decision were set by virtue 
of Section 7a of the Nuclear Energy Act and they 
call for continuous improvement. Among other 
things, the application of the diversity principle at 
the plant must be assessed again as a whole and 
TVO must prepare an action plan for its further 
development. For example, the residual heat re-
moval systems of the power plant units have not 
been designed in compliance with the diversity 
principle. Also, each subsystem of the reactor water 
level measurement system is based on the same 
measurement method. The risk of a common cause 
failure arising from the loss of the external power 
grid must also be reduced. Because of the revision 
of the decree on physical protection, STUK allowed 
a reasonable period of time during which the re-
quirements of the decree must be fulfilled in the 
power plant’s and TVO’s operations.
4.2.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Technical Specifications
The Technical Specifications of the Olkiluoto plant 
are up-to-date. TVO has initiated work for develop-
ing the Technical Specifications in order to improve 
their legibility and ease of use. In particular, the 
justifications for the conditions and requirements 
presented in the Technical Specifications will be de-
veloped, and the structure of the requirements part 
will be harmonised and clarified. The development 
plan was submitted to STUK for inspection as part 
of the periodic safety review. No situations were 
observed during the year in which the plant would 
have been in non-compliance with the Technical 
Specifications (Appendix 1, Indicator A.I.2).
The power company applied for permission from 
STUK for six planned deviations from the Technical 
Specifications (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). The 
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Table 4. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units subject to special reports by the power company. The table shows 
events due to which the plant unit was in non-compliance with the Technical Specifications. All events subject to 
reporting are discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1). Appendix 3 describes events subject to special reports in 
more detail.
Event Non-compliance with the 
Technical Specifications
Special 
report
INES 
rating
Stoppage of the pump of  the shutdown service water system as a result of 
signal lamp failure at Olkiluoto 1
• 1
Inoperability of an isolation valve in the containment vessel spray system when 
using an external diesel generator for power supply in a periodic test carried out 
at Olkiluoto 1
• 0
Malfunctions of the outer isolation valves of main steam lines at Olkiluoto 1 • 1
Jamming of the fuel transfer machine during transfers of spent fuel at 
Olkiluoto 2 •
1
Actuator faults in the strainers of shutdown service water systems • 0
Figure 10. IneS classified events at the Olkiluoto plant 
(IneS level 1 or higher).
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applications concerned moving the Olkiluoto 2 
containment leak test from 2009 to 2011, remov-
ing protection from the Olkiluoto 2 fuel transfer 
machine to enable repair work, inoperability of 
the radiation measurements controlling the liquid 
waste discharge line during the replacement of the 
equipment, preventing disturbances of the radioac-
tivity monitors of the Olkiluoto 2 main steam lines, 
and possible violation of the limit used for reactor 
core monitoring to ensure representative stability 
measurement. Since the planned deviations had 
no safety significance, STUK approved the applica-
tions except the postponement of the containment 
leak test. This deviation was not urgent yet, be-
cause according to the Technical Specifications the 
test can also be performed in 2010.
TVO submitted 18 amendment proposals of the 
Technical Specifications to STUK for approval, con-
cerning issues such as periodic testing, chemistry 
and power supply. STUK approved six amendment 
proposals as they were. Nine amendment proposals 
were approved partly or with additional require-
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 1 
The refuelling outage at Olkiluoto 1 took place 
between 3 May and 12 May 2009 and lasted for 
about 8½ days. During the outage, almost a quar-
ter of the fuel was replaced. No major maintenance 
or modification work took place. The intention was 
to replace the inner isolation valves of the main 
steam lines of the reactor during the 2010 outage 
which is why preparations were made for that 
modification during annual maintenance. These 
included replacement of the rails that are required 
for installing the valves.
Towards the end of annual maintenance opera-
tions, the water level in the reactor tank was low-
ered, following a misunderstanding, about one me-
tre lower than planned. The intention was to drain 
off washing water collected at the bottom of the 
reactor pool when the pool was being washed, but 
the draining was carried out erroneously by lower-
ing the water level in the reactor instead of using 
the draining line of the gutter at the bottom of the 
pool. When the layer of water on top of the fuel, 
intended for attenuating the radiation, became 
thinner, the radiation level at the bottom of the re-
actor pool increased. Fuel cooling was not at risk, 
but the persons working at the bottom of the pool 
received a minor dose of radiation (less than 0.5 
mSv/person). The malfunction was detected when 
the radiation meters produced an alarm, and the 
workers were asked to leave the pool. TVO will take 
this event into account for employee training and 
kick-off meetings for operations. 
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ments. Three amendment proposals were returned 
for further preparatory work.
Operation and operational events
Plant operation has been systematic and in compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications and guide-
lines. During the year, there were no events result-
ing in a reactor trip. The most significant events in 
2009 included the isolation valve actuator failures 
which could have prevented the valves from clos-
ing, and the jamming of a spent fuel element in the 
refuelling machine when transporting fuel during 
annual maintenance. Observations made in the 
operation-related inspections by STUK concerned 
issues such as the implementation and follow-up 
of corrective actions, cleanliness and order at the 
plant, and the marking of storage areas.
In 2009, the risk caused by the detected com-
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 2
The maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 took place be-
tween 13 and 30 May 2009 and lasted approximately 
16½ days. The outage lasted about 1½ days longer 
than planned. The delay was due to the inoperability 
of the fuel transfer machine. 
No major modernisation work was made to the 
plant during annual maintenance. One of the most 
extensive operations was that of replacing a valve 
in the shutdown cooling system with a new type. 
The new outage building improved access to the 
controlled areas and the radiation measurements of 
employees. 
The most significant observations regarding the 
integrity of equipment were the cracks found in the 
steam dryer and the damaged valve seals in the reac-
tor trip system. 
Figure 11. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 12. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto 
plant in 2009.
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ponent malfunctions, preventive maintenance and 
other events at the Olkiluoto 1 plant was 4.0%, and 
at the Olkiluoto 2 plant 5.4%, of the expected value 
of the annual accident risk calculated using the 
plant’s risk model. The events can be considered to 
be part of normal nuclear power plant operation, 
and they did not give rise to any further measures 
by STUK.
Annual maintenance outages
Annual maintenance ensures the preconditions for 
operating the power plant efficiently and safely 
during the next operating cycles. STUK oversaw 
the planning and implementation of annual main-
tenance by reviewing the documents required by 
the regulations, such as outage plans and modifi-
cation documentation, and by performing on-site 
inspections during annual maintenance. Based on 
its oversight, STUK determined that annual main-
tenance was safely implemented at the Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2 units.
According to STUK’s indicator, proportionally 
more exceptional events with safety implications 
take place or are observed during annual mainte-
nance than during power operation. The number of 
events is probably partly due to the fact that the 
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major part of annual inspection, repair and modi-
fication work is done during annual maintenance, 
which lasts for about a month.
STUK used a total of 212 person days for 
the regulatory oversight of the annual mainte-
nance outages. In addition, two resident inspectors 
worked regularly on site.
4.2.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
The reliability of plant safety functions was af-
fected by malfunctions observed in the steam line 
isolation valves. The function of the steam line iso-
lation valves is to shutdown the steam lines in an 
accident and to contain radioactive substances pos-
sibly released in the accident inside the contain-
ment. There are two successive isolation valves on 
the steam lines. The malfunction of the outer isola-
tion valve on the main steam line at Olkiluoto 1 
was caused by a gear on the actuator opening and 
closing the valve. The gear was broken by fatigue 
resulting from long use. All these gear units were 
replaced at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and incipi-
ent cracks caused by material fatigue were detected 
on some of the removed gears. STUK required that 
TVO investigate by the end of 2009 whether the 
gear dimensioning is sufficient for maintaining the 
gear undamaged in long-lasting continuous opera-
tion, or whether the damage was due to insufficient 
strength of material caused by a manufacturing 
defect. The malfunction did not cause any direct 
hazard to the environment; yet in certain accidents 
it could have had an impact on the leaktightness of 
the containment. The significance of the malfunc-
tion was increased by the fact that cracks were 
detected on the gears of several valves.
In Sweden, an analysis has been carried out, 
concentrating in particular on the effects of volt-
age drops of long duration on the pump motors in 
safety systems. Similar studies were carried out 
in Finland, and TVO’s results will be completed in 
early 2010. Similar analyses have been carried out 
before, and these new ones are mainly intended to 
establish the current situation of the plants.
4.2.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
At Olkiluoto 1, a malfunction was detected in the 
opening of the outer isolation valve on the reac-
tor main steam line due to the actuator, and at 
Olkiluoto 2 damage to a steam dryer guide plate 
was detected. In addition, at Olkiluoto 2 a reactor 
scram valve seal damage and an actuator failure 
of the strainers in the seawater system were de-
tected. No fuel failures were detected on either 
plant unit in 2009.
Damage that had earlier escaped attention was 
detected in the Olkiluoto 2 reactor steam dryer (a 
broken guide plate, the so-called chevron plate). 
TVO assessed the condition of the dryer and the 
safety of its use, and based on the assessment, 
proposed that the dryer be installed back into the 
reactor. STUK approved the proposal. The dam-
age was visible in the pictures taken after the 
2006–2007 operating cycle, and there has been no 
change during two operating cycles. As a result of 
the event, STUK required a plan to be prepared for 
steam dryer inspection principles. The steam dryer 
has also presented problems in previous years. It 
was installed in the reactor during the 2005 an-
nual maintenance, but it was found in the follow-
ing year’s maintenance that the flow guide plate 
had partly come loose. The old steam dryer was in-
stalled in the reactor for the 2006–2007 operating 
cycle, and the guide plates were removed from the 
new dryer. The new dryer was installed again dur-
ing the 2007 annual maintenance. The inspections 
carried out during the 2008 annual maintenance 
revealed four cracks in the steam dryer panels; the 
cracks were repaired during the 2009 outage. None 
of the above failures have been in actual load-
carrying structures.
Towards the end of the annual maintenance out-
age at Olkiluoto 2, it was observed that the scram 
valves in the reactor scram system were not tight. 
The reason was that the seals, which had been in 
use for one year, had been damaged. The seals were 
replaced. During the annual maintenance outage, 
Pressure equipment manufacturers, and 
inspection and testing organisations 
A total of 28 nuclear pressure equipment manu-
facturers were approved for the Olkiluoto plant 
(plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). STUK approved 
15 testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures for the Olkiluoto plants. Testing op-
eratives from four different testing organisations 
were approved for carrying out periodic tests of 
mechanical equipment and structures pursuant 
to YVL 3.8.
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the reactor is shut down and there are no oper-
ability requirements for the scram valves, which is 
why the failures could be repaired without safety 
implications. It is also possible to repair individual 
failures during power operation, but it is not pos-
sible to repair this many scram valves simultane-
ously without shutting the reactor down. There 
were no leaks in the Olkiluoto 1 scram valves. The 
event shows that there are shortcomings in the 
corrective actions and their impact, because TVO 
also dealt with similar leaks due to sealing mate-
rial damage in 2007.
During annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 2, the 
actuator of the strainers in the seawater system 
failed. Wear preventing operation was found in the 
planetary gear of the actuator. TVO will check all 
similar actuators during 2009-2010; in the inspec-
tions carried out by the end of 2009, no failures of a 
similar type were detected.
Altogether 11 inspections of pressure equip-
ment were carried out; all these inspections were 
in the inspection mandate of an inspection or-
ganisation. A total of 82 inspections were carried 
out at Olkiluoto 2; of these, 19 inspections were in 
STUK’s inspection mandate.
4.2.5 Development of the plant and its safety
Major modifications at Olkiluoto
During the year, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
will implement several modifications improving 
plant safety or plant operation.
The replacement of the reactor cooling system’s 
inner isolation valves, which started in 2006, was 
completed when the last valve was replaced dur-
ing the annual maintenance of Olkiluoto 2. The 
upgrading and repair project of the fine screening 
units in the seawater screening system continued; 
it started in 2007, and one screen was upgraded on 
each unit during the year. According to the plans, 
the project will be completed in 2010, when all 
eight fine screening units will be changed. Also, the 
radiation measurement system upgrading project 
continued. A so-called outage entrance building 
was built between the plant units before the an-
nual maintenances.
Coming large-scale modifications were planned 
during the year. These will mainly take place dur-
ing the 2010 annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 
1 and during the 2011 annual maintenance at 
Olkiluoto 2. According to these plans, the inner 
isolation valves of the main steam lines will be re-
placed, the low pressure turbines and the genera-
tor will be renewed, and the main seawater pumps 
upgraded.
Upgrade of the radiation 
measurement systems
The radiation measurement system upgrade 
project involves the renewal of practically all the 
stationary radiation measurement equipment on 
the plant units. The first new devices were in-
stalled and operational in 2008. At the end of 2009, 
there were over ten renewed stationary radiation 
monitors on each plant unit. In addition, several 
new devices have been installed for test operation. 
The purpose of test operation is to compare the 
measurement results of the new devices with the 
measurement results of the old devices. The aim 
has been to place the new devices in accordance 
with operating experience gained in more repre-
sentative places. An additional aim has been to 
find alarm limit set values that would be optimal 
in terms of radiation safety and plant processes.
In 2009, TVO revised the personnel monitoring 
system. The system was installed in the new outage 
building which was commissioned before the an-
nual maintenance outages. At the same time, some 
of the electronic dose measurement equipment was 
replaced. The outage building enables centralised 
access of workers to the controlled areas of both 
plant units.
4.2.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and low- 
and intermediate-level waste
STUK inspected, in accordance with the periodic 
inspection programme, the low- and intermedi-
ate-level waste management and final disposal of 
waste materials at the Olkiluoto power plant. The 
inspection of low- and intermediate-level waste 
management focused on the situation of waste 
management development projects, waste account-
ing, organisation and guidelines. No significant is-
sues with safety implications requiring rectifica-
tion were observed in the inspections.
The treatment, storage and final disposal of low- 
and intermediate-level waste (“operating waste”) 
at the Olkiluoto power plant were carried out as 
planned and no significant events in terms of plant 
or environmental safety were evident. The volume 
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and activity of low- and intermediate-level waste 
in relation to generated electrical power remained 
relatively low compared with most other countries. 
Contributing factors include the high quality re-
quirements for nuclear waste management and nu-
clear fuel, the planning of maintenance and repair 
operations, decontamination, component and proc-
ess modifications, as well as waste monitoring and 
sorting, which enable some of the waste with a very 
low radioactive substance content to be cleared 
from control. In 2009, maintenance waste below 
the activity limits to be taken to the local landfill 
for burial, waste oil to be delivered to Ekokem Oy, 
and recycling metal and certain objects and a site 
hut delivered for reuse were cleared from control 
with STUK’s approval. In addition, the power plant 
employs efficient procedures for reducing the vol-
ume of waste subject to final disposal.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
STUK reviewed the documents on the financial 
provision made for the costs of nuclear waste man-
agement referred to in Section 90 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and submitted statements on them 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
In its statement, STUK assessed the technical 
plans and cost estimates on which the financial 
provision is based and considered them appropri-
ate. TVO’s extent of liability is €1160.7 million at 
2009 prices. A total of €44.1 million has been re-
served for regulatory oversight costs. TVO’s share 
of this sum is €25.2 million.
Decommissioning plan for 
Olkiluoto power plant
TVO submitted an updated decommissioning plan 
for the Olkiluoto power plant to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy at the end of 2008. 
STUK reviewed the plan in 2009, and submitted a 
statement on to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy. The plan is based on the assump-
tion that both Olkiluoto power plant units will be 
closed after 60 years of operation in 2038 and 2040. 
Decommissioning will start 30 years after the ter-
mination of monitored storage. The duration of de-
commissioning after the monitored storage period is 
about 15 years. The justification for delayed decom-
missioning is occupational radiation protection. It 
has been estimated that the cost of decommission-
ing will be €170 million at late 2007 prices. The vol-
ume of waste for final disposal will amount to about 
26,600 m³. The decommissioning of the Olkiluoto 3 
plant unit currently under construction will start 
immediately after 60 years of operation in 2071, 
and its decommissioning will start after the older 
plant units have been decommissioned. In STUK’s 
opinion, the decommissioning plan is sufficiently 
comprehensive and detailed at this point.
Other plans for nuclear waste management
In accordance with Section 74 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, TVO submitted a report on the plans for 
the implementation of nuclear waste management 
activities to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy at the end of September. The report con-
tains a detailed plan for the next three years and 
a general account of the measures planned for the 
next six years. The detailed plan covers the period 
at the end of which those liable for waste manage-
ment are prepared to submit a construction permit 
application for a disposal facility. The Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy requested STUK 
submit a statement on the material by the end of 
September 2010. The statement will be prepared 
in connection with the processing of preliminary 
construction permit materials for Posiva’s disposal 
facility.
4.2.7 Organisational operations 
and quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that, with a view to 
ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has operated 
in a systematic and development-oriented way. As 
a result of an assessment launched on STUK’s in-
tiative in 2008, TVO has identified strengths and 
development areas in the power plant’s safety cul-
Waste volumes
The volume of spent nuclear fuel on-site at the 
Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2009 was 7,212 as-
semblies (1,277 tU, tonnes of original uranium), 
an increase of 228 assemblies (52 tU) in 2009.
The volume of low- and intermediate-level 
waste at the Olkiluoto power plant was 6,410 m3 
at the end of 2009. The total increase in volume 
from 2008 is 170 m3. Approximately 80% of the 
waste has been finally disposed of.
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ture. With regard to strengths, TVO noted that 
the personnel are motivated and have a sense of 
responsibility. Areas for development include en-
suring competence, handling of personnel’s worries 
related to safety and project management in modi-
fications. STUK will monitor progress gained with 
the development areas in 2010.
TVO has created a management system for 
managing the power plant. Guide YVL 1.4, which 
STUK has recently implemented, sets require-
ments for this system. TVO has conducted an as-
sessment of the functionality of its management 
system and started to develop the system in order 
to fulfil the requirements of Guide YVL 1.4. The 
responsibility for management system develop-
ment has been delegated to new people due to 
organisational change and guality management 
and auditing activities have been chosen as areas 
for development. The follow-up of the areas for 
development and deviations will be improved in 
TVO by introducing a new application for deviation 
management. STUK has followed the development 
of the management system and required TVO to 
develop their self-assessment procedure and its de-
scription. As part of the plant management system, 
TVO has a bonus scheme for the personnel. STUK 
has assessed the impact of TVO’s bonus scheme in 
terms of the focus on plant safety. In STUK’s opin-
ion, TVO could further develop the bonus scheme 
with a view to making the importance of safety 
more evident in the bonus criteria.
With regard to personnel competence, STUK 
has drawn attention to the fact that the rea-
sons and underlying factors of the previous years’ 
events emphasize the importance of ensuring per-
sonnel competence. TVO has come to the same 
conclusions in their own assessments. STUK has 
required TVO to assess their procedures related 
to ensuring competence and to prepare a develop-
ment plan for improving the systematic character 
and quality of these activities. In STUK’s opinion, 
TVO must pay special attention to work induction 
and ensuring the competence of those in expert 
posts. TVO has initiated an assessment of their 
training programmes; the assessments will also 
take into account the needs of Olkiluoto 3. Based 
on STUK’s regulatory acitivites, it can be stated of 
TVO’s training activities that they are subject to 
continuous improvement and training data is man-
aged in a systematic way.
In its inspections, STUK has assessed TVO’s 
human resource planning and resourcing practice. 
As a result of regulatory activities, it has been not-
ed that the practice inside TVO varies because the 
guidelines are of a general character and, for exam-
ple, there are no guidelines for human resource allo-
cation in project activities. STUK’s observations are 
in line with the results of TVO’s assessment of safe-
ty culture. TVO has initiated a development project 
for project activities, including personnel training.
TVO made changes in the organisation and per-
sonnel in 2009. The most important organisational 
change was the transfer of the Corporate Safety 
Office from the Corporate Services Department to 
the Production Department. TVO has assessed the 
safety significance of the changes and submitted 
the assessment to STUK as an attachment to the 
updated management code. STUK reviewed and 
approved the changes suggested by TVO, as well as 
the change of the deputies of the director respon-
sible for plant operations. STUK drew attention 
to updating the training plans and to induction 
training plans for persons who have moved to new 
posts.
STUK participated in examinations of shift 
personnel where the operators working in the 
control rooms show that they are conversant with 
all salient matters related to plant operation and 
safety. STUK approved 18 operator licences for 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in 2009.
4.2.8 Operating experience feedback
Systematic follow-up of operating experiences and 
their entry into processing belong to TVO’s oper-
ating experience team’s activities. The operating 
experience database has been made more user-
friendly and its structure changed for better us-
ability, but the database is not used very exten-
sively. Systematic research methods are not much 
applied to event studies; the database leads the 
analysis of causes. It would be worthwhile to apply 
more systematic and documented methods to event 
studies, and to add weight to the analysis of root 
causes. Corrective actions are monitored by means 
of database applications.
The inspection concerning international operat-
ing experience feedback and the utilisation of expe-
rience focused on the state of TVO’s development 
work on operating experience feedback aiming to 
embrace the needs of Olkiluoto 3, and the verifica-
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tion and assessment of the functionality of TVOs’ 
operating experience procedures with the aid of 
events from abroad which STUK had selected in 
advance. Thanks to a new meeting practice, the 
number of clarification requests to the company’s 
technical experts by TVO’s operating experience 
team (KÄKRY) concerning external events was 
doubled in 2008 compared to the previous year. 
However, there is scope for improvement in report-
ing the measures taken on the basis of such events 
and their follow-up.
In screening international operating experience 
(WANO, IRS and NRC reports) and its assess-
ment, TVO draws strongly on EFRATOM, an op-
erating experience organisation jointly established 
by Swedish power companies, Westinghouse, and 
Vattenfall Group’s training centre (KSU). It has 
been established in previous inspections that the 
screening criteria of ERFATOM are not sufficient 
for the needs of Olkiluoto 3. Until now the nuclear 
technology representative in KÄKRY has screened 
out international reports the lessons of which need 
to be taken into account in the technical solutions 
of Olkiluoto 3, and the reports have been submit-
ted to the Olkiluoto 3 plant supplier for state-
ment. From the beginning of 2009, the Operational 
Safety Engineer of Olkiluoto 3 has drawn attention 
to events the lessons of which could be applied to 
operating activities and administrative procedures. 
Events and lessons selected with these criteria 
are presented to the shift personnel on operating 
training days. The development of TVO’s operat-
ing experience feedback to embrace the needs of 
Olkiluoto 3 appears to be promising, because the 
process of assessing events from Olkiluoto 3 and 
from outside has already been described up to the 
beginning of commissioning.
4.2.9 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and environment
Occupational radiation safety
In the spring, STUK carried out a radiation protec-
tion inspection according to the periodic inspec-
tion programme at the Olkiluoto plant, focusing 
on occupational dosimetric surveillance and radia-
tion measurements in particular. Based on the in-
spection, it was stated that dosimetric surveillance 
functions in an acceptable way and in accordance 
with the power plant’s quality system instructions. 
STUK requested that, with regard to dosimetric 
measurements, the power company submit the un-
reported result material of annual calibrations and 
quality tests for previous years to STUK for infor-
mation. The power company was also requested to 
describe the procedures for controlling the radia-
tion doses employees have been exposed to before 
starting work and for ensuring that all employees 
undergo measurement of internal doses after the 
completion of annual maintenance.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protec-
tion inspections during the annual maintenance 
at the Olkiluoto plant units. In the inspections, 
STUK assessed the radiation protection person-
nel’s operations and radiation protection methods. 
At the same time, the operations of employees in 
radiation work were assessed. It was concluded 
that radiation protection at the plant units mainly 
functions well. During the inspection, observations 
were made of individual issues for improvement 
relating to entering arrangements of radiation 
control areas requiring the use of additional pro-
tective equipment, use of protective equipment 
and the presence of workers in a radiation work 
environment. Also, some incidents were observed 
where the radiation protection personnel had not 
been adequately informed of ongoing work in the 
controlled area.
Radiation protection resources at a nuclear 
power plant are very essential for gaining good 
results. The requirements imposed on radiation 
protection at the Olkiluoto plant are fulfilled. The 
current human resources will not be sufficient dur-
ing the commissioning of the new unit and annual 
maintenance outages of the operating units. The 
power company has drawn up plans for organising 
radiation protection duties and for recruiting and 
training new people for the duties in the future. 
STUK will assess the implementation of the plans 
in its inspections.
The annual maintenance entrance building 
built between the plant units was commissioned 
before the annual maintenance. This is why the 
access to the controlled areas of both plant units 
was, unlike earlier, primarily through one building. 
Also, the measurement of individual contamina-
tion improved with the new building. A person 
leaving the controlled area goes through two meas-
urements to ensure that there are no radioactive 
substances on the person’s skin or clothes. Also, 
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Figure 14. Annual radiation doses to the critical groups since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 
and 2. Over the recent years, the doses to the critical groups has remained below one percent of the set limit, 
0.1 milliSv.
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Figure 13. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
the contamination cleaning facilities are now more 
functional than earlier.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 0.40 
manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.79 manSv at Olkiluoto 
2. According to STUK guidelines, the threshold for 
one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over two 
successive years is 2.5 manSv per gigawatt of net 
electrical power. This means a collective dose value 
of 2.10 manSv per Olkiluoto plant unit. This limit 
value was not exceeded at either plant unit.
The collective radiation dose of the Olkiluoto 
plant units was lower than average compared to 
the dose in its operating history. The collective 
radiation dose of the Olkiluoto power plants was 
clearly below average for BWRs in the OECD coun-
tries.
Occupational radiation doses of NPP workers 
mostly accumulate in work carried out during 
annual maintenance outages. The collective ra-
diation dose due to operations during the outage 
at Olkiluoto 1 was 0.26 manSv, and the collective 
radiation dose due to operations during the outage 
at Olkiluoto 2 was 0.72 manSv. The radiation levels 
at the turbine plants continued to decrease thanks 
to the new steam dryers. A new steam dryer has 
been installed in the Olkiluoto 1 reactor since 
2006. The steam dryer installed at Olkiluoto 2 in 
2005 has been in the reactor with the exception of 
the 2006–2007 operating cycle. The new dryers are 
effective in removing moisture from the steam, and 
they have clearly reduced the transportation of ra-
dioactive substances to the turbines.
The highest individual radiation dose incurred 
during the outage amounted to 5.4 mSv at Olkiluoto 
1, and to 9.45 mSv at Olkiluoto 2. The highest indi-
vidual radiation doses at Olkiluoto have been less 
than 10 mSv during the last three years. The indi-
vidual radiation dose distribution of workers at the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants in 2009 
is given in Appendix 2.
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Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
The measurement results of the replaced moni-
toring sensors of the site weather mast on-site 
were assessed in cooperation between STUK, the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute and TVO. The 
new sensors which were introduced in late 2008 
and the data transmission has functioned well, 
with the exception of individual device failures. 
The weather measurement results produced by the 
upgraded weather measurement equipment are 
more precise than those of the removed sensors. 
The stability of air is measured with direct tur-
bulence measurements using ultrasonic measur-
ing technology. STUK, together with the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute, will check the values of 
the roughness parameters and their impact on dis-
persion calculation using the measurement results 
for 2009. Roughness parameter values are used for 
determining the stability of air flows.
STUK has earlier required the Olkiluoto plant 
to assess not only the development of the weath-
er mast system on-site, but also that of off-site 
real-time additional measurements and the re-
lated predictive models with regard to the spread 
of any atmospheric releases. STUK, the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute and the power company 
have continued to investigate the issue. STUK 
granted TVO an extension of time until the end of 
2011 to prepare a conceptual design plan complet-
ing the areal scope of the Olkiluoto weather meas-
urement system.
The new measuring equipment of the external 
radiation monitoring network of the Olkiluoto 
NPP surroundings was commissioned in November 
2008. The installed equipment is identical to that 
used in the nationwide radiation monitoring net-
work of Finland. The Olkiluoto monitoring network 
has 14 radiation measurement stations, four inside 
the plant perimeter and 10 outside it.
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well be-
low authorised annual limits in 2009. No releases 
of radioactive noble gases into the environment 
were detected. Releases of radioactive iodine iso-
topes into the air were approximately 0.1 MBq, 
which is approximately 0.0001% of the authorised 
limit. The emissions through the vent stack also 
included radioactive particulate matter amounting 
to 29 MBq, tritium amounting to 0.3 TBq and car-
bon-14 amounting to approximately 0.8 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, 1.9 TBq, is approximately 10% of the 
annual release limit. The total activity of other 
radionuclides released into the sea was 0.2 GBq, 
which is about 0.1% of the plant location-specific 
release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.03 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% of the set 
limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). The average 
person living in Finland receives the equivalent 
radiation dose from natural and spatial radiation 
sources in about 15 minutes.
A total of 280 samples were collected and ana-
lysed from the terrestrial and aquatic environment 
surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant during 
2009. External background radiation and the ex-
posure to radioactivity of people in the surround-
ings are also measured regularly. Extremely small 
amounts of radioactive substances originating in 
the nuclear power plant have been observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts are so small that they are insignificant in 
terms of people’s radiation exposure.
4.2.10 Emergency preparedness
STUK monitors the readiness of the organisations 
operating nuclear power plants to act in abnor-
mal situations. No such situations occurred at the 
Olkiluoto power plant in 2009.
The emergency preparedness arrangements at 
the Olkiluoto power plant fulfil the key require-
ments; this was established during emergency 
preparedness inspections as part of the periodic 
inspection programme. The objects of inspection in-
cluded securing of connections used for plant data 
Table 5. Radioactive nuclides found in 2009 in the 
environmental samples in Olkiluoto, originating from 
the Olkiluoto power plant.
Type of sample
Number of environmental samples 
containing radionuclides originating from 
the NPP (several different nuclides may 
be found in the same sample)
H-3 Mn-54 Co-60
Air sampling – 1 2
Aquatic plants – 3 8
Seabed fauna (clams) – – 1
Sedimenting materials – – 7
Seawater 2 – –
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transfer during preparedness situations at the 
operating Olkiluoto plant units and for Olkiluoto 
3 now under construction, and emergency prepar-
edness related to the commissioning of the new 
plant unit. The inspection also concerned training 
and mustering drills for the personnel working on 
the construction sites of Olkiluoto 3 and Onkalo 
concerning the evacuation of personnel from the 
site in case of an accident at Olkiluoto 1 or 2. A 
personnel mustering exercise was organised in the 
limited area of the Olkiluoto 3 construction site 
on 11 December 2009. Both nuclear power plants 
also organise fire training and drills, with the 
fire brigades of the plants and the fire and rescue 
services of the surrounding municipalities partici-
pating. Fire drills were organised at the Olkiluoto 
power plant site as follows: a cooperation drill at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 on 9 November 2009, a coopera-
tion drill at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site on 20 
April 2009 and a map drill on 2 December 2009. 
A fire drill was organised at the Onkalo site on 8 
june 2009.
The licensee and public authorities have contin-
ued their co-operation for maintaining emergency 
preparedness. In 2009, a cooperation group of TVO 
and the authorities studied feedback from the 
rescue drill organised in Olkiluoto in 2008 and the 
implementation of development areas such as the 
improvement of exchange of information and creat-
ing a simultaneous status assessment, training of 
preparedness organisations and making communi-
cation with citizens more effective via the Internet
4.3 Regulatory oversight of the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3 is based 
on the observations made by STUK in the review of 
plans, the oversight of manufacturing, construction 
and installation, results of the construction inspec-
tion programme during construction, oversight of 
the plant vendor and its subcontractors, as well as 
experience acquired as a result of interactions be-
tween STUK, TVO and the plant vendor.
Detailed design of the plant systems continued 
in 2009. To some extent the plans still do not meet 
the objectives set for them in terms of quality 
and content, and hence STUK required further 
elaboration of the plans. STUK’s decisions required 
improvements to be made in the design of systems 
which would further improve plant safety. The 
design of the systems must be completed before 
the requirements for the system’s components can 
be finally specified, the components manufactured 
and the installation phase started. At the end of 
2009, this was still ongoing for some process and 
electrical systems, but in particular for the I&C 
systems.
Regarding the I&C systems, STUK required 
the design of overall architecture preceding sys-
tem design to be supplemented with unambiguous 
requirements for design, and that the I&C archi-
tecture created on the basis of the requirements is 
described. STUK required that the requirements 
set in STUK’s guides and decisions for the I&C sys-
tems which back-up each other and for the failure 
criteria to be observed are taken into account in 
design. STUK also required that the realisation of 
the requirements for independence and failure cri-
teria must be demonstrated by means of analyses. 
The first analyses submitted to STUK for demon-
strating the realisation of failure criteria were not 
acceptable. The plant vendor and TVO must pay 
special attention to the completion of the design 
and assessment of the I&C systems, and to compli-
ance with safety requirements.
Construction work at the plant site has made 
significant progress. Concrete construction has 
proceeded almost without problems, and the pro-
cedures created for determining readiness for con-
crete casting have proven to function well. The 
procedures have served to ensure that the plant 
vendor and TVO have inspected and approved the 
structure to be concreted and the plans for the con-
creting before STUK is requested to give permis-
sion to start the work.
The most significant construction-related steel 
structure is the steel lining of the containment 
building which ensures that radioactive substanc-
es are contained inside the containment building 
in an accident. In STUK’s inspections, deviations 
were detected in the grinding of steel lining welds 
which the contractor, the plant vendor and TVO 
had not noticed during their own inspections. 
STUK requested TVO take measures in order to 
improve welding quality control. STUK had no 
remarks concerning welds performed later on, and 
TVO’s quality control was considered to be suffi-
cient in this regard.
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At the end of 2009, the installation of the first 
Safety Class 2 pipelines started on the Olkiluoto 3 
nuclear island. The oversight of the start of instal-
lation work and the assessment of TVO’s instal-
lation supervision procedures, instructions and 
resources have been one of the focus areas in 
STUK’s oversight activities in 2009. In October, 
STUK found deviations in pipeline welds which 
the subcontractor, plant vendor and TVO had not 
detected. Thus, the supervision of welding work 
was not adequate, due to which welding work was 
interrupted for improvement measures. The event 
revealed deficiencies in the plant vendor’s and 
TVO’s quality control similar to those detected ear-
lier in connection with welding of the containment 
steel lining. STUK has required TVO also apply 
the quality control practices they have learnt from 
these events in the installation supervision of other 
safety-critical objects. It is also necessary that TVO 
follows and assesses whether the supervision and 
inspections carried out by the plant vendor are ad-
equate and function well, and, if necessary, steers 
the plant vendor’s work. 
Of the Olkiluoto 3 main components, the reactor 
pressure vessel, steam generators and pressurizer 
are ready and delivered to the plant site awaiting 
for installation. However, the manufacturing of sev-
eral other mechanical components, such as valves, 
pumps, heat exchangers and pipes, is still ongoing. 
During 2009, STUK carried out over 500 construc-
tion inspections related to manufacturing. It was 
necessary to interrupt some of the inspections due 
to the lack of the necessary prerequisites for the 
inspection. In many cases it has been a question of a 
need to complement manufacturing documentation 
or the incompleteness of manufacturing or related 
testing and inspection or its documentation. STUK 
has required that the plant vendor and TVO carry 
out the inspection phases preceding STUK’s inspec-
tion well in advance before requesting that STUK 
visit the manufacturing site, not just before it or at 
the same time as STUK’s construction inspection.
A major deviation was detected in the manu-
facturing of the primary circuit main coolant pipes 
in October 2009: an inspection carried out by the 
plant vendor and the licensee revealed repairs 
made by welding on the inside and outside surfaces 
of pipes. The welds had been made to repair some 
millimetre-deep notches which had emerged dur-
ing manufacturing and inspections; these welds 
had not been documented during manufacturing. 
The technical assessment of the significance of the 
repairs was not completed yet at the end of 2009. 
The event demonstrated serious deficiencies in the 
pipe manufacturer’s quality and safety culture, as 
well as in oversight carried out by the plant vendor 
and TVO, and in the guidance of subcontractors. 
Following the observation, STUK will carry out a 
repeated assessment of whether the manufacturer 
can be approved as a nuclear pressure equipment 
manufacturer.
With regard to the manufacturing of the electri-
cal systems’ main components, the most signifi-
cant problems have related to taking into account 
electrical transient situations and environmental 
conditions in manufacturing and to the qualifica-
tion of electrical devices containing software-based 
automation for nuclear power plant application. 
STUK has required that, in the design of electrical 
devices for Olkiluoto 3, such electrical transient 
situations must be taken into account which are 
not taken into account in a normal industrial en-
vironment and which have not been wholly taken 
into account in the basic design of an EPR plant. 
STUK has also required changes to be made in the 
radiation qualification of some electrical devices 
for ensuring the functioning of the devices in a pos-
sible accident condition. These devices include part 
of the motors of safety system pumps.
Software-based automation is often embedded 
in equipment and devices commonly used in in-
dustry; the automation is used for controlling the 
device’s functions. TVO has suggested the use this 
kind of equipment in Olkiluoto 3 systems with sig-
nificant safety implications. In nuclear power plant 
applications, it is required that software-based 
automation, depending on the safety class of the 
device, is qualified in compliance with a nuclear 
standard or other standard intended for safety-
critical purposes. However, devices used in indus-
trial applications may not have this kind of quali-
fication, and on the other hand, it is not possible to 
find on the market devices or equipment manufac-
tured in compliance with nuclear standards. STUK 
has required the plant vendor and TVO to analyse 
the software of these devices in order to ensure 
that their operation is reliable enough.
In 2008, STUK carried out an inspection con-
cerning the safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 con-
struction site and named assessment and improve-
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ment as development areas. In 2009, STUK carried 
out a follow-up inspection on the construction site 
for inspecting the measures taken to assess and 
improve the safety culture. Based on the inspec-
tion, it was noted TVO has conducted a safety 
culture survey, established a safety culture team 
to follow and develop safety culture and hired a 
person who speaks with people on the construction 
site and observes the site safety culture. TVO has 
also defined safety principles for the construction 
site. STUK required TVO to continue the develop-
ment and description of the construction site safety 
culture assessment method.
STUK has inspected TVO’s preparations for 
plant commissioning and noted that the situa-
tion is good enough at this point. When Olkiluoto 
3 starts commercial operation, the licensee will 
be responsible for three power plant units, two of 
which are identical boiling water reactor units and 
one is a pressurized water reactor unit. STUK has 
received from TVO the first plans for the coming 
operating organisation which comprises, in addi-
tion to the actual operating personnel, the neces-
sary technical experts and maintenance personnel. 
STUK made a remark to TVO that the experience 
gained from the design and implementation of the 
systems during the construction of Olkiluoto 3 
should be utilised as extensively as possible in 
plant operation. This means, for example, that the 
Olkiluoto 3 project should employ in all areas of 
technology people who will also work in TVO’s op-
erating organisation.
During construction, TVO and the plant vendor 
have been able to take into account the modifica-
tion needs which have emerged as design of the 
different areas of technology has become more de-
tailed. Manufacturing defects have either been cor-
rected so that the original quality requirements are 
fulfilled, or it has been demonstrated by means of 
additional inspections or analyses that the require-
ments are fulfilled. The flaws in the work of differ-
ent parties and in product quality have resulted 
in additional work to solve the problems. This has 
had an impact on the progress of the project, not on 
the fulfilment of its quality requirements. In sum-
mary, based on the results of regulatory activities, 
STUK can state that the original safety objectives 
of the plant can be achieved.
In 2010, it will be specially challenging for the 
plant vendor and TVO to manage the extensive in-
stallation of equipment and pipes. This will also be 
one of the focus areas of STUK’s oversight in addi-
tion to inspections concerning the I&C systems.
4.3.2 Design and planning
Plant and system design
STUK continued to review the overall architecture 
of the I&C systems throughout the year. STUK has 
required that TVO and the plant vendor specify un-
ambiguous requirements for the design of the I&C 
system overall architecture, and that the I&C ar-
chitecture created on the basis of the requirements 
is described. In terms of safety, it is particularly 
important to specify unambiguous requirements for 
the independence of different I&C systems involved 
in the architecture, because different I&C systems 
back each other up. Another issue with particular 
safety significance has been the specification of the 
failure criteria to be observed in the I&C systems 
– the internal redundancy of the systems improves 
the reliability of their operation in device and other 
failures. STUK also required that the realisation of 
the requirements for independence and failure cri-
teria must be demonstrated by means of analyses. 
During 2009, STUK has reviewed the first analyses 
demonstrating the realisation of failure criteria 
and noted that their scope is not sufficient.
STUK continued to review reports on internal 
and external hazards and their updates. The anal-
yses showed that the separation principle decided 
on earlier allows the consequences of internal and 
external hazards to be minimised.
STUK was supplied with an analysis of a situ-
ation where the air conditioning necessary for the 
cooling of electrical and I&C rooms is lost. An up-
dated report is being reviewed by STUK.
In 2009, the plant vendor submitted to STUK 
reports on external and internal voltage and fre-
quency transients at Olkiluoto 3; STUK approved 
most of them. In 2009, STUK also approved the 
plan for plant power cable routing. Further, STUK 
approved the cable dimensioning principles for 
Olkiluoto 3 with a few exceptions. Following the 
approvals, STUK gave permission to start the in-
stallation of electrical systems, devices and cables 
on the nuclear island in December 2009.
STUK continued to review the detailed design 
of process, support and electrical systems in 2009. 
Some modifications were made in the systems to 
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improve their reliability and take into account the 
modifications to be made in the I&C controlling the 
systems. 
The most important modifications are discussed 
in section Design modifications.
 In addition to assessing the acceptability of the 
system modifications, STUK’s inspection concerned 
in particular I&C and electrical design, how radia-
tion protection issues are taken into account in sys-
tem plan, and the failure analyses of the systems. 
There was still scope for quality improvement in 
system design, in particular in the descriptions 
of airconditioning and auxiliary systems. For this 
reason STUK required an update of the plans.
Transient and accident analyses
No new transient and accident analyses were sub-
mitted to STUK in 2009.
Probabilistic risk analyses (PRA)
In 2009, STUK assessed the realisation of the fun-
damental design principles affecting plant safety 
in the detailed design documentation for systems 
and structures. 
The review work concentrated on the design of 
safety systems, reactor coolant pump protection 
concept against oil fires, cable fire safety, risk anal-
yses of I&C systems and fuel handling systems, 
and heavy load drop analyses. 
The objective was to ensure that adequate pro-
visions have been taken against area events (such 
as internal fires and flooding) and external events 
in particular, and that the interdependencies of 
systems and possibilities for common cause fail-
ures have been sufficiently taken into account in 
plant design. 
No significant needs for improving the design 
were detected in STUK’s review. An update of the 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) computer model 
was submitted to STUK for information as well as 
part of the PRA documentation. 
Of the documentation related to risk analyses, 
STUK reviewed the methodology description of the 
risk-informed in-service inspection programme., 
description of the fire risk analysis method, report 
on the building-specific fire hazard analysis meth-
ods, and description of the human error analysis 
(HRA) method. The reliability assessment of the 
overall I&C architecture required by STUK was 
moved to 2010.
Radiation safety
As part of its inspection of process systems, STUK 
reviewed the requirements for radiation safety, 
such as radiation shielding, equipment layout, ac-
cessibility and decontamination possibilities. STUK 
approved the power company’s reports related to 
the radiation shielding and radiation classification 
of rooms, and taking the ALARA principle into ac-
count in design work.
Fire safety at the plant
STUK reviewed structural fire hazard analyses 
(FHA), the purpose of which was to demonstrate 
that the plant structures will withstand the fire 
loads in fire compartments in all potential fire situ-
ations. In addition to the structural fire hazard 
analyses, STUK received for review fire hazard 
functional analyses (FHFA) showing the impact 
of fires on the safety functions of the plant. STUK 
required that the FHFA descriptions are subjected 
to a boundary analysis. A boundary analysis serves 
to ensure that no principal contradictions remain 
between the FHFA and probabilistic fire analyses 
(fire PRA). In addition, STUK required an assess-
ment to be made of the adequacy of the fire com-
partmentation in large cable rooms in case of fire 
protection system failures in situations when e.g. 
fire dampers will not close or ven tilation remains 
in  operation.
In 2008, STUK contracted VTT to conduct an 
independent verification analysis of a reactor 
coolant pump oil fire inside containment. As a 
result of VTT’s analysis, it was concluded that in 
a situation when the whole oil volume of a pump 
has burnt, the plant’s safety functions are at risk. 
STUK required that the effects of mechanical 
damage and the ex tent of oil leaks in different 
failure situations must be assessed in more detail. 
STUK approved the fire safety concept submitted 
in 2009 describing meas ures to prevent large oil 
leaks and fires.
VTT continued to investigate the safety of 
Olkiluoto 3 specific fire-retardant (FRNC) power 
cables, which should self-extinguish when installed 
in bundles.. The fire characteristics of the FRNC 
cables proved to be better than what VTT esti-
mated on the basis of the first tests in 2008. Based 
on VTT’s study completed in 2009, it was concluded 
that the fire retardant characteristics of the tested 
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cables are sufficient in de sign basis situations for 
cable room fire compartments, and that the pro-
jected fire compartment concept is sufficient. A cor-
responding study of FRNC type instrumentation 
cables will be conducted in 2010.
It was found out that flooding caused by a possi-
ble rupture in the fire water pipeline in the annulus 
space be tween the inner and outer (structural pro-
tection against aircraft crash) containment walls 
could threaten safety functions. A plan aiming at 
preventing flooding from the fire water system in 
the annulus space was submitted to STUK for re-
view in 2009. The plan will be re viewed in 2010.
Design of components and structures
STUK continued the review of detailed plans for 
Safety Class 2 components and structures in 2009. 
The key objects of this review were the construc-
tion an work plans of concrete and steel structures, 
as well as the construction plans of pressure equip-
ment. For pressure equipment, STUK received, in 
particular, many documents concerning the isomet-
rics, supporting structures and stress analyses of 
pipelines. STUK relied on the assistance of con-
sultants in this review work. STUK reviewed the 
documents referred to in YVL 3.8 containing input 
information related to qualifications of inservice 
inspections of pipelines. Another important docu-
mentation package was that related to the design 
and manufacture of valves. In addition to these, 
STUK reviewed the construction and manufactur-
ing plans of equipment and structures related to 
fuel handling, as well as those of the most impor-
tant hoisting equipment. The review of the final 
stress analysis of primary circuit main components 
was continued.
STUK received for review documents describing 
the environmental conditions of equipment in op-
erational and accident situations. The documents 
present the temperatures, pressures, radiation con-
ditions and vibrations caused by seismic events in 
which the equipment must be able to operate. The 
assessment of ageing management was continued 
in 2009.
4.3.3 Construction
Construction oversight by STUK focused on the 
manufacturing and installation of Safety Class 2 
steel and concrete structures in particular. STUK 
inspected the readiness to start the concreting of 
Safety Class 2 concrete structures and authorised 
the start of concrete casting. These concrete struc-
tures include the containment wall and its internal 
structures. Concrete casting has been rather suc-
cessful from a technical point of view; in some cast-
ings concrete pumping to the casting object was in-
terrupted from time to time due to power failures, 
but because of the short duration of the interrup-
tions and long setting time of concrete, they had no 
significance for the quality of the cast structures. 
Following the interruptions, STUK required TVO 
to be prepared also for possible longer interrup-
tions in concrete casting. The procedures to deter-
mine readiness to start concreting have proven to 
function well. These procedures have served to en-
sure that the plant vendor and TVO have inspected 
and approved the structure to be concreted and the 
plans for the concreting before STUK is requested 
to give permission to start the work.
Design modifications
As system design has become more detailed, STUK 
has required modifications to be made in order to 
improve safety. In early 2009, the plant supplier 
proposed modifications to the I & C system design 
for reducing the interdependencies between I & C 
systems. STUK did not approve the modifications 
as they were proposed, but instead required that 
the plant supplier should produce a less am-
biguous description of I & C architecture and its 
requirements, as well as an analysis of the interde-
pendencies between I & C systems. The processing 
of this issue will continue in 2010.
TVO and the plant supplier proposed design 
modifications regarding the operation of the reac-
tor emergency cooling systems. STUK did not ap-
prove the design modification where the diversity 
principle (i.e. a different principle of operation) 
would not have been applied for cooling the mo-
tors of pumps required for emergency cooling. The 
plant supplier justified the modification by, among 
other things, lack of space in the room where the 
pump motors are located.
A design modification was made in 2009 to the 
nuclear fuel of Olkiluoto 3 with the intention of 
reducing the mechanical loads exerted on the fuel. 
The fuel modification documents were submitted 
to STUK for approval, and the matter will be furt-
her processed during 2010.
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Welding and installation of the cylindrical and 
dome sections of the containment steel lining were 
completed at the factory in Poland and on site in 
Olkiluoto. It was found in STUK’s construction 
inspection of the welding of the steel lining that 
in places the weld had been ground too thin. The 
thin parts were repaired immediately. Because 
TVO, the plant vendor and the manufacturer had 
not detected these thinned welds while supervis-
ing the work and inspecting the welds, STUK re-
quested TVO to present a report on quality control. 
Thanks to improvements in quality control, welds 
performed later did not require remarks in STUK’s 
inspections, and TVO’s quality control was consid-
ered sufficient in this respect.
4.3.4 Manufacture
Manufacture of main components
Of the primary circuit components, the reactor 
pressure vessel was put into storage at the plant 
site in early 2009. The manufacture of four steam 
generators and one pressurizer was also completed 
at the plant vendor’s factory in St. Marcel, France. 
STUK oversaw the pressure tests performed on 
the equipment after manufacture and carried out 
a construction inspection before transportation to 
the plant site in the autumn of 2009.
STUK oversaw the manufacture of the reactor 
coolant pumps and the control rod drive mecha-
nisms by regular visits to the plant vendor’s fac-
tory in jeumont, France. A test run of three coolant 
pumps was performed in the manufacturer’s test 
equipment. The manufacturing of the internals 
of the reactor pressure vessel was supervised 
by STUK at Skoda’s Pelzen factory in the Czech 
Republic. Through its supervision and inspections, 
STUK aims to verify the performance of the manu-
facturers, the plant vendor and the power company, 
and to ensure that the products comply with the 
requirements.
STUK oversaw the manufacturing of the reac-
tor coolant pipes by regular visits. The forged parts 
of the reactor coolant pipes were manufactured 
again in 2008 in order to make the grain size of 
the material smaller and more homogenous than 
in the first, rejected pipes. Grain size homogene-
ity is a prerequisite for inspecting the pipes using 
ultrasonic technology. STUK approved the mate-
rial characteristics of the forged parts in early 
2009. The first welded seam between a straight 
forged part and a bent forged part joined with 
it was made in the spring. When inspecting the 
weld, the manufacturer detected indications of 
fracture on the outside surface of the base metal 
of the straight part at about 2 mm distance from 
the fusion line. Welding work was suspended for 
a closer investigation of the defects and for find-
ing out their significance and cause. On the basis 
of the preliminary clarifications received, STUK 
gave permission to continue welding work on the 
next corresponding weld. This weld was inspected 
according to a more detailed programme, but the 
inspection revealed no manufacturing defects. But 
identical defects occurred again in the third weld. 
STUK stopped welding work and requested TVO 
to find out whether similar defects are present in 
the pipe structure at different depths of the weld. 
The manufacturer and TVO supplemented their 
investigations of the formation mechanism and 
safety significance of the defects. STUK concluded 
that the investigations show that there are no in-
dications below the surface of the pipe. STUK gave 
permission to repair the surface indications and to 
continue welding.
Factory welding of the reactor coolant pipe 
prefabricates was completed during the autumn. 
As the pipes were being finished, repairs made by 
welding were detected on the inside and outside 
surfaces of the pipes; these repairs had not been 
appropriately documented in accordance with the 
pipe manufacturing instructions. The observation 
was made in an inspection carried out by the man-
ufacturer’s inspection organisation and TVO. Pipe 
manufacturing was halted due to the observation. 
The repairs had been made to fill some millimetres 
deep notches which had emerged during manufac-
turing and inspections. STUK gave permission to 
continue the manufacturing of the pipes after the 
plant vendor and TVO had submitted a report on 
how the technical acceptability of the repairs and 
the flaws in the manufacturer’s quality control will 
be assessed and handled.
Manufacture of other equipment
During 2009, STUK supervised and inspected, be-
sides the main components, the manufacture of 
Safety Class 1 and 2 pipelines, tanks, heat ex-
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changers, pumps, valves and steel structures as 
well. STUK has maintained a permanent supervi-
sion at the German factory manufacturing pipeline 
prefabricates. The prefabrication of pipelines was 
also supervised at the Olkiluoto harbour. STUK 
also supervised and inspected the manufacture of 
fuel handling equipment and the polar crane in-
tended for the containment.
In addition to supervising the manufacture of 
pressure equipment and steel structures, STUK 
has supervised and inspected the manufacture of 
emergency diesel generators used for emergen-
cy power supply. The emergency diesel generator 
which was dropped during transportation in 2008 
was inspected with the machine disassembled. 
Based on the inspections, STUK concluded that the 
dropping had not caused any damage to the ma-
chine and gave permission to assemble it.
STUK’s construction inspections, intended to 
ensure that the manufacture of components com-
plies with requirements, still revealed issues pre-
venting the inspections from being carried out 
as planned. The most serious of these issues con-
cerned equipment’s readiness for inspection and 
open issues related to construction plans. As early 
as 2008, STUK required TVO and the plant vendor 
to ensure before the inspections that the prereq-
uisites for construction inspection are present. 
TVO and the plant vendor have now changed their 
supervision and inspection procedures so that the 
aim is to ensure readiness for inspection prior to 
STUK’s inspection
4.3.5 Installation work
The installation of equipment with significant im-
plications for nuclear safety commenced during 
2009 in the reactor plant with the installation of 
the first pipelines and electrical cables with signifi-
cant implications for safety. STUK paid special at-
tention to installation supervision at the plant site 
with a view to tackling any possible flaws in instal-
lation work as soon as they occur. STUK inspected 
TVO’s installation supervision in several inspec-
tions carried out in accordance with the inspection 
programme for the construction stage during 2009 
in order to ensure the adequacy of TVO’s supervi-
sion procedures. STUK has participated in quality 
audits carried out by the plant vendor and TVO at 
the plant site for subcontractors with significant 
implications for safety.
4.3.6 Preparations for commissioning
The training of operating personnel for the plant 
and their induction continued during 2009. The 
future operating personnel participated in the 
processing of technical documents and in this 
way also became familiar with their future duties. 
STUK reviewed the training programme as part 
of the periodic inspection programme during con-
struction. The inspection evaluated, among other 
things, how the future plant operators are prepared 
for simulator training and the readiness of test ar-
rangements related to the regulatory qualification 
of the operators. No issues requiring rectification 
were observed in the inspections.
The processing of technical and administra-
tive instructions for commissioning started with 
a wider scope during 2009. The content of pre-
operational test programmes was specified more 
in detail during the processing. STUK oversaw the 
preparations for commissioning as part of the peri-
odic inspection programme during construction.
4.3.7 Organisation and quality management
Organisational changes took place in the quality 
assurance unit of the Olkiluoto 3 project during 
2009. The most important of these changes was the 
In early October¸ it was found in conjunction 
of a site visit that incorrect welding parameters 
were used for welding Safety Class 2 pipelines: 
the welding current used was too high. The person 
performing the welding was also unfamiliar with 
the relevant welding instructions, nor was he able 
to tell who his supervisor was. STUK stopped the 
welding work immediately in that location and 
also issued a decision to consequently stop all 
welding work in other installation sites of this 
subcontractor because the supervision of instal-
lation work by the subcontractor, plant supplier 
and TVO was obviously inadequate. Following 
the event, the welders were provided with further 
training regarding welding instructions and ad-
herence to them. The parties also improved their 
supervisory procedures so that STUK was able to 
give a permission to continue the welding work. 
The welding seams produced using too high cur-
rent settings were inspected after the event. The 
investigation showed that the deviation had no 
impact on the durability of the final welds.
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nomination of a new manager. Since the manufac-
turing of equipment is about to be completed, the 
quality assurance unit is shifting the focus of its 
supervision from factory supervision to supervis-
ing the compliance with requirements of the instal-
lation and manufacturing organisations’ activities 
at the Olkiluoto 3 site.
The observations concerning the operation 
of site organisations showed that the difficulties 
in quality management in the construction of 
Olkiluoto 3 continued. In 2009, STUK evaluated 
in particular the operations of the plant vendor’s 
subcontractors working in nuclear island in terms 
of their compliance with requirements. It was 
noted in site audits carried out by the plant ven-
dor and TVO that there were plenty of quality-
management-related deviations in the operations 
of Areva’s subcontractors. In some cases it was 
necessary to stop the supplier’s work even repeat-
edly because basic preconditions for the work were 
missing. The subcontractors’ work was hampered 
by, among other things, deficiencies in the man-
agement of materials, documents and working 
methods. Regardless of the flaws in procedures, 
the subcontractors’ end products were as a rule 
implemented in accordance with the requirements 
imposed on them or they were repaired to comply 
with the requirements. Because the flaws in the 
subcontractors’ operations were found only af-
ter the plant vendor’s acceptance and evaluation 
process, it is possible that said process had been 
planned or implemented inadequately. This is why 
STUK required the licencee to review the actual 
evaluation processes and their impact instead of 
individual corrective actions.
STUK required TVO to improve their supervi-
sion with regard to the kick-off meetings between 
the plant vendor and their subcontractors. One 
of the objectives of kick-off meetings is to evalu-
ate a new supplier’s readiness to commence work 
in terms of quality management. TVO must plan 
their supervision activities to be timely and they 
must be extensive enough to make it possible to 
evaluate the appropriateness of decisions the plant 
vendor has made in order to determine a supplier’s 
readiness in terms of quality management. It was 
required that supervision and its results are docu-
mented.
Handling of non-conformances is one of the 
main tools for ensuring the compliance of products 
with quality requirements.  In 2009, TVO contin-
ued to work out procedures for non-conformances 
reporting and handling. TVO aimed to further im-
prove their non-conformances handling procedure 
by means of systematic classification and analysis 
of non-conformances. TVO intends to utilise the 
results of non-conformance analyses in project 
management and decision making by assessing 
the results twice a year in management reviews. 
STUK continues to assess the functionality of non-
conformance handling methods with regard to site 
operations in particular.
Flaws in the flow of information between differ-
ent areas of technology and procedural flaws have 
also surfaced during the installation phase. The 
smooth flow of TVO’s equipment installation man-
agement process concerning the Olkiluoto 3 project 
from a safety point of view was one of the focus 
areas of regulatory oversight by STUK in 2009. 
In 2009, STUK carried out an inspection of TVO’s 
installation and manufacturing supervision, and 
two follow-up inspections. As a result of the obser-
vations made in the inspections, TVO was required 
to elaborate, among other things, its procedure and 
performance instructions, to ensure that organisa-
tions are aware of their duties and to ensure that 
the installation supervision organisation is made 
familiar with the procedures followed by different 
organisations during the installation phase of the 
Olkiluoto 3 project.
STUK’s regulatory activities in 2010 will focus 
strongly on installation and manufacturing activi-
ties at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. In order to 
support regulatory activities and decision-making, 
STUK will commision an external, independent re-
view of the impact of TVO’s equipment installation 
management process in the spring of 2010.
Safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site
In August 2008, STUK carried out an inspection of 
the safety culture at the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
site because there had been suggestions in the me-
dia that flaws in quality or industrial safety may 
not be freely brought up at the site. Following the 
inspection, it was found that it would be beneficial 
to have more open and effective communications 
at the site. STUK required TVO to draw up a plan 
for evaluating and developing the safety culture 
on site.
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In 2009, STUK carried out a follow-up inspec-
tion to review the implementation and impact of 
safety culture development measures. It was noted 
in the inspection that TVO has established a safety 
culture team to follow and develop safety culture 
and hired a person who speaks with people at the 
construction site and observes the site safety cul-
ture. TVO has also defined safety principles for the 
construction site.
Based on the inspection, STUK required TVO 
to further develop their operations with the aim of 
evaluating and developing on-site safety culture 
in a systematic way. This means that information 
and training measures are completed so that new 
people coming to the site are familiar with the 
safety principles to be observed at the site and are 
aware of expectations and alternative routes for 
bringing up drawbacks and problems. In addition, 
STUK required TVO to ensure that the new super-
visors and inspectors of the plant vendor and their 
subcontractors working on safety-classified objects 
get sufficient induction training, and to present a 
continuous procedure for overseeing that on-site 
communication is ensured.
TVO has submitted to STUK a plan for taking 
into account the requirements set in the inspec-
tion. STUK will follow up the implementation and 
effectiveness of these actions during 2009 in con-
junction with its own inspections.
4.3.8 Nuclear waste management
STUK inspected and approved the pre-inspection 
material for the solid low- and intermediate-level 
waste processing system. Nuclear waste manage-
ment during construction was inspected in con-
junction with a periodic inspection. The inspection 
dealt with the progress of Olkiluoto 3 plant unit 
construction, personnel training and increase in 
personnel, state of documents and procurement of 
equipment needed for waste processing.
The method chosen for the processing of in-
termediate-level waste at Olkiluoto 3 is drying in 
drums. TVO suggested in the construction permit 
material that the drums are embedded in concrete 
cases and disposed of in the silos for intermediate-
level waste (KAj Storage) in the repository for 
current nuclear waste (VLj Storage) . It turned out 
in practice that the solution is difficult to imple-
ment because the dimensions of the final disposal 
packages differ from those of the final disposal 
packages of the waste from the operating units. 
This makes it difficult to place the packages. In ad-
dition, embedding in a concrete case is technically 
demanding.
TVO presented to STUK a new procedure which 
will be proposed in conjunction with the operat-
ing licence application. In this procedure, waste 
dried in drums is stored in an existing radioactive 
waste storage facility at the plant site and later on 
disposed of in a repository designed for this new 
waste type and to be excavated at VLj Storage. 
Preliminarily STUK considered this suggestion 
acceptable because provisions for extending VLj 
Storage have already been made. It is necessary to 
monitor the condition of the waste drums during 
long-term storage.
Extension of spent fuel storage
TVO has planned to start the extension of the 
Olkiluoto spent fuel storage (KPA Storage) with 
three additional pools in 2010. In 2009, the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy specified the li-
cence process for the extension at TVO’s request so 
that construction will be carried out under the op-
erating licence for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and 
the construction permit for Olkiluoto 3. STUK gave 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy a 
statement concerning the licence process. In ac-
cordance with the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy’s decision, the extension is regarded as 
modification work, and STUK will make a decision 
concerning the safety of construction on the basis 
of TVO’s conceptual design plan. In 2009, STUK es-
tablished an oversight project for inspection work 
and drew up a plan for reviewing the conceptual 
design plan. TVO submitted the conceptual design 
plan to STUK for approval in December 2009.
4.4 New NPP projects
Assessment of environmental 
impact of the planned nuclear 
facilities and land use planning
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) for 
Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant project was com-
pleted when the company submitted supplements 
to the report on the environmental impact assess-
ment required by the statements of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy and the environmen-
tal authorities.
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STUK has issued statements required for the 
project on the land use planning concerning the 
drafts for local detailed plans for Hanhikivi in 
Pyhäjoki and Karsikkoniemi in Simo and on pro-
posals for phased regional land use plans related 
to nuclear power. The safety zones entered in the 
prepared regional plans include the population 
centres situated on the border of the said area in 
their entirety.
In Olkiluoto, the process of town planning is un-
derway. Its purpose is to amend the town plan for 
the nuclear plant site because of the spent fuel dis-
posal operations. STUK issued a statement on the 
town plan proposal to the municipality of Eurajoki. 
STUK had no remarks concerning the town plan 
proposal.
Preliminary safety assessments of the 
projected nuclear power plants
TVO’s Olkiluoto 4 project
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) is planning to build 
a new Olkiluoto 4 plant unit with 1,000 to 1,800 
MW of electrical power in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki. In 
the application for a decision-in-principle, TVO 
presents five plant options, two of which are boil-
ing water reactors and three pressurized water 
reactors. At the decision-in-principle phase, it is 
STUK’s task to assess whether there are any fac-
tors showing that there are not sufficient precondi-
tions for building a safe nuclear facility. The pre-
liminary safety assessment comprises an evalu-
ation of TVO’s organisation and the location of 
Olkiluoto.
On 29 May 2009, STUK submitted to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy a pre-
liminary safety assessment of the Olkiluoto 4 
project and a related statement by the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety. In its statement 
STUK concludes that the nuclear facilities sug-
gested by TVO can be constructed to comply with 
Finnish safety requirements. All the plant options, 
however, do not fulfil safety requirements as they 
are. The character and scope of the necessary modi-
fications vary. For some plant options relatively 
small modifications would suffice, whereas other 
options would require more extensive structural 
modifications. Technical solutions for some of the 
necessary modifications are open.
With regard to the organisation, STUK esti-
mates that TVO has the prerequisites for creating 
a management system for the construction and op-
eration of a new plant unit which would allow the 
realisation of safety and quality management, and 
good safety culture.
Geological, hydrological and seismological sur-
veys of the Olkiluoto 4 site location did not reveal 
any factors which would present an obstacle to 
building a new plant unit or related extensions of 
nuclear facilities in Olkiluoto. STUK has evalu-
ated the suitability of the projected site location 
for its purpose as well as preconditions for the 
implementation of safety and preparedness ar-
rangements, nuclear waste management and nu-
clear safeguards. Final disposal of the spent fuel 
from the Olkiluoto 4 unit is assessed by STUK in a 
separate preliminary safety assessment of Posiva’s 
decision-in-principle application for an extension of 
the repository to accommodate spent nuclear fuel 
from the Olkiluoto 4 unit.
Fortum’s Loviisa 3 project
Fortum is planning to build a new Loviisa 3 plant 
unit with 1,200 to 1,700 MW of electrical power on 
the southern tip of Hästholmen island, Loviisa. In 
the application for a decision-in-principle, Fortum 
presents five plant options, two of which are boil-
ing water reactors and three pressurized water 
reactors. At the decision-in-principle phase, it is 
STUK’s task to assess whether there are any fac-
tors showing that there are not sufficient precondi-
tions for building a safe nuclear facility. The pre-
liminary safety assessment comprises an evalua-
tion of Fortum’s organisation and the site location.
On 5 October 2009, STUK submitted to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy a pre-
liminary safety assessment of Fortum’s decision-in-
principle application for the construction of a third 
nuclear power plant unit in Loviisa and attached 
to it a statement by the Advisory Committee on 
Nuclear Safety. In its statement STUK concludes 
that the plant options suggested by Fortum do not 
fulfil Finnish safety requirements as they are, but 
it is possible to modify the plants to comply with 
the requirements. For some plant options rela-
tively small modifications would suffice, whereas 
other options would require more extensive struc-
tural modifications. Technical solutions for some of 
the necessary modifications are open. In STUK’s 
opinion, the necessary additional work and modi-
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fications can be done at later stages of the licence 
procedure.
With regard to the organisation, STUK esti-
mates that Fortum has the prerequisites for creat-
ing a management system for the construction and 
operation of a new plant unit which would allow 
the realisation of safety and quality management, 
and good safety culture. Fortum is also prepared to 
allocate a sufficient number of competent person-
nel to project implemetation.
The survey of the Loviisa 3 plant site location 
did not reveal any factors which would present an 
obstacle to building a new plant unit or related ex-
tensions of nuclear facilities. STUK has evaluated 
the suitability of the projected site location for its 
purpose, as well as preconditions for the implemen-
tation of safety and preparedness arrangements, 
nuclear waste management and safeguards. The 
evaluation considered, among other things, geologi-
cal and seismological conditions in the area, sea 
water level, weather phenomena and the impact 
of climate change on them. Final disposal of the 
spent fuel from the Loviisa 3 unit is assessed by 
STUK in a separate preliminary safety assessment 
of Posiva’s decision-in-principle application for an 
extension of the repository to accommodate spent 
nuclear fuel from the Loviisa 3 unit.
Fennovoima’s nuclear power plant project
Fennovoima has applied for a Government deci-
sion-in-principle on building a nuclear power plant 
with electrical power of 1,500 to 2,500 MW. The 
power plant would consist of one or two nuclear 
power plant units. Fennovoima has three plant op-
tions, two of which use a boiling water reactor and 
one with a pressurized water reactor.
On 20 October 2009, STUK submitted to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy a pre-
liminary safety assessment of Fennovoima Oy’s de-
cision-in-principle application for the construction 
of a nuclear power plant in Pyhäjoki, Ruotsinpyhtää 
or Simo. In its statement STUK concludes that the 
nuclear power plants suggested by Fennovoima 
can be constructed to comply with Finnish safety 
requirements.
The suggested plant options do not fulfil Finnish 
nuclear safety requirements as they are, but STUK 
estimates that it is possible to make them comply 
with the requirements at later stages of the licence 
procedure. To achieve this, the plant designs must 
be changed.
With regard to the suggested site locations – 
Pyhäjoki, Ruotsinpyhtää and Simo – STUK states 
that in none of the locations do the conditions con-
tain any features which would present an obstacle 
to building a new nuclear power plant in compli-
ance with safety requirements. It is also possible to 
implement the necessary safety and preparedness 
arrangements in all the locations. There are no 
existing nuclear power plants in any of the sug-
gested municipalities. Concerning the projected 
site locations, extensive surveys of geology, seismol-
ogy, availability of cooling water from the sea, and 
climatic and other environmental factors, such as 
oil transportation and air traffic, have also been 
conducted.
With regard to the final disposal of nuclear 
waste, STUK evaluated the suitability of the sug-
gested locations for a final disposal facility placed 
in the bedrock and final disposal of very low-level 
waste in the soil. The evaluations studied geologi-
cal, seismic and hydrological features of the areas 
and surveys of natural resources located in the 
vicinity of the suggested site locations. In STUK’s 
opinion, it is possible to implement final disposal 
of nuclear waste in a safe manner in all three site 
options.
Regarding intermediate storage of spent nuclear 
fuel, the evaluation concluded that the suggested 
wet and dry storage solutions can be implemented 
in a safe manner. For the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel, Fennovoima’s application presented 
a plan which, according to STUK’s assessment, is 
in compliance with statutory requirements and 
which, in terms of its scope, is sufficient for the 
decision-in-principle phase. The presented develop-
ment and implementation plans for final disposal 
are preliminary. The implementation of the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel requires a separate 
decision-in-principle process.
STUK estimates that Fennovoima has the pre-
requisites for creating a management system for 
the construction and operation of a new plant 
unit which would allow the realisation of safety 
http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/ydinvoimalaitokset/uudet_laitosyksikot/en_GB/uudet_laitosyksikot/
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and quality management, and good safety culture. 
Fennovoima is also prepared to allocate a sufficient 
number of competent personnel to project imple-
mentation.
At STUK, the safety assessment work on the 
new nuclear power plant projects was organised in 
the form of a separate oversight project which end-
ed after the safety assessments were completed.
4.5 FiR 1 research reactor
The FiR 1 research reactor has continued to op-
erate regularly. It has been possible to give two 
radiation treatments per week to patients at the 
reactor. In addition, the operations included re-
search-related isotope irradiation commissioned by 
external enterprises and basic training in reactor 
physics.
STUK regularly assesses and reviews the safety 
documents on the FiR 1 reactor required by the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. In 2009, STUK approved 
the revised preparedness manual of the reactor. 
STUK carried out inspections on the operational 
safety, physical protection and emergency prepared-
ness, nuclear safeguards and radiation protection 
of the FiR 1 reactor in accordance with the an-
nual plan. STUK’s remarks concerned, among other 
things, the repair of the control rod drive mecha-
nism, the change of the person working as a produc-
tion manager, training of the personnel responsible 
for quality matters, and nuclear safeguards.
The personnel and training plan drawn up on 
the key duties of the FiR 1 reactor operating per-
sonnel continues to concern the training and duties 
of, among others, the person responsible for physi-
cal protection.
STUK approved the new person in charge of nu-
clear material issues in May 2009. In December, an 
examination of new supervisors and operators was 
arranged at the FiR 1 reactor, and the documents 
were submitted to STUK for approval. Supervisor 
licences were renewed for two persons and opera-
tor licences for three.
The nuclear safety of the FiR 1 reactor, the con-
dition of its structures, systems and components, as 
well as the human resources and the related oper-
ating plans, are sufficient for continued operation. 
The current operating licence period will expire at 
the end of 2011. The Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, STUK and VTT have started prepa-
rations for a licence application and its processing.
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5 Regulatory oversight of the spent 
nuclear fuel disposal project
From the perspective of nuclear energy legislation, 
the spent nuclear fuel disposal project may be bro-
ken down into five main stages: 
1. research stage: from the 1970s to the Govern-
ment’s decision-in-principle
2. research construction stage: from the decision-
in-principle to the construction permit; compris-
es the ongoing construction of an underground 
research facility, Onkalo
3. construction stage: from the construction permit 
to the operating licence
4. operating stage: from the operating licence to 
decommissioning
5. terminal stage: from decommissioning to the 
termination of the licensee’s waste manage-
ment obligation. When the final disposal of nu-
clear waste has been carried out acceptably, the 
licensee’s waste management obligation.ends 
and the responsibility for the nuclear waste dis-
posed of is transfered to the State.
In 2001, Parliament ratified the decision-in-prin-
ciple issued by the Government in the year before 
that the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the 
bedrock at Olkiluoto is in line with the overall good 
of society. The decision-in-principle states that the 
spent nuclear fuel disposal project may proceed 
to the construction of an underground research 
facility and more detailed investigation. With this 
statement, the Government indicates how far the 
implementation of the final disposal project may 
proceed pursuant to the decision-in-principle, tak-
ing into account that the underground research 
facility, Onkalo, referred to in the decision-in-prin-
ciple is designed to form a part of the final disposal 
facility to be constructed later. 
After receiving the decision-in-principle, Posiva 
began investigations regarding the suitability of 
the final disposal site at Olkiluoto. The construc-
tion of the underground research facility started in 
2004. Since the research facility is designed to form 
a part of the final disposal facility to be constructed 
later, it will be constructed in accordance with the 
requirements concerning nuclear facilities with 
corresponding regulatory oversight.
In 2009, the disposal project and its regula-
tory oversight were at stage two, the “research 
construction stage”. Research, development and 
analysis work related to the safety and technol-
ogy of final disposal continued and so did the site 
investigations from above ground and in Onkalo 
with the aim of ensuring the suitability of the dis-
posal site. The construction of Onkalo continued as 
planned in 2009. 
5.1 Regulatory oversight of the 
Onkalo underground rock 
characterization facility
The construction of Onkalo is divided into five ex-
cavation stages. In 2009.excavation stage four was 
being implemented.  During the year, the construc-
tion of the access tunnel proceeded from chainage 
3,310 metres to over 4,055 metres (to a depth of 
about 385 metres). The disposal is projected to be 
implemented at a depth of 420 metres, and the 
technical facilities of Onkalo at a depth of 437 me-
tres. STUK’s oversight covered geological mappings 
and surveys of the rock to be excavated, excavation 
of the access tunnel with the drilling and blasting 
method, raise boring of vertical shafts, sealing the 
rock with grouting and reinforcement of the rock, 
and review of safety documents. 
Site inspections
Posiva’s construction organisation and its oper-
ating methods were focus the Onkalo construc-
tion inspection programme. In addition, STUK did 
regular inspections to the construction site, about 
twice a month depending on the situation of the 
construction work. Issues related to the construc-
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tion and the oversight of the construction of Onkalo 
were discussed at monitoring meetings about once 
a month. 
During the year, STUK monitored the progress 
of the construction of Onkalo as follows:
•	 The	 excavated	access	 tunnel	penetrated	a	 few	
water-conducting structures, which were sealed 
by means of injections. Rock bolting to reinforce 
the rock proceeded to about 4,020 metres. The 
inlet air shaft was bored from below upwards 
and now reaches a depth of 290 metres. The bor-
ing of the inlet and exhaust air shafts between 
290 and 440 metres was prepared by sealing 
the rock with grouting. STUK carried out six 
inspections in order to give permission for shot-
creting of excavated rock surfaces. The aim of 
the inspections is to ensure the sufficient scope 
and correctness of the survey data before the 
rock surfaces are covered by shotcreting.
•	 The	 impact	 of	 excavation	 on	 the	 surrounding	
bedrock was regularly discussed at site moni-
toring meetings. During the year, two investi-
gation niches were completed; they serve the 
development of excavation methods and studies 
related to rock mechanics and groundwater. 
Posiva provided STUK with the plans for rock 
mechanics investigations for review. 
•	 In	 addition	 to	 regular	 site	 inspections,	 STUK	
carried out a review of Onkalo documentation 
which covered the plans for compiling as-built 
Onkalo documentation and part of the quality 
assurance documentation of grouting and rein-
forcement.  
•	 The	installation	of	heat,	water,	air	conditioning	
and electrical systems in Onkalo continued as 
planned.
STUK carried out eight inspections according to 
the construction inspection programme. The in-
spections concerned: 
•	 the	design	of	Onkalo
•	 management	 of	 the	 excavation	 damaged	 zone	
(EDZ)
•	 processing	of	safety	issues
•	 drilling	in	the	Onkalo	area
•	 site	supervision	carried	out	by	Posiva
•	 keeping	 groundwater	 leakage	 into	 Onkalo	
small, grouting (too much groutting can disturb 
the bedrock’s chemical conditions which secure 
the slow corroding of the copper canisters)
•	 use	 and	 amount	 of	 foreign	 materials	 which	
could disturb the bedrock’s chemical conditions 
(for example explosives, concrete, fuels)
•	 Onkalo’s	 impact	 on	 bedrock	 flow	 conditions	
(pumping water from Onkalo can change the 
natural flow of groundwater). 
Based on the inspections, STUK required improve-
ments in the instructions and procedures con-
cerning the construction of the research facility. 
Examples of the requirements and remarks in-
clude:
•	 improvement	of	grouting	instructions	and	strict-
er control of use of approved foreign materials 
•	 development	of	the	analysis	of	groundwater	dis-
turbances caused by Onkalo
•	 taking	into	account	STUK’s	approval	practices	
in construction drawing review and control pro-
cedures
•	 improvement	 of	 some	 instructions	 concerning	
excavation and drilling
•	 improvement	of	plans	for	submission	of	and	re-
sponsibility for documentation to be submitted 
to STUK.
STUK’s regulatory oversight of Posiva’s subcon-
tractors was based on the safety significance of the 
work they perform. STUK participated in the fol-
lowing Posiva’s audits: SK-Kaivin, the excavation 
contractor for Onkalo, and Kalliosuunnittelu Oy, 
carrying out rock engineering design for Onkalo.
Construction document reviews
At the end of 2008, Posiva revised the plans for 
Onkalo’s construction so that the lower research 
level (below 520 m) will not be implemented. STUK 
assessed long-term safety implications of the modi-
fications and implications on the research of the 
Olkiluoto bedrock. Posiva was requested to provide 
a report on how the modification of the access tun-
nel routing will affect the disturbances of bedrock 
properties caused by construction and how Posiva 
intends to ensure the adequacy of bedrock data 
and the development of the bedrock classification 
system (RSC) after the modifications. According to 
Posiva’s report the modification does not have any 
long-term safety implications. Posiva’s report also 
included new plans for characterising the bedrock 
from Onkalo and for the development of the RSC. 
In addition to the modifications in the Onkalo lay-
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out, Posiva submitted to STUK for review a report 
on a modification in the following implementation 
stage of Onkalo (stage five). The modification will 
reduce the bedrock volume to be excavated before 
the construction license, and in this way also bring 
down the disturbances caused by Onkalo. 
Based on the safety analyses conducted, STUK saw 
no obstacles to approving the suggested modifica-
tion.
Due to the modifications in Onkalo and the 
design of Onkalo’s systems becoming more de-
tailed, STUK requested Posiva to update the report 
corresponding to the preliminary safety analysis 
report for Onkalo and submit it to STUK for ap-
proval. The documentation submitted by Posiva 
describes, among other things, the design bases of 
the Onkalo systems, their implementation and the 
consequences of possible malfunctions. STUK ap-
proved the documentation but requested that how 
the requirements set by standards and the long 
operating life are taken into account be specified 
in more detail. At the same time, STUK reviewed 
the main drawings describing the implementation 
scope of Onkalo. Posiva’s plan follows the decision-
in-principle’s line concerning the final disposal 
facility, thus STUK, based on the conducted safety 
analyses, saw no obstacles to approving the report.
STUK reviewed Posiva’s application for ap-
proving the person in charge of the construction of 
Onkalo. STUK arranged an examination to ensure 
that the person is suitable for the task with regard 
to experience and familiarity with the construction 
of Onkalo. STUK approved the person in charge of 
the construction of Onkalo to assume responsibil-
ity, considering Onkalo’s scope of implementation, 
for duties equivalent to those of a director in charge 
of the construction of a nuclear facility.
Posiva submitted their updated management 
system for approval at the end of 2008. STUK in-
spected whether Posiva had taken into account the 
remarks made in the previous review and approved 
the management system with remarks. The review 
shows that Posiva still needs to pay attention to 
the operating methods employed when introducing 
suppliers and subsuppliers to Posiva’s safety and 
quality policy. 
Excavation is causing damage to the bedrock 
close to the rock surface. The increase in fragmen-
tation may have safety implications, especially for 
the tunnel sections which are near the deposition 
holes. For that reason, it is one of the factors pos-
sibly affecting Onkalo’s long-term safety which 
Posiva’s management system has placed under 
special monitoring. Posiva started preparations 
for excavating a niche intended for investigating 
the damaged zone caused by excavation.  In April, 
STUK reviewed the project plan for the research 
undertaking; the progress of research will be moni-
tored at monthly meetings at the construction site. 
STUK reviewed the updates of Posiva’s rock 
construction standard designs. The standard de-
signs describe the design bases and optional solu-
tions which are used in Onkalo’s implementation. 
Monitoring procedures for the repository facilities 
will also be developed in conjunction with the re-
view of the designs. 
Posiva presented to STUK a delivery plan for 
Onkalo plans and an update of the construction 
communication plan and accordingly submitted 
research plans for Onkalo (for example, plans for 
groundwater measuring stations, a pilot drilling 
plan, and a research plan for a test to study bed-
rock spalting). 
In addition, STUK reviewed the plans submit-
ted by Posiva for information. The plans concern 
bedrock design for Onkalo, the heat, water, air 
conditioning and electrical systems of Onkalo and 
Onkalo research work. 
5.2 Reviews of safety documentation
During the year, STUK evaluated a plan for final 
disposal safety documentation. STUK’s evaluation 
focused on the safety case as a whole, its content 
and its implementation in terms of schedule, tak-
ing into account the needs set by the construction 
licence application. STUK concluded in its evalua-
tion that, from the point of view of the construction 
licence application, the plan presented by Posiva 
is sufficient in its scope, and no issues have been 
observed which would prevent the safety case from 
being approved. There are, however, sections which 
require more improvement such as more detailed 
definition of safety functions, description of prob-
able and improbable scenarios and their hierar-
chy, and quality management in the generation of 
the safety case. During 2009, STUK completed the 
evaluation of two safety case documentation sets 
for final disposal (the safety analysis and so-called 
process documentation of a horizontal deposition 
solution) and started the evaluation of one safety 
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case documentation (the description of the final 
disposal site) and the review of Posiva’s three-year 
research, development and planning documenta-
tion (TKS-2009). This work will continue in 2010. 
STUK also reviewed approximately seventy re-
search reports. Their main subjects were mainly 
site survey results and final disposal technology.
In its reviews, STUK has identified issues which 
warrant further investigation or analysis for their 
safety significance, or the safety implications of 
which are not fully known at this time. The safety 
issues are related to encapsulation and disposal 
technology, site confirmation/investigation and 
safety assessment methodology. These issues are 
discussed in semiannual meetings between STUK 
and Posiva. The 2009 meetings were focused on the 
licence applicant’s and STUK’s preparations for 
the construction licence stage, and discussions of 
the safety case evaluation. In addition to Finnish 
experts, STUK was supported by experts from 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany and the 
USA.
Encapsulation and disposal technologies
STUK’s review of the safety analysis of a horizon-
tal deposition solution (KBS-3H) was completed 
at the end of September. In its review, STUK took 
account of the needs of the forthcoming construc-
tion licence application. According to STUK, the 
documentation is a major step forward and it cov-
ers the requirement areas of the safety case . It is 
considered that the flaws in the technical feasibil-
ity of a horizontal solution and in the presentation 
of the safety analysis can be largely supplemented 
by the construction licence stage. The analysis of 
one separate canister serving as a basis for the 
long-term safety assessment is not sufficient to 
be granted a construction licence. The actual un-
certainty analysis is missing and there is scope 
for further elaboration in the event development 
analysis and its presentation. In addition, putting 
the horizontal solution to use presumes that the 
solution is included in the forthcoming construc-
tion licence application.
Repository site
Posiva continued to survey the eastern part of the 
Olkiluoto island using research excavation and 
drilling three new deep boreholes, which, as well 
as being used for geological surveys, were also used 
for the geophysical and hydrological studies re-
quired for modelling and, at the beginning of 2010, 
for geophysical hole measurements and optical im-
aging of the hole. 
In 2009, STUK started the combined review 
of a repository site description (Olkiluoto Site 
Description) and a classification system describing 
the suitability of the bedrock. Repository site de-
scriptions comprise all geological, rock-mechanical 
and chemical research data, as well as research 
data describing groundwater properties and flows. 
This research data has been accumulated as a re-
sult of years of research of the Olkiluoto bedrock. 
The rock suitability criteria for the bedrock direct 
the detailed design of the repository facilities and 
the choosing of the location of the deposition holes. 
In addition, STUK reviewed research reports relat-
ed to site surveys concerning, inter alia, the results 
of the Olkiluoto seismic station network, ground 
and bedrock surveys, hydro-geological modelling 
and the impact on the bedrock of the heat gener-
ated by spent nuclear fuel. 
Regulatory oversight of safety analysis 
and safety case development
STUK’s review of the so-called process documen-
tation concerning characteristic features, events, 
natural phenomena and their development in the 
repository facilities was completed in April. STUK 
considered the documentation to be mainly pre-
pared in a systematic and clear way, but stated in 
the remarks, among other things, that:
•	 the	procedure	employed	by	Posiva	 is	not	suffi-
cient to ensure that the characteristic features, 
events and phenomena with long-term safety 
significance have been comprehensively identi-
fied and included in further processing;
•	 the	 description	 and	 justification	 of	 develop-
ments deemed probable and improbable devel-
opments detrimental to long-term safety are 
still too meagre.
Review of preliminary construction 
permit documentation
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy re-
quired in 2003 that Posiva submit so-called prelim-
inary construction licence documentation for the 
final disposal facility in 2009. The preliminary con-
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struction licence documentation refers to documen-
tation equal to the documentation of a construction 
licence application pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act. It indicates which parts of the documentation 
required by the construction permit are still insuf-
ficient and what the schedule is for its completion. 
STUK drew up a draft review plan for the large 
documentation. Posiva Oy submitted on schedule 
the application documentation pursuant to Section 
32 of the Nuclear Energy Decree at the end of the 
year, when STUK began to review it. In the first 
stage, STUK will review the scope of the material, 
and after that the review will focus on content re-
quirements. 
Regulatory oversight of 
Posiva’s safety studies
Posiva’s safety studies are based on Posiva’s own 
projects and on long-term bilateral or multilateral 
collaboration projects. The majority of the bilateral 
research projects are included in the collabora-
tion between Posiva and SKB, Sweden. The most 
significant multilateral research projects are the 
integrated projects NF-PRO, FUNMIG, PAMINA 
and THERESA within the EU’s sixth framework 
programme, in which Posiva and Finnish research 
institutes are participating. In addition, Posiva is 
participating in the international DECOVALEX 
project. In addition to technical and scientific bene-
fits, international collaboration will increase open-
ness concerning Posiva’s activities among the in-
ternational scientific community; STUK considers 
this openness to have a significant impact promot-
ing safety and the safety culture. STUK reviewed 
Posiva’s research work by evaluating its quality 
and adequacy, as well as the results of research 
work. 
To the extent that Posiva employed and will 
employ the results of R&D conducted by others 
directly in the activities regulated by STUK, STUK 
reviews this work in the same way as the opera-
tion and output of Posiva’s other subcontractors. 
Depending on the safety significance, STUK follows 
the activities of the participating organisations 
through inspections, by participating in audits per-
formed by Posiva, and in connection with document 
processing, meetings, construction inspections of 
components and structures, and construction site 
and laboratory rounds.
5.3 Regulatory oversight of disposal 
facility extension projects
Posiva submitted an application for a decision-in-
principle for an extension of the spent nuclear fuel 
repository facilities for the spent fuel of Olkiluoto 
4 in April 2008, and correspondingly for the spent 
fuel of Loviisa 3 in March 2009. STUK provided the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy with a 
statement and a preliminary safety assessment 
concerning the extension of the repository facilities 
for the spent fuel of Olkiluoto on 29 May 2009 and 
for the spent fuel of Loviisa 3 on 2 October 2009.
In the preliminary safety assessments, STUK 
assessed Posiva’s applications for decisions-in-prin-
ciple in accordance with the safety requirements of 
the Nuclear Energy Act and Government Decree 
736/2008. The preliminary safety assessments dea-
lt with the following subjects:
•	 implementation	manner	and	timing	of	final	
disposal
•	 organisational	requirements
•	 design	of	encapsulation	and	final	disposal	
facility
•	 nuclear	safeguards
•	 operating	capability	of	barriers
•	 demonstration	of	compliance	with	safety	
regulations
•	 radiation	safety
STUK concluded in its assessment that the sug-
gested disposal solution is in compliance with the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and that the implementa-
tion schedule is flexible enough and in compliance 
with the decisions of the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy. Posiva’s organisation was deemed 
to be adequate for the current implementation stage. 
The plans for the encapsulation and final disposal 
facility were deemed to be sufficiently detailed and 
appropriate at this point. The safety assessments of 
the operation of the facilities and the transportation 
of nuclear fuel demonstrate compliance with safety 
regulations concerning them to the extent which is 
necessary for a decision-in-principle.
The extension is to be implemented by con-
structing the facilities at one level in the eastern 
part of the Olkiluoto island, the bedrock of which 
is still rather unexplored. This fact and transi-
tions taking place in the bedrock in the long term 
require more research. The optimal layout of the 
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repository facilities in the bedrock, as well as the 
minimisation of detrimental effects of their con-
struction, operation and closing on the bedrock, 
require method development and testing.
The demonstration of long-term safety is based 
on the safety case for a horizontal deposition so-
lution, research conducted over 30 years and the 
multiple barriers principle. Successive barriers are 
composed of engineered and natural barriers com-
plementing each other. On the basis of these, STUK 
stated that the final disposal solution projected in 
the extension application and the suggested site 
have the capabilities to fulfil the requirements im-
posed on long-term safety. 
5.4 Joint convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management
The joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management requires that the states that 
have joined the Convention prepare a report eve-
ry three years on how the obligations stated in 
the Convention are met. The reports are assessed 
country by country at a joint meeting of the parties. 
In 2009, the parties convened for the third time 
at a joint review meeting in Vienna. Altogether, 
48 countries have joined the Convention, which is 
far less than there are countries with radioactive 
waste (about 200). STUK played an active role at 
the review meeting and acted as one of the presid-
ing officers for one group of countries.
Finland’s report received a favourable response. 
In addition to questions (approximately 130) re-
ceived before the meeting, further questions were 
answered at the meeting. The meeting considered 
the following to be good practices: the persistent 
work and progress of Finnish nuclear waste man-
agement, the strong role and technical competence 
of the regulatory authorities, proactive commu-
nication and active measures to pass competence 
from one generation to another. Challenges were 
pointed out in the continuation of the spent fuel 
disposal programme according to its objectives, the 
resources of the authorities and licence applicants 
in a changing operating environment and the re-
tirement of baby boomers. The report is available 
at the STUK website (http://www.stuk.fi/julkaisut/
stuk-b/stuk-b96.html).
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6 Regulatory oversight of 
nuclear non-proliferation
6.1 The basis, subjects and 
methods of regulatory control 
of nuclear materials
Regulatory control of nuclear materials 
and activities in Finland is based on the 
Nuclear Energy Act, Nuclear Energy 
Decree and on international treaties
Safeguarding nuclear materials and nuclear ac-
tivities constitutes a requirement for the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. Finland has in place a na-
tional state system of accounting for and control 
of nuclear material (SSAC), maintained by STUK. 
Provisions on the control system are laid down 
in section 118 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, and 
its purpose is to carry out the safeguards for the 
use of nuclear energy that are necessary for the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
STUK’s task is to attend to the control pertaining 
to international agreements in the field of nuclear 
energy signed by Finland.
International safeguards are implemented by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Transport and Energy, Directorates H 
and I, currently the Directorate General for Energy, 
Directorates D and E, called Euratom. IAEA safe-
guards are based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) 
signed by non-nuclear weapon EU Member States, 
the European Atomic Energy Agency and the IAEA, 
as well as the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193/Add.8). EU safeguards 
are based on the Euratom Treaty and Commission 
Regulation EURATOM 302/2005. According to 
Section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK’s pres-
ence is required in all inspections performed by the 
IAEA and the European Commission in Finland.
The Additional Protocol entitles the IAEA to 
gather more information on activities in the nu-
clear field. States must declare to the IAEA the 
nuclear facility sites, research and development 
projects related to the nuclear fuel cycle, as well 
as the manufacture of certain, separately defined, 
components in the nuclear field and their export. 
STUK submits to the IAEA and the Commission 
the declarations concerning Finland and Finnish 
facilities required by the Additional Protocol. In 
support of its controls, the IAEA gathers informa-
tion from open sources, uses satellite imagery and 
collects environmental samples. The Additional 
Protocol also allows the IAEA more extensive ac-
cess rights to inspect nuclear activities in a state.
Combined, the regulatory control under the 
Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and that under 
the Additional Protocol constitute Integrated 
Safeguards. In Integrated Safeguards, the IAEA 
performs fewer routine inspections, but it has the 
option of carrying out random interim inspections 
giving a short period of notice to facilities or ac-
tivities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. This allows 
the IAEA to verify that the member state has no 
undeclared activities related to the nuclear fuel 
cycle, and that the member state complies with its 
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. The IAEA’s integrated safeguards control 
began in Finland on 15 October 2008. The ef-
ficient implementation of the IAEA’s Integrated 
Safeguards in Finland is made possible by the na-
tional control system maintained by STUK. STUK 
has increased its inspector’s capabilities to par-
ticipate in the IAEA’s Unannounced Inspections 
(UI) or short notice random inspections (SNRI). In 
parallel with the development of the IAEA’s regu-
latory control, the Commission also developed its 
inspection activities. In 2009, the number of inspec-
tions carried out by the IAEA and the Commission 
decreased significantly: in 2008 the IAEA carried 
out altogether 26 and the Commission 25 inspec-
tions, whereas in 2009 the IAEA carried out only 
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11 inspections and the Commission 13 inspections. 
As expected, the number of inspections by STUK 
remained the same as in previous years; STUK 
carried out a total of 40 inspections in 2009.
STUK applies its regulatory control to 
all nuclear fuel cycle-related activities
STUK’s nuclear safeguards activities apply to all 
nuclear activities and items in Finland: material 
accounting and control systems, import, use, trans-
port, storage, transfers, removal from use and final 
disposal. Nuclear items include nuclear materials 
(uranium, plutonium and thorium), certain other 
substances (deuterium and graphite), as well as 
nuclear devices, equipment, software and technol-
ogy. Most nuclear materials in Finland (99.8%) are 
contained in nuclear power plants. A few consign-
ments of nuclear fuel are imported into Finland an-
nually. Currently, mainly fresh fuel is transported 
in Finland.
STUK inspects holders of nuclear items and 
stakeholders in the nuclear field through facility 
and transport inspections and document reviews. 
At facilities, STUK verifies that the quantity of 
nuclear materials and their physical location com-
ply with the accounting records. STUK reviews 
the documents on the facilities’ nuclear materials 
management (reports, notifications and nuclear 
safeguards manuals) and grants licences required 
by legislation. In addition, STUK is responsible for 
activities associated with the approval of interna-
tional inspectors.
The technical analysis methods applied in safe-
guards contribute to ensuring that nuclear ma-
terials and operations are in accordance with the 
declarations and that there are no undeclared ac-
tivities or materials. STUK applies non-destructive 
assay methods and environmental sample analy-
ses to verify that the information declared by the 
facilities regarding nuclear materials and their 
use, e.g. the degree of uranium enrichment, as well 
as fuel burn-up and the cooling period, is correct 
and complete.
The quantities of nuclear materials in Finland 
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Figure 15. Amount of uranium in Finland.
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Figure 16. Amount of plutonium in Finland.
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by material category are shown in Figures 15 and 
16 and in Table 6. The licences granted by STUK 
pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act are listed in 
Appendix 4.
Regulatory control of the 
transfer of nuclear items
In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and sensitive nuclear technology, STUK 
controls the transfer of nuclear items and provides 
expert assistance to Customs, the Police and oth-
er public authorities. A licence granted by either 
STUK or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is re-
quired for the import and export of nuclear prod-
ucts. Permission from STUK, as well as a trans-
port plan and safety plan approved by STUK, are 
required for the transport of nuclear materials. 
Customs and STUK co-operate in preventing ille-
gal import and export at Finnish borders.
Nuclear security co-operation between 
authorities to prevent illegal activities
Another objective of the regulatory control of nu-
clear materials is to ensure that appropriate se-
curity arrangements are in place for nuclear ma-
terials. In this context, the expression ’security ar-
rangements’ refers to the deterrence, prevention 
and detection of and response to illegal activities 
related to nuclear and other radioactive materials, 
as defined by the IAEA under the heading ’Nuclear 
Security’.
Cooperation in the field of nuclear security 
includes co-operation with Customs in investigat-
ing anomalies observed in radiation monitoring at 
borders and in developing these radiation monitor-
ing operations. It further includes participation 
in the national network of authorities aimed at 
preventing illegal CBRN activities and acting as 
the national contact point for the Illicit Traficking 
Database (ITDB) maintained by the IAEA to keep 
records of observed anomalous events regarding 
nuclear materials and radiation sources.
Regulatory control of the disposal facility
Final disposal of nuclear fuel in inaccessible un-
derground premises sets new kinds of challenges 
for nuclear safeguards. It is no longer possible to 
verify nuclear material after encapsulation in the 
same way as in traditional facilities or long-term 
storage. STUK has obliged Posiva Oy, the company 
in charge of the disposal project, to ensure the 
implementation of nuclear safeguards during the 
construction of Onkalo, the underground research 
facility, as it is designed to become part of a final 
disposal facility. The aim of the obligation is to 
ensure that all necessary information on the final 
disposal facility will be available in due course, and 
that it will be possible to show that no undeclared 
activities relevant to nuclear safeguards exist in 
the final repository area.
The objective of the early implementation of 
nuclear safeguards at the final disposal facility is 
also to enable international regulatory organisa-
tions to take care of their regulation obligations in 
an appropriate way: The IAEA must be convinced 
that, with regard to final disposal, there are no 
undeclared nuclear activities in Finland either. 
The Commission, on the other hand, makes sure 
that the operator employs adequate measures for 
carrying out nuclear safeguards in a facility for 
which experience of regulatory control is not found 
elsewhere in the world. Both the IAEA and the 
Commission plan and implement their own regula-
tion and inspection procedures on the basis of dec-
larations made by the operator and the state.
In early 2009, the IAEA and the Commission 
finalised the official Design Information 
Questionnaires needed for declaring the Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) of a final disposal 
facility. In November 2009, Posiva Oy submitted 
Table 6. Amounts of nuclear materials in Finland 31 December 2009.
Location
Natural uranium 
kg
Enriched uranium 
kg
Depleted
uranium kg
Plutonium 
kg
Torium 
kg
Loviisa plant – 540 477 – 4 809 –
Olkiluoto plant – 1 417 833 – 10 273 –
VTT / FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 ~0 – –
Other facililties ~ 2344 ~ 1,7 ~ 1694 ~ 0 ~ 5
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the preliminary BTC of the final disposal research 
facility, Onkalo. The delivery of the Basic Technical 
Characteristics has made it possible to initiate in-
ternational nuclear safeguards of final disposal.
6.2 Nuclear safeguards, activities 
and results in 2009
Licences and approvals
In 2009, STUK granted eight import licences, one 
export licence and one transfer licence for nucle-
ar materials to Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and two 
import licences to Fortum. An import licence was 
granted to VTT FiR 1 for plutonium standard ma-
terials from the IAEA. OMG Kokkola was granted 
a licence to produce, store and possess natural 
uranium which is generated as a by-product of 
processing industry.
STUK approved four transport plans for fresh 
nuclear fuel. In 2009, fresh fuel was imported by 
Finnish nuclear power plants from Sweden, Spain 
and Russia. In addition, STUK granted a transport 
licence for spent nuclear fuel and approved a trans-
port plan for spent nuclear fuel. STUK granted ap-
proval for three types of transport package design.
STUK approved the responsible person for nu-
clear safeguards of VTT FiR 1 in 2009. STUK 
also approved the responsible manager for nu-
clear safeguards of the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority and her deputy and the deputy 
of the new responsible manager of OMG Kokkola 
Chemicals. STUK also approved the updated nu-
clear safeguards manuals of the Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa power plants.
In 2009, STUK approved six new Euratom in-
spectors and 44 new IAEA inspectors to carry out 
inspections in Finland.
Declarations pursuant to the Additional 
Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement
Declarations pertaining to Finland, required under 
the Additional Protocol, totalled 18 in 2009, and 
they were submitted within the time limits set 
out in the Protocol. STUK inspected the received 
declarations and sent the annual reports to the 
IAEA. STUK also sent the IAEA quarterly the de-
tails of entries pursuant to the Additional Protocol. 
Euratom submitted to the IAEA the declarations 
pertaining to Finland under its responsibility.
Inspections as part of regulatory control 
of nuclear materials and activities
In 2009, STUK carried out a total of 40 safeguards 
inspections in Finland. Of these, the Commission 
participated in 13 and the IAEA in 11 inspections. 
STUK carried out 10 inspections at the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant; the Commission and the IAEA 
participated in two of these inspections. STUK car-
ried out 19 inspections at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant; the Commission and the IAEA par-
ticipated in seven of these inspections. The IAEA 
initiated two short notice random safeguards in-
spections, which both were carried out at Olkiluoto 
NPP. STUK and the Commission carried out one 
joint physical inventory verification of the FiR 1 
research reactor operated by VTT.
In 2009, STUK verified data on nuclear ma-
terials and their use by means of applying non-
destructive methods to 25 spent fuel assemblies at 
the Olkiluoto power plant and to 106 spent fuel as-
semblies at the Loviisa power plant. Furthermore, 
a measurement campaign was planned to be car-
ried out at the Olkiluoto power plant using a new 
tomographic measurement device but, due to the 
failure of the device’s commissioning test, it was 
necessary to postpone the campaign to 2010.
STUK inspected two transports of fresh fuel and 
one transport of spent fuel in 2009. The records of 
international transfers of nuclear fuel owned by 
TVO were inspected with respect to the fuel con-
signments destined for the Olkiluoto power plants 
in 2009 and with respect to natural uranium in 
TVO’s storage facilities outside Finland.
STUK carried out three periodic inspections 
of the final disposal facility construction site. The 
inspection verified that the underground premises 
of the final disposal facility’s Onkalo part are as 
declared. The IAEA and the Commission partici-
pated as observers in one inspection of Onkalo. The 
IAEA and the Commission will define the Design 
Information for this new type of facility for their 
monitoring purposes. A planning meeting was or-
ganised with the IAEA and the Commission in 
june and November regarding the implementa-
tion of monitoring. In December, STUK delivered 
the BTC of the final disposal facility prepared by 
Posiva through the Commission to the IAEA.
On the basis of inspections and swipe sample 
analyses carried out by STUK, it was found that 
STUK-B 118
71
the licensees and other operators had appropriate-
ly fulfilled the obligations of nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, and that no unreported materials or activities 
existed.
The IAEA conducted a Complementary Access 
to the Olkiluoto plant site at two hours’ notice and 
another one to the VTT site at 24 hours’ notice. 
STUK and the Commission participated in both 
Complementary Accesses.
The results of the inspections and audits show 
that Finnish plants implement their nuclear safe-
guards well. No materials or operations conflict-
ing with the notifications were observed, and the 
inspected materials and operations corresponded 
to the notifications submitted by the facilities. The 
IAEA and Euratom made no remarks concern-
ing the inspections. All of the facilities operated 
in a way that facilitated STUK’s fulfilment of the 
obligations of the international agreements in the 
nuclear field signed by Finland.
Upgrade of radiation control at the borders
Customs and STUK launched a joint project for re-
vising radiation control at the borders. The project 
is called RADAR. The project will be implemented 
in 2009–2014. The project includes equipment pur-
chases, an update of common operational methods 
and instructions, as well as a training plan and 
provision of training together with Customs School. 
The 2009 budget was EUR 0.9 million, which was 
used for updating control equipment at the eastern 
border, replacing outdated electronics and purchas-
ing neutron detectors. Purchases for Customs also 
included manual measuring devices which are also 
able to detect radioactive matter. The devices will 
be handed over in March 2010. STUK and Customs 
School started to design a training programme 
for customs officers together with the European 
Commission. The first training course will be deliv-
ered in early 2010.
STUK began the exchange of information 
through the Illicit Tracking Database (ITDB) main-
tained by the IAEA to keep records of observed 
irregularities regarding nuclear materials and ra-
diation sources. STUK acts as a contact point for 
the database in Finland.
Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) maintained 
by the IAEA.
6.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It will enter into 
force after ratification by 44 separately designated 
states. Finland ratified it in 1999. Adherence to the 
Treaty is monitored by means of an international 
monitoring system which, when complete, will com-
prise 321 monitoring stations. Of these, 80 stations 
detect radioactive particles in the atmosphere and 
40 are also capable of detecting radioactive xenon 
gas. The other stations measure seismic, hydro-
acoustic or infrasound waves. The measurement 
results of the monitoring system are available to 
all Member States.
The Preparatory Commission for the Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation 
(CTBTO), which convenes in Vienna, is preparing 
for the Treaty’s entry into force. All signatory states 
are represented in the Preparatory Commission. 
The Provisional Technical Secretariat, whose tasks 
include constructing and maintaining the interna-
tional monitoring system, operates in Vienna as 
well.
The National Data Centre (NDC), which is based 
on the CTBT and operates in conjunction with 
STUK, contributed to the work of the Preparatory 
Commission in establishing a cost-effective organi-
sation that is functional from the Finnish perspec-
tive. The automatic analysis software used for the 
NDC’s own routine monitoring analysed on aver-
age about 700 spectra per day towards the end of 
2009. Routine monitoring is facilitated by an alarm 
system transmitting data on unusual observations 
to NDC personnel. During 2009, backup systems 
were developed for the NDC.
The DPRK nuclear test on 25 May 2009 was 
clearly detected by the seismic devices of the CTBT 
monitoring network. Underground tests usually do 
not release radioactive particles to the atmosphere, 
but it is often possible to detect radioactive xenon 
gas. This was not detected this time by the CTBT 
network, neither have any other parties reported 
such observations in public. For about a week after 
the event, STUK provided the cooperation partners 
daily with situational pictures both prepared by 
the CTBTO and based on STUK’s own analyses.
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7 Safety research
The purpose of publicly funded safety research is 
to ascertain that the authorities have adequate 
expertise available, including concerning un-
foreseeable issues affecting the safety of nuclear 
facilities. Safety research is divided into two re-
search programmes, of which SAFIR2010 focuses 
on nuclear power plant safety and KYT2010 on 
strategic analyses of nuclear waste management. 
The projects under the research programmes are 
selected annually on the basis of a public call for 
projects. The projects selected for the programmes 
must be of a high scientific standard and their re-
sults must be available for publication. The results 
must have a broader scope of applicability than the 
nuclear facility of a particular licensee. Funding is 
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted by 
research institutions, universities and utilities operat-
ing nuclear power plants. In general terms, nuclear 
safety research comprises two distinct areas of re-
search: nuclear power plant safety and nuclear waste 
management.
Public research programmes related to nuclear 
safety currently operational in Finland are the nuclear 
power plant safety research programme SAFIR2010 
(2007–2010) and the national nuclear waste manage-
ment research programme KYT2010 (2006–2010). 
The purpose of these programmes is not only to 
provide scientific and technical results, but also to 
ensure the maintenance and development of Finnish 
expertise. Further information on the projects is avail-
able on the websites of the research programmes at 
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2010/ and http://
www.ydinjatetutkimus.fi/index.html.
Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the parties with 
nuclear waste management obligations are unam-
biguously responsible for the design, implementation 
and cost of managing the waste they have produced, 
including the associated research and development 
work. Regarding final disposal, this research and 
development work is carried out by Posiva Oy with its 
extensive research programme. 
Finnish actors contribute extensively to interna-
tional nuclear safety research within the framework 
of the following programmes and organisations: the 
European Union’s framework research programmes 
(both fission and fusion research), the Nordic NKS 
safety research programme, the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the OECD, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the UN family.
Finnish actors have also preliminarily charted 
issues related to the technology, safety and economy 
of new-generation GEN4 reactors. GEN4 research 
is financed within the four-year Sustainable Energy 
(SusEn) research programme of the Finnish Academy 
of Science and Letters, launched at the beginning of 
2008. Research into fourth-generation reactors is part 
of energy technology research.
not granted for research which is directly connect-
ed with projects licensees or parties representing 
them carry out for their own needs or for research 
which is directly provided by nuclear energy regu-
latory oversight. STUK controls this research by 
contributing to the work of the programmes’ steer-
ing and reference groups. Every year, The Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy ascertains that 
the proposed set of projects meets the statutory 
requirements and STUK’s research needs related 
to nuclear safety. STUK issued its statement on 
the projects under the publicly-funded SAFIR2010 
research programme for 2009 in january, and a 
corresponding statement on the KYT2010 pro-
gramme in February. Research results were pre-
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sented at seminars dedicated to the SAFIR2010 
and KYT2010 research programmes (websites: 
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2010/ and http://
www.ydinjatetutkimus.fi/tiedotteetmain.html). 
The core areas of the SAFIR2010 programme 
are fuel and reactor physics, the structural safety 
of the reactor circuit, thermal hydraulics and ac-
cident analyses. A slightly lesser focus is placed on 
organisations and human factors, automation and 
the control room, and the employment of proba-
bilistic risk analysis in safety management and 
control. The funding of the SAFIR2010 research 
programme totalled €7.0 million in 2009, which 
represents about half of nuclear facility safety 
research in Finland. The research programme pro-
vided funding to 31 research projects in various 
areas of research.  The areas of research under 
SAFIR2010 and their shares of the total funding 
are shown in Figure 17.
The SAFIR2010 safety research programme 
supports the safe operation of existing nuclear 
power plants, and also prepares for the develop-
Figure 17. Research areas of SAFIR2010 programme 
and their shares of the total funding in 2009.
Figure 18. Research areas of KYT2010 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2009.
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ment of the capabilities required by new plant 
projects. The expertise created during the research 
programme has been utilised, inter alia, in assess-
ing the safety of the new Olkiluoto 3 plant unit 
under construction. Experts, calculation methods 
and test equipment have been deployed on issues 
related to the ageing management of plant materi-
als, structures and equipment and to the review of 
accident analyses, and, in particular with regard to 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, to assessing the quality 
and manufacturing methods of reactor circuit pipe-
lines, to estimating the fire resistance of cables and 
to ensuring that requirements regarding aircraft 
impact are met.
Twenty-seven applications were received for 
the KYT2010 programme for 2009, 19 of which 
were accepted. The total budget of the programme 
was €1.7 million. The projects represented all 
subjects of the research programme – safety as-
sessment, strategic studies and studies of social 
impact. The KYT steering group gave its funding 
recommendations to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, relying on the assessments of the 
support group. The studies mainly concentrated on 
the safety assessment of final disposal of nuclear 
fuel, such as engineered barriers (8), bedrock and 
groundwater (3), and the release and transporta-
tion of radionuclides (6). In 2009, the programme 
included also one social research project and one 
strategic research project. Figure 18 shows the 
relative shares of these areas of the total funding. 
A total of 24 research project proposals were sub-
mitted for 2010, and the work of evaluating them 
is in progress. 
In 2009, the development of the processes and 
methods of the KYT2010 programme continued in 
the form of preparing guidelines describing the pro-
cedures for the implementation of the framework 
programmes and annual programmes, and setting 
up a working group for establishing a national 
training provision for nuclear waste management. 
Furthermore, working groups investigated the 
possibility of establishing a nuclear waste manage-
ment competence centre and enhanced the support 
group’s activities to follow the progress of research 
projects.
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8 Enforcement of regulatory 
oversight of nuclear facilities
8.1 Review of documents
In all, 4,121 documents were submitted to STUK 
for review in 2009. Of these, 1,815 concerned the 
nuclear power plant under construction, and 138 
were related to the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. A total of 3504 document reviews were com-
pleted, including documents submitted in 2009, 
those submitted earlier and licences granted by 
Figure 20. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 21. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2.
Figure 22. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 19. Number of documents received and 
reviewed as well as average document review time.
STUK in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
which are listed in Appendix 4. The average docu-
ment review time was 93 days. The number of 
documents and their average review times in 2005-
2009 are shown in Figure 19. Figures 20, 21 and 22 
present the distribution of document review times 
for the different plant units.
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8.2 Inspections on site and at 
suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
In 2009, STUK carried out 18 inspections at the 
Loviisa power plant and 17 at the Olkiluoto power 
plant in accordance with the periodic inspection 
programme (Appendix 5). STUK carried out 14 
inspections within the Olkiluoto 3 construction in-
spection programme (Appendix 6) and eight in-
spections within the Onkalo construction inspec-
tion programme (Appendix 7). The findings of the 
inspections are presented in the chapters on regu-
latory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 1,110 inspections on site or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2009 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the safeguards of nuclear materi-
als and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground research facility at Olkiluoto, 
which are discussed separately). An inspection 
comprises one or more partial inspections, such 
as a review of results documentation, an inspec-
tion of a component or a structure, a pressure or 
leakage test, a functional test or a commissioning 
inspection. Of the inspections, 594 were related to 
the regulatory oversight of the plant under con-
struction and 516 to that of the operating plants . 
Relevant documents are reviewed prior to on-site 
inspections.
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 3085. 
This number includes not only inspections pertain-
ing to the safety of nuclear power plants, but also 
those associated with nuclear waste management 
and safeguards, and audits and inspection of the 
underground research facility at Olkiluoto. In addi-
tion, a total of 241 inspection days outside normal 
working hours were spent at operating nuclear 
power plants, mostly during annual maintenance 
outages, as well as 113 inspection days at the plant 
under construction. Six resident inspectors worked 
at the Olkiluoto power plant and two resident in-
spectors at the Loviisa power plant. The number of 
on-site inspection days in 2005–2009 is shown in 
Figure 23.
8.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to, and not subject to, a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
consisted of the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to oversight. Those basic operations not subject 
to a charge included international and domestic 
co-operation, as well as emergency response and 
communications. Basic operations not subject to a 
charge are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-
making and support functions (administration, 
development projects in support of regulatory ac-
tivities, training, maintenance and development of 
expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2009, the costs of the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were €16.0 mil-
Figure 23. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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Figure 24. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
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lion. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were €17.5 million. Thus the share of activities 
subject to a charge was 91.4%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2009 was €16.0  million. Of this, €2.5 million came 
from the inspection and review of the Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant and €9.4 million from the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants. In addition to the operating 
plant units, the income from the Olkiluoto plant 
includes that derived from the regulatory oversight 
of the Olkiluoto 3 construction project. The income 
from the regulatory oversight of the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants also includes the 
costs invoiced for the safety assessment of the new 
nuclear power plant projects. The income derived 
from the safety assessments of Fennovoima’s nu-
clear power plant project was about €240,000. The 
income from the inspection and review of Posiva 
Oy’s operations was €2.0 million. Figure 24 shows 
the annual income and costs from nuclear safety 
regulation in 2005–2009.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant was 11.3 person-
years, i.e. 8.5% of the total working time of the nu-
clear regulatory personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant’s operating units it was 12.0 person-
years, which accounts for 9.0% of the total working 
time. In addition to the monitoring of the operation 
of nuclear power plants, the figure includes nuclear 
material control. The time spent on inspection 
and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 33.6 person-years, 
i.e. 25.2% of the total working time. Work related 
to the new power plant projects accounted for 2.6 
person-years, i.e. 2.0% of the total working time. 
The time spent on nuclear waste management 
inspection and review was 8.5 person-years. The 
time spent on international co-operation regarding 
regulatory oversight of nuclear safety was 5.3 per-
son-years, and that spent on the FiR 1 research 
reactor was 0.1 person-years. The working time 
spent on small-scale users of nuclear material was 
0.01 person-years. Figure 25 shows the division of 
working hours of the personnel engaged in nuclear 
safety oversight (in person-years) by subject of 
oversight in 2001–2009.
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of reg-
ulatory decision making. Figures 26 and 27 show 
the costs of nuclear safety research in 2005–2008. 
In addition to technical support projects, the 2005 
figures also reflect the costs of national nuclear 
safety research. The costs for 2009 mostly relate 
to reference analyses and independent assess-
ments made for the plant unit under construction 
and to the reviews of safety documentation for the 
final disposal of nuclear waste. Appendix 8 lists 
STUK-financed, nuclear power plant safety-related 
commissions completed in 2008. The reviews of 
the safety documentation for the final disposal of 
nuclear energy are discussed in section 5.2.
The distribution of the annual working time of 
the nuclear safety regulatory personnel to different 
duty areas is shown in Table 7.
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Figure 26. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 27. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table 7. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Basic operations subject to a charge 47.1 53.6 55.7 60.7 68.0
Basic operations not subject to a charge 7.2 5.7 6.1 6.3 6.6
Contracted services 3.3 3.0 2.2 2.2 1.7
Rule-making and support functions 27.5 28.8 30.3 31.5 33.6
Holidays and absences 16.9 20.0 19.1 21.1 23.5
Total 101.9 111.0 113.4 121.8 133.5
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9 Development of regulatory oversight
9.1 STUK’s own development projects
Changes in practices and the organisation 
were updated in the quality manual
A total of 21 guides were updated in the qual-
ity manual for nuclear safety regulation, and two 
new guides completed. The new guides apply to 
external expert groups in nuclear waste manage-
ment and to conveying data on exceptional events 
related to nuclear materials and other radioactive 
materials to the database maintained by the IAEA. 
Updates were required due to, for example, new 
upper-level regulations, changed procedures, the 
organisational change carried out in the Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation department, and the changes 
in persons responsible for various tasks.
STUK’s internal regulations 
preparation process was enhanced
The development of STUK’s internal process for 
preparing regulations continued during the year. 
The guides in STUK’s quality system concerning 
drafting of regulations were evaluated and updat-
ed, the Regulations team consisting of representa-
tives from different departments was regularised, 
and due to feedback received, the structure and 
naming of YVL Guides now being revised were re-
considered and clarified. Changes took place in per-
sons coordinating and managing regulations work 
at department level. STUK nominated a director 
who is responsible especially for the preparation of 
safety regulations in STUK’s mandate. The direc-
tor reports to the Director General.
Review of nuclear waste management by 
international regulatory authorities
STUK arranged a European peer review of the 
regulatory authorities’ operations in nuclear waste 
management on 2–6 November 2009. The review-
ers were invited from all EU member states and 
also from Norway, Switzerland and the European 
Commission. The objective was to receive a de-
tailed collegial assessment of the level of our regu-
latory control and suggestions for the development 
of the safety assessment of a nuclear facility of a 
new type. The review was carried out using the 
IAEA’s international peer review model and safety 
criteria.
Eleven reviewers participated in the review, 
that is from practically all EU countries using nu-
clear energy (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Rumania, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK). The review group set to 
work on, among other things, management of nu-
clear waste regulatory control, safety assessment 
work, inspection activities, preparation of safety 
regulations, adequacy of competence and organisa-
tion, resource and training issues, and corporate 
relations.
The review group’s recommendation to STUK 
was that the safety regulations and instructions 
should be elaborated to be more detailed and fo-
cusing more on the future stages of nuclear waste 
management. The group identified persistent nu-
clear waste work and the efficiency of the regula-
tory system as good practices and a useful lesson to 
other EU countries.
The results and an action programme based on 
them are available at STUK’s website (http://www.
stuk.fi/stuk/fi_FI/palveluksessasi).
International review of physical protection
As a commission from the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, an International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service mission (IPPAS) per-
taining to Finnish nuclear facilities and radiation 
sources was carried out by the IAEA on 22 june–3 
july 2009. The assessment concerned legislation 
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and other regulations related to physical protec-
tion, authority activities and practical implementa-
tion of physical protection.
An expert team of seven persons participated in 
the assessment. The team had discussions with ex-
perts representing many different official organisa-
tions and visited Finnish nuclear power plants and 
some facilities where radiation is used.
The assessment team observed several good 
practices in Finland and compiled several recom-
mendations and proposals to further improve phys-
ical protection and its monitoring. After the IPPAS 
mission, STUK’s resources in physical protection 
oversight and coordination of oversight have been 
strengthened.
Based on the results of the assessment, an ac-
tion programme has been drawn up, according to 
which an interim report was prepared on the sta-
tus of the implementation of the actions at the end 
of january 2010. All the necessary actions will be 
carried out by the end of 2010.
Faltering start for the records 
management system
Records management software covering all STUK’s 
activities was introduced. The new software com-
bines STUK’s earlier separate records and regis-
ters. The introduction of the records management 
solution also required that STUK’s earlier records 
management plan (AMS) was reviewed and up-
dated.
During the implementation of the software, 
technical flaws were still detected in some of its 
functions due to which, for example, the introduc-
tion of electronic workflows had to be postponed. 
Also abundant feedback from the users necessitat-
ed reconsidering some choices made in the original 
requirement specification. After the commissioning 
some critical corrections and modifications were 
made without delay, which made it possible to 
continue the commissioning. The records manage-
ment system was named the SAHA system and at 
the end of 2009 it was available to all at STUK for 
preparing and recording official documents. The 
development needs of the system have been sys-
tematically collected and in this respect the work 
will continue in the next few years.
Electronic inspection records 
will be introduced
Over 10 different inspection record forms have been 
used in nuclear safety regulation. The manual pro-
cedures for these protocols in their current format 
do not allow optimal information management, 
such as reports on the effectiveness of STUK’s own 
operations, compilation of statistics on inspection 
observations and follow-up of remarks made in in-
spections. In early 2009, work with the system sup-
plier’s experts started. The project continued in the 
spring of 2009 with the designing of forms, and the 
first model records were introduced for trial in the 
summer of 2009. The project has made progress, 
and the first inspection records will be put into 
service in 2010.
Regulatory control of final disposal project
Processing of construction 
permit applications
During 2009, STUK worked out the processing 
of the construction permit application for the fi-
nal disposal and encapsulation facility for spent 
nuclear fuel. In this connection the requirements 
for these facilities set forth in related STUK YVL 
Guides were looked through. The purpose of this 
was to chart which of the requirements concerning 
primarily nuclear facilities concern final disposal 
of spent fuel.
Regulatory control of the manufacture of 
the bentonite buffer and copper canister
Since 2008, procedures have been developed and 
documentation prepared for the regulatory control 
of the manufacture and installation of the canister 
and the buffer material as well as backfill, and for 
quality verification. The aim is to be able to control 
the quality of the manufacture of the canister and 
other EBS (Engineered Barrier System) compo-
nents, and the success of installation. The docu-
mentation will be revised later on to form part of 
the renewed YVL Guides and/or of STUK’s internal 
operational guides (YTV Guides). A dialogue with 
the licence applicant has been set in motion.
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Assessment of the long-term 
safety of final disposal
STUK strengthened its capabilities to analyse the 
long-term safety of final disposal of spent fuel by 
purchasing the first version of the Ecolego soft-
ware. The programme can be used for conducting 
comparative independent analyses, and in this way 
the main results of a preliminary safety analysis 
can be assessed, as well the long-term safety sig-
nificance of the initial data and assumptions used 
in the analysis. The long-term objective is the as-
sessment of the significance of the open safety is-
sues in Posiva’s licence projects and consequently 
the prioritisation of resources for the assessment of 
the whole licence project.
Requirements management system
A browser-based requirements management sys-
tem was under development by STUK in 2009. The 
purpose of the system is to improve the dialogue 
between the regulatory authorities and mainly 
Posiva, as well as the traceability of correspond-
ence. Also, the most important issues from transac-
tions between Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Fortum Oy 
and Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation are 
recorded in the system.
9.2 Renewal and human resources
Training was organised for STUK inspectors on nu-
clear power plant systems and regulatory opera-
tions, for example. New STUK inspectors participat-
ed in a national training programme in the nuclear 
safety field (the YK course), which STUK organises 
together with other actors in the field. The total du-
ration of the sixth YK course was 19 days in six pe-
riods. Three phases took place in spring 2009. Nine 
STUK employees participated in the YK6 course. In 
autumn 2009, the YK7 course began with ten STUK 
inspectors participating. The total number of par-
ticipants in the YK7 course was 65.
STUK’s inspectors also participated in training 
provided by external enterprises, such as lead au-
ditor training, project operations training, auditing 
training, and various domestic and international 
training events. In addition, supervisors in the nu-
clear safety field participated in leadership skills 
coaching programmes.
In 2009, a Master of Science thesis (Mikko Aho, 
Configuration Management in Automation System 
Projects, 2009) was completed at the department of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The thesis examines 
factors and procedures related to configuration 
change management in automation systems. In 
configuration management, leadership and proce-
dures employed by the organisation often play a 
bigger role than technology. A lot of changes are 
often made in big projects. Hence it is important 
that all parties share a common point of view and 
guidelines for configuration management.
On average, 10.6 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation and 9.5 
days per inspector in the field of nuclear reactor 
regulation were spent on developing the expertise 
of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2009.
Six new inspectors were hired for nuclear reac-
tor regulation in 2009. They are engaged in the 
inspection of mechanical components, in the field of 
I&C technology, in construction technology, physi-
cal protection regulation and installation over-
sight. Two new inspectors were hired for nuclear 
waste regulation. The first of them started work in 
june 2009, and the second in january 2010. Their 
areas of responsibility are radiation protection and 
system design.
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10 Emergency preparedness
In 2009, STUK organised emergency training and 
exercises related to nuclear facility and radiation 
emergencies. The exercises test the operation of 
the emergency response organisation, the func-
tionality of the emergency response guidelines and 
the usability of the emergency response premises 
in practice, and develop these spheres on the ba-
sis of the feedback received from the exercises. 
In addition, they familiarise new personnel with 
STUK’s operations in emergency situations and 
their personal duties in the emergency response 
organisation.
STUK participated in Barents Rescue exercise 
arranged by the Nordic countries and Russia on 
8–10 September 2009 in Murmansk, Russia, and 
in a emergency exercise at the Loviisa power plant 
in the spring of 2009. Part of the STUK emergency 
response organisation also participated in interna-
tional emergency exercises organised by the IAEA 
and the EU.
The functioning of the equipment and communi-
cations in STUK’s alert area with emergency power 
supply was tested in conjunction with substation 
maintenance in the building on 2 june 2009.
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11 Communication
New power plant projects attracted 
interest of the public and the media 
In 2009, nuclear safety issues invoked a lot of dis-
cussion and questions in Finland. STUK experts 
gave several interviews in particular on new nucle-
ar power plant projects and on problems observed 
in Olkiluoto 3 I&C design, safety culture and weld-
ing work.
STUK experts also appeared in public hearings 
arranged in conjunction with the preparation of the 
decision-in-principle for the nuclear power plant 
projects. These hearings were arranged in project-
ed nuclear power plant localities. The experts also 
provided locals with basic information on nuclear 
and radiation safety in other local events.
A total of 21 press releases were issued. STUK 
provided information about the results of the pre-
liminary safety assessment of TVO’s new power 
plant project at the end of May, and of Fortum’s and 
Fennovoima’s assessments in October. According to 
the press releases, all the projected power plant 
options can be constructed in compliance with 
Finnish safety regulations.
At midsummer, STUK announced that it had 
requested TVO to provide additional clarifications 
of the Olkiluoto 3 I&C design. The I&C issues came 
up again in October, when STUK, together with 
French and British nuclear safety authorities, pre-
pared an announcement, in which the authorities 
jointly require that the automation-based safety 
systems of the EPR nuclear power plant must be 
improved from the original design.
STUK also provided information about the flaws 
detected in the welds of the reactor coolant pipes, 
containment building and cooling system pipes 
and about two events classified as INES 1 at the 
operating Olkiluoto power plants. In addition, a 
press release was issued in june relating informa-
tion about an assessment carried out by an IAEA 
expert team of physical protection in Finland. 
The team recorded a number of recommendations 
which have proven useful and which help to perfect 
physical protection.
At the end of October, STUK reported that it 
had inspected the periodic safety review carried 
out by TVO on the operating Olkiluoto power plant 
units. STUK’s press release stated that the safety 
of the plant units is good but it can still be im-
proved with practical measures. The safety review 
itself, as all important decision documents concern-
ing nuclear power plant regulation, was published 
by STUK on the Internet.
The fifth “Säteilyn salat” (Secrets of Radiation) 
reporter course was arranged in spring. Twenty-
two reporters participated in the course, during 
which STUK experts gave informative lectures 
on radiation-related subjects and also on nuclear 
safety. In addition to lectures, the participants had 
an opportunity to make an excursion to the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant and, on a study trip, to the 
Chernobyl power plant site in Ukraine.
STUK’s Alara magazine dealt with nuclear 
safety issues taking into account the entire life 
cycle of a nuclear power plant. Among other things, 
the magazine considered the reasons for the delay 
of the Olkiluoto 3 construction project, the impact 
of nuclear power plants’ waste heat release into 
the sea and the responsibilities of environmental 
monitoring and challenges presented by nuclear 
power plant decommissioning.
The last issue of the year, a thematic issue on 
nuclear safety, also estimated how the worldwide 
construction of more nuclear energy, advancement 
of technology and the proliferation of nuclear arms 
challenge the nuclear safety branch to enhance 
their international cooperation. In the same issue 
Daniel jåfs, a fresh doctoral graduate, recounted in 
his interview how the first introduction of nuclear 
energy to Finland at the turn of 1960s–1970s also 
improved safety culture in Russia.
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12 International cooperation
Participation in cooperation within international 
organisations in the fields of radiation and nucle-
ar safety regulatory control, bilateral cooperation 
with various countries, participation in cooperation 
projects involving several countries, and presenta-
tions given at international meetings in 2009 are 
listed in Appendix 9.
The following includes short summaries of the 
international cooperation domains which were the 
most significant from a nuclear safety regulation 
perspective in 2009.
Cooperation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory 
guides on nuclear safety. STUK had a representa-
tive in both the Commission on Safety Standards 
(CSS) managing the preparation of the regulatory 
guides and in the committees dealing with the 
content of the regulatory guides, viz. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the Waste 
Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) 
and the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC). STUK issued statements on the IAEA 
regulatory guides under preparation. STUK also 
participated in the composition of regulatory guide 
drafts in small expert groups.
The International Nuclear Safety Group 
(INSAG) is convened under the auspices of the 
IAEA at the invitation of the IAEA Director 
General with the objective of providing strategic 
opinions for the development of nuclear safety 
globally. STUK’s representative acts as the deputy 
chairperson of the group. STUK’s representative 
is also included in another group invited by the 
Director General, the SAGSI, dealing with nuclear 
material safeguards.
STUK’s representatives participated in expert 
groups summoned by the IAEA; the groups re-
viewed the regulatory authorities’ operations in the 
United Kingdom, Russia and Canada. Furthermore, 
STUK’s representative participated in an OSART 
review carried out at the Oskarshamn nuclear 
power plant, in which a team of 13 international 
experts set up by the IAEA reviewed the nuclear 
power plants operation for almost three weeks.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for co-operation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. STUK’s 
representatives also participated actively in the 
activities of working groups under the standing 
committees. The main committees’ fields of activity 
are:
•	 nuclear	safety	regulation	(CNRA,	Committee	on	
Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safety	
of Nuclear Installations)
•	 radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 nuclear	 waste	 management	 (RWMC,	 Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee)
Cooperation within the EU
STUK participated in the activities of the EU 
member states’ nuclear safety regulators’ co-oper-
ation group (ENSREG, European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group) and in two of its subgroups (nu-
clear safety and nuclear waste management). The 
cooperation group participates in the preparation 
of directives pertaining to nuclear safety and co-
ordinates the implementation of directives in the 
member states.
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STUK took an active part in the planning and 
steering of the European coordination centre for 
nuclear power plants’ operational experience feed-
back network (EU Clearinghouse on NPP OEF). 
The coordination centre works in conjunction with 
the European Commission’s Institute for Energy, 
joint Research Centre (IE-jRC) located in Petten, 
the Netherlands. One STUK employee works as a 
national expert at the IE-jRC in Petten. STUK’s 
Director General acts as the chair of the Technical 
Board of the EU Clearinghouse and STUK’s coor-
dinator for international operating feedback as his 
assistant. STUK’s responsible person for the IRS 
database participates in a group designing the EU 
Clearinghouse website and database.
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was originally established on the initia-
tive of the United States nuclear safety authority 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC) with the 
objective of improving cooperation in the field of 
the assessment of new nuclear power plants and to 
develop convergent regulatory practices. Nuclear 
safety authorities from 10 countries participate 
in the programme: the USA, South Africa, japan, 
Canada, China, Korea, France, Finland, the United 
Kingdom and Russia. Participants in the program-
me include only countries with new nuclear power 
plants at some stage of assessment by the regula-
tory authorities. Some other countries have also 
expressed their interest in joining the program-
me, but for the time being no new countries have 
been accepted. The programme has contracted the 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency to function as its 
secretariat. In addition to meeting arrangements, 
the secretariat takes care of the library where all 
the documents are entered. The MDEP work is 
organised in Design-Specific and Issue-Specific 
working groups. Currently there are two Design-
Specific working groups: the EPR working group 
and the AP 1000-working group. Finland partici-
pates in the EPR working group only. The other 
countries in the EPR group include France, the 
USA, the United Kingdom, Canada and China. The 
Finnish representative is the chairperson of the 
EPR working group. The EPR group’s work was 
originally a continuation of cooperation between 
the Finnish and French authorities concerning sa-
fety assessment of EPR power plants.
There are three Issue-Specific working groups:
•	 Vendor	Inspection	Cooperation	Working	Group
•	 Pressure	Boundary	Codes	and	Standards	Work-
ing Group
•	 Digital	Instrumentation	and	Controls	Working	
Group.
Finland participates in the activities of all three 
Issue-Specific Working Groups. The objective of the 
Vendor Inspection Working Group is to achieve 
an understanding of the participating countries’ 
inspection procedures concerning primary circuit 
main components, their biggest differences and 
similarities and possibilities to utilise inspections 
carried out by other regulatory authorities. In 
2009, the group carried out 13 joint inspections. 
The objective of the Pressure Boundary Working 
Group is the harmonisation of the requirements 
in different standards, not their complete unifica-
tion. For harmonisation it is necessary to know the 
differences between standards and to understand 
the reasons for them. Stage one deals with Class 1 
pressure vessels and stage two is going to deal with 
Class 1 pipelines, valves and pumps. Stage one 
is almost completed. The Digital Instrumentation 
and Controls Working Group aims to promote coor-
dinated development of the IEC and IEEE stand-
ards. In addition, some individual issues have been 
chosen, on which common position type opinions 
have been drafted.
Besides these working groups, a subgroup act-
ing in conjunction with the Steering Technical 
Committee has prepared a report on nuclear power 
plant safety objectives in different countries.
WENRA, Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association
STUK participated in the WENRA (Western 
European Regulators’ Association) working groups 
on nuclear safety, nuclear waste and decommission-
ing. The groups developed common safety reference 
levels on the basis of the IAEA standards. The 
leading nuclear safety authorities who comprise 
the WENRA group have set as their objective that 
the requirements for nuclear safety be brought 
into compliance with these reference levels in the 
WENRA member states by the end of 2010. The 
target schedule for the requirements for nuclear 
waste storage is the end of 2012; for the require-
ments for decommissioning, the end of 2013; and 
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for the requirements for final disposal of nuclear 
waste, the end of 2015. In 2009, the nuclear safety 
group also drew up general safety principles for 
new reactors. At the end of 2009, STUK’s Director 
General was elected to chair WENRA.
VVER cooperation
STUK participated in the cooperation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with VVER 
power plants via the VVER Forum. Two working 
groups chaired by STUK representatives function 
in conjunction with the forum:
•	 Probabilistic	risk	analyses	of	VVER-440	power	
plants. The final report for three years’ work 
was completed.
•	 Regulatory	 oversight	 of	 organisations.	 The	
working group’s theme was the assessment and 
oversight of management systems.
Bilateral cooperation
In 2009, STUK continued bilateral cooperation in 
the form of meetings and conferences with the 
nuclear safety regulatory authorities of Sweden, 
Russia, France and the USA, among others.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operati-
on of nuclear power plants. the power companies 
and StuK evaluate and oversee the safety and 
operation of the plants in many ways. along with 
inspections and safety reviews, indicators are a 
method of acquiring information on the safety level 
of the plant and on any changes to the safety level. 
the StuK indicator system consists of two main 
groups: 1) plant safety indicators and 2) indicators 
describing the efficiency of the authorities. this 
summary covers the indicators describing plant 
safety.
the objective of the indicator system is to recog-
nise changes in plant safety as early as possible. if 
indicators weaken, the factors behind the develop-
ment are defined and changes to plant operation 
and StuK’s oversight of the area are considered. 
indicators can also be used to monitor the efficien-
cy and effectiveness of the corrective measures. 
the information yielded by the indicators is also 
used when communicating nuclear safety.
in the indicator system the nuclear safety is 
divided into three sectors: 1) safety and quality 
culture, 2) operational events, and 3) structural in-
tegrity. these three sectors are futhermore divided 
into a total of 14 sub-areas to be interpreted (see 
the table below).
StuK began the development of its own indica-
tor system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator informa-
tion has been managed in StuK’s indi (indicator 
display) information system. nominated StuK 
representatives are responsible for the mainte-
nance and analysis of the indicators. individual 
indicators, their maintenance procedures and the 
interpretation of results are presented at the end 
of this summary. in 2003, the nuclear safety indica-
tors were first connected with StuK’s strategy and 
reported as part of regulatory oversight of nuclear 
safety. indicators monitor the implementation and 
success of the strategy. 
Nuclear safety
A.I Safety and quality culture A.II Operational events A.III Stuructural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events
1. Fuel integrity2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Technical Specifications
2. Direct causes of events
3. Unavailability of safety systems 3. Risk-significance of events 2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity4. Occupational radiation doses
4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
5. Radioactive releases
3. Containment integrity
6. Investments in facilities 5. Number of fire alarms
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StuK’s long-term safety objectives concerning 
nuclear power plants were as follows in 2009:
•	 No	accidents	or	serious	incidents	occur	at	Fin-
nish nuclear power plants.
•	 Risks	related	to	a	nuclear	power	plant	are	ma-
naged to decrease or stabilise the accident risk 
at the plants in the long term.
•	 Only	 minor	 releases	 of	 radioactive	 materials	
into the environment occur.
•	 The	 radiation	 dose	 of	 every	 employee	 at	 the	
nuclear facility is below the personal dose li-
mit.
•	 The	collective	radiation	dose	 for	all	employees	
of a nuclear power plant stays below the ma-
ximum limit defined in Guide yVl 7.9 when 
figures from both nuclear power plants are in-
cluded.
the nuclear safety performance indicators show 
that the operation and maintenance of the loviisa 
and olkiluoto power plants have complied with 
these objectives. a brief summary of the safety 
situation in each plant in 2009 is presented below, 
followed by the detailed results by indicator.
Results for the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2009
Loviisa NPP
Summary
a fuel leak occurred at both plant units of the 
loviisa power plant. the fuel leak at loviisa 2 
was detected in late 2008. however, the fuel leak 
remained small and the leaking bundle was remo-
ved from the reactor during the 2009 annual main-
tenance. at loviisa 1, the fuel leak was detected 
after annual maintenance in october 2009 and the 
leaking bundle will be removed from the reactor 
during the 2010 annual maintenance at the latest. 
the causes for the fuel leaks have not been estab-
lished yet. the integrity of the primary circuit and 
the containment building remained good. 
regarding plant operation, the licence holder re-
ported six exceptional situations, five of which were 
non-compliant with the technical Specifications. 
the events were minor and their safety signifi-
cance small. in 2009, both plant units had short 
refuelling outages with few significant works as 
Safety and quality culture is assessed on the 
basis of information concerning the radiation pro-
tection and the operation and maintenance of the 
plant. The operation and maintenance of the plant 
is monitored using the failure and maintenance 
data for the components with an effect on the safe 
operation of the plant, as well as by monitoring 
compliance with the Technical Specifications. The 
success of radiation protection is monitored on the 
basis of the employees’ radiation doses and radio-
active releases into the environment. When asses-
sing the safety and quality culture, attention is 
also paid to investments to improve the plant and 
to the up-to-dateness of the plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational events 
are used to monitor special situations and signifi-
cant disturbances at the plant. Special situations 
include events with an effect on the safety of the 
plant, the personnel or the environment. A spe-
cial report is required for any special situations. 
Correspondingly, a disturbance report must be 
prepared for any significant disturbances occur-
ring at a plant unit. Such disturbances include 
reactor and turbine trips, and other operational 
transients leading to a forced reduction of more 
than 5% in the reactor power or average gross po-
wer. Risk indicators are used to monitor the safety 
effect of the equipment’s unavailability periods 
and the development of the plant’s risk level. The 
results provide insight into the operational activi-
ties at the plant and the efficiency of the operating 
experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and se-
condary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control primary and secon-
dary circuit integrity. The monitoring is done by 
indices depicting water chemistry control and by 
following selected corrosive impurities and corro-
sion products. The integrity of the containment is 
monitored by testing the leak tightness of isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
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regards radiation protection, and the radiation do-
ses received by employees were small. Systematic 
development work has been done at the loviisa 
power plant for reducing the radiation doses re-
ceived during annual maintenance in particular. 
the results of developing radiation protection me-
asures are also reflected in the favourable trend 
of indicators describing exposure to radiation. the 
releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere 
and aquatic environment were small and clearly 
below the release limits. in 2009, the loviisa power 
plant discharged low-activity evaporation residues 
into the sea as planned. this was shown as inc-
reased releases of materials with gamma activity 
and further as an increase in the calculated dose 
for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of 
the plant. the small scale of releases is reflected in 
the fact that the calculated dose (0.449 µSv) was 
less than 5% of the limit set in the Government 
decision (733/2008).
the calculated risk of accident at the loviisa 
power plant has constantly decreased during the 
last ten years. this is due to both the improved 
accuracy of risk analyses and, in particular, the 
significant modifications carried out at the plant 
for improving plant safety. the most significant ac-
cident risks include actions during annual mainte-
nance, such as the lifting of heavy loads in the reac-
tor hall or a power surge caused by sudden dilution 
of the boron used to adjust reactor operation, oil 
accidents at sea during refuelling outages, fire and 
high levels of seawater during power operation. 
however, the risks due to operating activities have 
slightly increased compared to previous years. this 
is in part explained by the unusually high number 
of faults associated with the ventilation systems 
of the plants as well as faults and maintenance 
operations in the auxiliary emergency feedwater 
systems. attention must be paid in the future to 
the management of ventilation faults at the plant. 
the functionality of safety systems is followed 
at the loviisa power plant on the basis of unavaila-
bility of the high-pressure safety injection system, 
the emergency feedwater system and the emergen-
cy diesel generators. the safety systems were in 
good condition, although the availability of diesel 
generators had slightly decreased from the previo-
us years. the maintenance of and fault repairs to 
components important to safety was appropriate.
Below, the results of the nuclear safety indica-
tors are presented in detail.
Olkiluoto NPP
Summary
the integrity of fuel and the primary circuit re-
mained good. the integrity of the containment 
building was affected by the fact that the total 
as-found leakages of outer isolation valves at both 
plant units exceeded the limit set in tech Specs 
during the first leak tests. at olkiluoto 1, most of 
the total as-found leakages were caused by a leaky 
valve of one measurement fitting in the reactor 
pressure vessel. at olkiluoto 2, most of the total 
as-found leakages were by a single leaking valve in 
the reactor pressure vessel cover spraying system. 
the isolation valve fitted in the same line inside 
the containment did not leak. after repairs, the 
total leakage of outer isolation valves met the re-
quirements of the technical Specifications.
a total of five events warranting special reports 
occurred at the olkiluoto power plant in 2009. this 
is in line with the ten-year average. the radiation 
doses received by employees and the releases to 
the environment remained small and clearly below 
the limits set in official regulations. the number 
of fire alarm occurrences increased somewhat in 
2009. this is at least in part explained by the modi-
fication and repair operations in 2009 as the dust, 
fumes and humidity generated by these operations 
caused some alarms in the detectors.
in 2009, the accident risk indicator for the 
olkiluoto power plant increased because the new 
analyses indicated that the reactor cleaning sys-
tem can no longer be utilised as the ultimate me-
ans of residual heat removal. in order to reduce 
the accident risk, tVo has established a working 
group for designing a separate route for the trans-
fer of residual heat. the most important factors 
affecting the overall accident risk include events 
during power operation, such as component failu-
res and pipe ruptures resulting from operational 
transients. the risks caused by operating activities 
have remained at the previous years’ level.
the functionality of safety systems at the 
olkiluoto power plant is assessed by monitoring 
the unavailability of the containment building 
spraying system, the auxiliary feed system and 
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the diesel generators. the indicators describing 
the containment building spraying system and 
the auxiliary feed system show that no significant 
deterioration has taken place in the condition of 
these systems. the availability of diesel generators 
was lower in 2008 which was caused by faults in 
the starter motors. the starter motors have now 
been included in the regular maintenance schedu-
les, and the indicators describing the availability of 
diesel generators in 2009 showed that they were in 
good condition.
the maintenance of components covered by the 
technical Specifications has functioned well. the 
number of fault repairs and associated operation 
restrictions has gradually decreased, and the re-
pairs have, as a rule, been carried out quickly. the 
operability of components covered by the technical 
Specifications were mainly reduced by the follo-
wing faults at olkiluoto 1: a fault in the isolation 
valve of the containment spray system, faults in 
the system controlling the neutron flux measu-
rement system actuators, washing operations of 
the component cooling system heat exchangers, 
and a fault in the position indication of the cont-
rol valve of the steam system blowdown line. at 
olkiluoto 2, the decrease in operability was caused 
by faults in two systems: washing operations of the 
component cooling system heat exchangers due to 
their reduced capacity and a fault in the position 
indication of the control valve of the steam system 
blowdown line. all fault repairs were carried out 
within the time constraints set out in the technical 
Specifications.
Below, the results of the nuclear safety indica-
tors are presented in detail.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject 
to the Technical Specifications
Definition
the number of failures causing unavailability of 
components defined in the technical Specifications 
(tech Spec components) during power operation is 
monitored as an indicator. the failures are divided 
by plant unit into two groups: failures causing an 
immediate operation restriction and failures cau-
sing an operation restriction in connection with 
repair work.
Source of data
the data is obtained from the work order sys-
tems and the operational documents of the power 
plants.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to assess the plant life-cycle 
management and the development of the condition 
of components.
Responsible units/persons
organisations and operations (oKa),  
resident inspectors
pauli Kopiloff (loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
in 2009, the number of failures in tech Spec com-
ponents causing an operating restriction was 181 
while it was 180 in 2008. the number of failures 
occurring in 2009 was significantly lower than the 
average of the four preceding years (210).
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the number of failures per year has remained rela-
tively stable. any variation therein is caused by the 
random occurrence of failures that are difficult to 
predict but will occur in any large number of compo-
nents. the recurrences of failures causing operating 
restrictions observed in 2009 are a matter that must 
be addressed in future plant maintenance. 
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failure detection and anticipation have been 
continuously improved in plant maintenance ope-
rations at loviisa, and components have been rep-
laced. thanks to these measures, the operability 
of components affecting the safe operation of the 
plant has remained under control. 
Based on the above, it can be stated that the 
indicator or the failure data behind it does not 
show the effects associated with the ageing of the 
facilities, which is an indication of well-functioning 
component life-cycle management and component 
maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
the number of failures occurring during power 
operation and causing the unavailability of compo-
nents subject to technical Specifications has been 
decreasing since 2007. the number of failures indi-
cates that maintenance work has been successful.
the inoperability period at ol1 during the first 
quarter of 2009 mainly consisted of faults in the 
containment spraying system isolation valve and 
the actuating system of the neutron flux measure-
ment system. the longest periods of inoperability 
during the second quarter were caused by the wa-
shing operations of the component cooling system 
heat exchangers. the inoperability period of the 
last quarter mainly consisted of a fault in the posi-
tion indicator of the control valve of the blowdown 
line of the steam system. in other respects, the 
periods of inoperability of individual components 
have been very short.
inoperability was caused at ol2 during the 
second quarter of 2009 by the washing operations 
of the component cooling system heat exchangers, 
necessitated by their deteriorated capacity. the 
inoperability period of the last quarter mainly 
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consisted of a fault in the position indicator of the 
control valve of the blowdown line of the steam sys-
tem. in other respects, the periods of inoperability 
due to faults have been very short.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components 
subject to the Technical Specifications
Definition
as the indicator, the number of failure repairs and 
preventive maintenance work orders for compo-
nents defined in the tech Specs are followed by 
plant unit.
Source of data
the data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and failure repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator describes the volumes of failure re-
pairs and preventive maintenance and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. the indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy executed at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
organisations and operations (oKa),  
resident inspectors
pauli Kopiloff (loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
a new it system was commissioned at the power 
plant in 2006. the indicator was improved in con-
junction with the it system revision. the annual 
maintenance operations also included the work for 
such components covered by tech Specs to which 
no operating restriction applied. the preventive 
maintenance figures include, according to the in-
formation system’s classification, the scheduled 
maintenance, in-service inspection, periodic testing 
and condition monitoring for components, as well 
as inspection/shift rounds. Similarly, repair work 
figures include overhauls and repairs of compo-
nent failures. due to the it system change and the 
extension and further specification of the scope of 
the figures, the maintenance figures are only fully 
comparable for the last four years. 
when considering the variation in the volume 
of failure repairs and particularly in the number 
of preventive maintenance works, the scheduling 
of various annual maintenance works (fuel repla-
cement outage, 4 year annual maintenance, brief 
annual maintenance, 8 year annual maintenance) 
included in the maintenance strategy during a four 
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year cycle should be considered as this can have a 
significant impact on the annual figures. Short re-
fuelling outages were implemented at the loviisa 
plant units in 2009. consequently, there was a sig-
nificant reduction in the maintenance work figures 
related to components covered by the tech Specs.
Judging by the data behind the indicator, 2009 
was not markedly different from the previous years 
as concerns preventive maintenance. the ratio of 
preventive maintenance work to fault repairs was 
4.18 in 2009, having been 4.30 in 2008. the large 
proportion of preventive maintenance work reflects 
the chosen maintenance strategy that allows kee-
ping the number of faults and their consequences 
at a reasonable level. 
the stability of the indicator values, with chan-
ges being mainly attributable to variation due to 
the scheduling of annual maintenance, may be 
regarded as an indication of a functional mainte-
nance strategy.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
the data for the indicator is obtained from the 
plant work order system and operating documen-
tation. due to changes in the work order system 
implemented by the power company as of 1 January 
2006, the data is not comparable with the figures 
for earlier years. class 3 data (systems subject to 
the technical Specifications (tech Specs)) has been 
removed from the work order classification, since 
the class 3 category covers all systems specified in 
the tech Specs. however, nowhere near all of these 
systems are subject to restrictions set out in the 
tech Specs. thus this indicator is used to monitor 
the ratio of the number of preventive maintenance 
works causing unavailability of components to the 
number of failure repairs.
the number of maintenance works causing ino-
perability of components, included in the indicator, 
has been decreasing since 2006 due to the decrea-
sing number of fault repairs. the amount of work 
causing unavailability of components included in 
the so-called preventive maintenance packages, 
carried out for ol2 in the first part of the year 
and for ol1 in the latter part of the year, dropped 
approximately 30% in 2007 compared to 2006. the 
figure for 2009 was almost the same as in 2007 and 
2008.
the total number of fault repairs due to oc-
currences of inoperability has been on the decline 
since 2006 while the total number of preventive 
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maintenance operations has increased during the 
last three years.
the ratio of preventive maintenance work to 
fault repairs was 1.20 in 2007 and 1.33 in 2008. in 
2008, the ratio was 1.68.
Based on the development of the ratio of preven-
tive maintenance work to fault repairs and the as-
sessment of the work behind the figures, the main-
tenance strategy can be considered functional.
A.I.1c Repair time of components subject 
to the Technical Specifications
Definition
as the indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing unavailability of components defined in 
the tech Specs is monitored. with each repair, the 
time recorded is the time of inoperability. it is cal-
culated from the detection of the failure to the end 
of repair work, if the failure causes an immediate 
operation restriction. if the component is operable 
until the beginning of repair, only the time of the 
repair work is taken into account.
Source of data
the data is obtained from the work order systems 
and maintenance, and the operational documents 
of the power plants.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator shows how quickly failed tech Spec 
components are repaired in relation to the repair 
time allowed in the tech Specs. the indicator is 
used to assess the strategy, resources and effective-
ness of plant maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
organisations and operations (oKa),  
resident inspectors
pauli Kopiloff (loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
the technical Specifications define the maximum 
allowed repair times for components based on the 
components’ safety significance. the times vary 
between 4 hours and 21 days. in addition to the 
allotted time, the principle is that the failures of 
tech Spec components are to be repaired without 
undue delay.
due to the small amount of work requiring 
operation restrictions and the varying allowable 
repair times, an individual operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator value even when 
it is performed within the allotted time. this as-
pect of the indicator is taken into account in the 
interpretation of the indicator by evaluating the 
significance of individual long-term failure repairs 
in terms of maintenance strategy, resources and 
efficiency of operations.
the average repair times of failures causing 
unavailability of components have remained stable 
at the loviisa plant for several years. in 2009, the 
average repair time at the plant units was 39.4 
hours while the average for the four preceding 
years was 31.5 hours. the average repair time of 
tech Spec component failures that had an allowed 
repair time of 72 hours or less was 25.4 hours at 
lo1 and 21.7 hours at lo2 in 2009.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
the indicator is used to monitor the repair times of 
components subject to the technical Specifications. 
the repair time allowed in the technical 
Specifications is usually 30 days for faults con-
cerning one subsystem and three days for faults 
concerning two subsystems. depending on the sys-
tem and the component, other allowed repair times 
may be defined in the technical Specifications.
over a longer period, the average repair time 
has varied between five to eight hours with the ex-
ception of 2007. in that year, repair times increased 
strongly for both plant units to 1.5 times the pre-
vious figure at ol1 and to more than six times the 
previous figure at ol2. for both plant units, the 
increase was due to a failure in a single device.
in 2009, the average repair time of failures 
causing inoperability of components defined in 
the technical Specifications was approximately 10 
hours for both plant units. this meant a two-fold 
increase from the previous year. for both plant 
units, the increase was due to a failure in a single 
device. at both plant units, the fault was in the 
position indication of the control valve of the steam 
system blowdown line.
on the basis of the 2009 indicators and the data 
behind them, the plant’s maintenance operations 
meet the requirements.
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A.I.1d Common cause failures
Definition
as the indicator, the number of common cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the tech 
Specs is followed.
Source of data
data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the utilities of works causing an operation re-
striction.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
tomi Koskiniemi (loviisa)
Suvi ristonmaa (olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
in 2009, no safety-significant common cause failures 
were identified at the loviisa power plant. however, 
common cause failures were identified among ot-
hers in the trigger valves of the fire-fighting area 
sprinkler system where throttles of the wrong size 
were found in an inspection following a failed test, 
and in the fuel levels in the emergency diesel gene-
rators’ fuel tanks. the events are described in more 
detail in Section 4.1.2 and appendix 3.
Olkiluoto
one common cause failure was identified at 
olkiluoto in components covered by tech Specs. 
damages were found in the planetary gears of the 
actuators used for opening and closing the outer iso-
lation valves of steam lines. the event is described 
in more detail in Section 4.2.3 and appendix 3.
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A.I.1g Production loss due to failures
Definition
as the indicator, the loss of power production 
caused by failures in relation to rated power (gross) 
is monitored.
Source of data
data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the significance of 
failures from the point of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
tomi Koskiniemi (loviisa)
Suvi ristonmaa (olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
production losses due to failures have been small 
at both loviisa and olkiluoto, as is also indicated 
by the plants’ high load factors.
Loviisa
there were few production losses due to compo-
nent failures in loviisa during 2009. no reactor 
trips took place; instead, all faults were rectified 
when operating at low load. at loviisa 1 all and at 
loviisa 2 two-thirds of the faults were related to 
main coolant pumps. at loviisa 1, the faults were 
individual occurrences of main coolant pump fai-
lures. at loviisa 2, all faults occurred in the same 
main coolant pump: first there was a leak in the 
motor cooling water hose that was rectified, and 
after that, there was an oil leak from the motor. 
the diagnosis and repair of this fault took three 
days in all.
Olkiluoto
there were very few production losses due to com-
ponent failures in 2009. at olkiluoto 1 about one-
third and at olkiluoto 2 about two-thirds of them 
were caused by faults in the actuators of outer iso-
lation valves in the steam lines. half of the produc-
tion losses due to component failures at olkiluoto 
1 were caused by a fault in the position indication 
of the blowdown system control valve. the reactor 
had to be shut down on 14 november 2009 for re-
pairing this fault.
Loss of power production due to failures, 
Loviisa NPP
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.10 0.70 0.70 0.10 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.34 0.09 0.03
 0.20 1.20 1.30 2.60 0.25 0.15 0.51 0.23 0.03 0.17
 LO1
 LO2
Loss of power production due to failures, 
Olkiluoto NPP
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.10 0.01 0.60 0.20 0.78 0.02 0.33 0.04 1.84 0.29
 0.03 0.50 0.70 0.40 1.20 0.05 0.21 1.31 0.90 0.14
 OL1
 OL2
STUK-B 118
99
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2009
A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from 
the Technical Specifications
Definition
as indicators, the number of non-compliances with 
the technical Specifications, as well as the number 
of exemptions granted by StuK, are monitored.
Source of data
data for the indicators is collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the utilities’ activi-
ties in accordance with the tech Specs: compliance 
with the tech Specs and identified situations du-
ring which it is necessary to deviate from them; 
of which conclusions can be made as regards the 
appropriateness of the tech Specs.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
tomi Koskiniemi (loviisa)
Suvi ristonmaa (olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
the main purpose of the tech Specs exemption 
procedure is to enable alterations and maintenan-
ce promoting safety and plant availability.
non-compliance with the tech Specs refers to 
a situation where the plant or a system or compo-
nent of the plant is not in a safe state as required 
by the technical Specifications. the objective is for 
no events with non-compliance to the technical 
Specifications to occur at the plants. the licensee 
always prepares a special report on the non-comp-
liance and any corrective action, and submits it to 
StuK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
the number of exemptions was similar as in pre-
vious years. eight exemptions are in line with the 
ten-year average. in addition, the plant has an ave-
rage of two or three events in which operations are 
non-compliant with the tech Specs.
in 2009, the power company applied for permis-
sion from StuK for seven planned deviations from 
the technical Specifications. two of these related 
to fault repairs, two to the change of mode of ope-
rations during fault repair in annual maintenance, 
and three to the i & c renewal. the two faults 
occurring during annual maintenance were to do 
with the position indicator of the ice condensing 
system door related to control of serious accidents 
at loviisa 1 and the emergency diesel generator at 
loviisa 2. the two other fault-related applications 
concerned additional time for finding the fault in 
the emergency generator at loviisa 1 and additio-
nal isolation for rectifying the fault in the seawater 
pump while the plant was in power operation. 
StuK approved six applications because they had 
no significant impact on the safety of the plant or 
its environment. one of the applications was not 
approved by StuK, because the deviation applica-
tion concerned i & c renewal related work which 
StuK had not approved yet.
Events non-compliant with the Tech Specs
in 2009, the number of events non-compliant with 
tech Specs clearly exceeded the average of recent 
years (2). the loviisa plant had five events du-
ring the year when the plant was not in a state 
compliant with the technical Specifications. these 
involved ambiguous instructions regarding the fuel 
levels in a tank, failure to complete the periodic 
inspections during maintenance, erroneous isola-
tions (two events) and incorrect actions in repairing 
a fault. the events were analysed and reported in 
special reports. the events were all cases of indivi-
dual and inadvertent human errors. the events did 
not put nuclear or personal safety at risk.
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Olkiluoto
the number of events related to technical 
Specifications does not deviate from the average. 
Based on the results of the last ten years, olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant applies for StuK’s approval 
for non-compliance with the tech Specs six times 
per year on average. in addition, the plant has an 
average of four events in which operations are non-
compliant with the tech Specs. in 2004 and 2005, 
the number of exemptions was increased by work 
and installations related to the modernisation of 
ol1 and ol2 and the construction of ol3.
Exemptions
in 2009, the power company applied for permis-
sion from StuK for six planned deviations from 
the technical Specifications. the applications con-
cerned the postponement of leak tightness testing 
of the containment of olkiluoto 2 from 2009 to 
2011, the removal of protection from the fuel trans-
fer machine of olkiluoto 2 for repairs, the inopera-
bility of radiation measurements monitoring the 
liquid waste drainage line for upgrading the equip-
ment, the prevention of peaking in the radiation 
meters at the main steam line of olkiluoto 2 and 
the possible deviation from the cpr margin of the 
reactor core for verifying the representative stabili-
ty measurement. Since the planned deviations had 
no significant safety implications, StuK approved 
the applications apart from the postponement of 
the containment leak tightness test. this deviation 
was not topical yet because the tech Specs also al-
low for performing the test in 2010.
Events non-compliant with the Tech Specs
in 2009, there were four situations at the olkiluoto 
plant in which the technical Specifications were 
violated. two concerned the failure to carry out pe-
riodic radiation measurement testing, one with the 
withdrawal of a control rod during annual main-
tenance, and one with the start-up of a plant unit 
after annual maintenance while one containment 
isolation valve was inoperable.
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A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
as the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored by the plant unit. the systems 
monitored at olkiluoto nuclear power plant are the 
containment vessel spray system (322), the auxilia-
ry feed water system (327) and the emergency die-
sel generators (651–656). those followed at loviisa 
nuclear power plant are the high-pressure safety 
injection system (tJ), auxiliary feed water system 
(rl92/93, rl94/97) and the emergency diesel gene-
rators (ey).
essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavaila-
bility hours and its required availability hours is 
calculated as the indicator. unavailability hours 
are the combined unavailability time of redundant 
sub-systems divided by the number of subsystems.
annual plant criticality hours are the avai-
lability requirement for the 322, 327, tJ and rl 
systems. for diesels, the requirement is conti nuous 
– i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
Subsystem unavailability hours include the 
time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to failures. the 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior to 
failure detection. if a failure is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test, but to have 
escaped detection, the time between periodic tests 
is added to the unavailability time. if a failure has 
occurred between tests such that its date of occur-
rence is unknown, half of the time period between 
tests is added to the unavailability time. whenever 
the occurrence of the failure can be identified as an 
operational, maintenance, testing or other event, 
the time between the event and the fault detection 
is added to the unavailability time.
Source of data
data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. licensee representatives submit the 
necessary data to the relevant person in charge at 
StuK.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. the condition and status of safety sys-
tems and their development can be monitored by 
means of the indicator.
Responsible units/persons
organisations and operations (oKa),  
resident inspectors
pauli Kopiloff (loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems (tJ) of the plant 
units and their background information shows that 
the lo1 plant unit had no faults or events cau-
sing unavailability in 2009. the lo2 system had 
one fault, found in periodic tests, where the pump 
protection operated so that the pump could not be 
started. the faulty component turned out to be the 
pump power supply switch at the switchgear. this 
single fault caused an unavailability period of 233 
hours for the other redundant part of the system. 
replacement of the faulty switch, i.e. repair of the 
fault, took 16 hours and the estimated duration of 
unavailability before detecting the fault was 217 
hours.
the unavailability of the high pressure safety 
injection systems was low in 2009, i.e. their conditi-
on and availability were good.
RL system
for lo1, the total unavailability time was 149 
hours, 136 hours of which consisted of rl94 main-
tenance work performed during the annual outage. 
at lo1, the unavailability of the rl system during 
power operation amounted to 13 hours, 3 of which 
were due to repairs of valve faults. the failures 
were significant from the point of system operabi-
lity. for lo2, the total unavailability time was 197 
hours, which was exclusively caused by the annual 
maintenance of the rl97 system.
the unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
systems was low in 2009, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
the unavailability of the emergency diesels (ey) 
increased in 2009 compared to the previous year’s 
level, but still remained low, i.e. their availability 
was satisfactory.
in 2009, the total unavailability for all eight die-
sel generators was 852 hours, where the estimated 
total duration of unavailability before detecting the 
faults was 368 hours. there were 20 faults in all, of 
which 9 caused immediate operation restrictions 
while 11 caused operating restrictions from the 
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beginning of the repair work. the failures detected 
were mainly caused by normal ageing of compo-
nents and did not have any serious implications.
Based on the indicators and an assessment 
of the failures behind them, the condition of the 
emergency diesels can be regarded as good.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
the unavailability times of the containment spray 
system have been decreasing since 2005. in 2007 
and 2008, the unavailability was zero for both plant 
units, and almost zero in 2009.
the unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system increased significantly after 2004, when 
the unavailability was practically at zero. the in-
creased unavailability of olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was 
due to faults in the recirculation and safety valves 
in system 327. as corrective measures, the torque 
settings of the recirculation line’s valve actuator 
motors were adjusted, and a separate safety val-
ve testing line was installed for one of the lines 
leading to the reactor core in 2008. testing lines 
will be installed in other similar lines at ol1 and 
ol2 during 2009 and 2010. no significant faults 
occurred in 2007, 2008 or 2009, and the unavaila-
bility of the auxiliary water system was reduced to 
zero in 2009 at both plant units.
the unavailability of the diesel generators has 
decreased since 2004, and was very low in 2006 
and 2007. in 2008, the value increased by nearly 
95% compared to the previous year. the increase 
was due to latent faults in the compressed air mo-
tors of the diesels in both plant units. the diesel 
generator of one subsystem did not start in connec-
tion with a periodic test at ol1 plant unit on 28 
may 2008. the failure was caused by a leak in the 
seals of both compressed air motors of the diesel 
engine. in inspections, similar leaks were found in 
the seals of the compressed air motors of several 
diesel generators in both plant units. thus, the 
failure was a common cause failure endangering 
the availability of a Safety class 2 system. the 
event was classified as an anomaly, rated as ineS 
1 according to the international nuclear event 
Scale. the compressed air motor seals for the die-
sel engines for both ol1 and ol2 were inspected 
and replaced in connection with the inspections. 
the diesel generators were isolated one subsystem 
at a time. the isolation time for each diesel was, 
however, short. the inspection and repairs were 
carried out swiftly.
in 2009, the unavailability of diesel engines 
decreased considerably from the 2008 figures. 
the condition of the containment spray system 
and the auxiliary feed water system has remained 
Unavailability of shut-down cooling system (321) or 
containment spray system (322), Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
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1.2
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 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.15 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.07
 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.85 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unavailability of auxiliary feed water system (327), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
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0.5
1.0
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2.0
2.5
3.0
4.5
4.0
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.40 0.03 1.10 2.00 0.01 2.00 2.98 0.25 0.00 0.00
 0.00 0.30 0.01 2.71 0.01 1.10 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.00
Unavailability of emergency diesel generators (651…656), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.50 0.80 1.14 0.05 1.10 0.57 0.06 0.09 1.71 0.72
 1.50 0.80 1.14 0.05 1.10 0.57 0.06 0.09 1.71 0.72
good. the increase in the unavailability of emer-
gency diesels in 2008 was the result of starter 
motor failures that were caused by the exclusi-
on of these motors from appropriate preventive 
maintenance. in 2009, the condition of the diesels 
remained relatively good.
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A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses
Definition
as the indicators, collective radiation exposure by 
plant site and plant unit is monitored, as well as 
the average of the ten highest yearly radiation 
exposures.
Source of data
the data on collective radiation exposure is ob-
tained from quarterly and annual reports. the data 
on individual radiation doses is obtained from the 
national dose register.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. in addition, compliance with 
the yVl Guide’s calculated threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive 
years is followed. the threshold value, 2.5 manSv 
per one gigawatt of net electrical power, means a 
radiation dose of 1.22 manSv for one loviisa plant 
unit and 2.15 manSv for one olkiluoto plant unit. 
the collective radiation doses describe the success 
of the plant’s alara programme. the average of 
the ten highest doses indicates how close to the 
20 manSv dose limit the individual occupational 
doses at the plants are, at the same time indicating 
the effectiveness of the plant’s radiation protection 
unit.
Responsible unit/person
radiation protection (SÄt)
antti tynkkynen
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. thus, outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protec-
tion affect the yearly radiation doses. Both loviisa 
plant units have major annual outages every four 
and eight years (the four-year annual maintenance 
and the eight-year annual maintenance) so that 
both plant units never have a major annual main-
tenance outage in the same year. in the previous 
years, major outages have been held in even years 
and normal outages in odd years. the effect of 
annual outages on collective doses can be clearly 
observed in the Collective radiation dose, Loviisa 
graph. in 2009, there was a refuelling outage in 
both loviisa plant units. the time used for annual 
maintenance outages was short, and there were 
few operations with significance to radiation pro-
tection, which had the result that the total collec-
tive dose at loviisa was lower than in the preced-
ing year, second-lowest in the plant’s history. the 
lowest collective dose ever was recorded in 2007.
the radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers were below the individual dose limits. the 
trend of the average for the ten highest doses has 
been a decreasing one for some years, and in 2009 
the average was lower than ever. the radiation 
decree (1512/1991) stipulates that the effective 
dose for a worker from radiation work must not 
exceed the 20 manSv/year average over any period 
of five years, or 50 manSv in any one year.
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Collective occupational radiation dose (manSv), 
Loviisa NPP
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Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity averaged 
over two succesive years, Loviisa NPP
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Reporting threshold 2.5 manSv/GW according to the Guide YVL 7.9
furthermore, the threshold set for the collective 
occupational dose was not exceeded in 2009. if, at 
one plant unit, the collective occupational radiati-
on dose average over two successive years exceeds 
2.5 manSv per one Gw of net electrical power, the 
utility is to report the causes of this to StuK, and 
any measures possibly required to improve radiati-
on safety (Guide yVl 7.9).
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. thus outage duration and the amount 
of work having significance on radiation protecti-
on affect the yearly radiation doses. the annual 
outages for the olkiluoto power plant units are 
divided into two groups: the refuelling outages and 
the maintenance outages. the refuelling outage is 
shorter in duration (approx. 7 days). the length of 
the maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work (2–3 weeks). annual outages are scheduled so 
that in the same year, one plant unit has a mainte-
nance outage and the other a refuelling outage. in 
2005 and 2006, the collective doses for the workers 
were high due to turbine work with considerable 
significance for radiation protection. in 2009, the 
collective dose in olkiluoto was higher than in the 
previous year, but still lower than the average dose 
level of recent years, at the 2007 level. in addition, 
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity averaged 
over two succesive years, Olkiluoto NPP
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the average of the ten largest doses was higher 
than in the two previous years, but lower than ave-
rage. the prescribed dose limits (radiation decree 
1512/1991) were not exceeded.
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A.I.5 Radioactive releases
Definition
as the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the atmosphere (tBq) from the plant are moni-
tored, as well as the calculated dose due to releases 
to the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant.
Source of data
data for the indicators is collected from the utili-
ties’ quarterly and annual reports. from this data, 
the calculated radiation dose for the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the plant is defined.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and to assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq), 
Olkiluoto NPP
1.00E+04
1.00E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+07
1.00E+08
1.00E+09
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Kreq), 
Olkiluoto NPP
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below detection limit
Iodine isotope releases to atmosphere (Bq 131Ieq), 
Olkiluoto NPP
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below detection limit
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Kreq), 
Loviisa NPP
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Iodine isotope releases to atmosphere (Bq 131Ieq), 
Loviisa NPP
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Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq), 
Loviisa NPP
1.00E+04
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1.00E+08
1.00E+09
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Responsible unit/person
radiation protection (SÄt), antti tynkkynen
A.I.5a Releases into the atmosphere
Interpretation of the indicator
radioactive releases into the atmosphere from the 
loviisa and olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
of the same magnitude as in previous years. in 
loviisa, only the releases of iodine isotopes have 
been increasing. the iodine releases from loviisa in 
2009 were affected by the fuel leak occurring at the 
loviisa 2 plant unit that released more iodine than 
usual to the environment. the total releases from 
olkiluoto have decreased, and releases of noble gas 
activities remained below the detection limit for 
the second consecutive time. emissions of radio-
active substances into the environment from the 
loviisa and olkiluoto power plants were minor and 
remained clearly under the set emission limits.
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Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate in leaking fuel rods, in 
the minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication, 
and in reactor surface contamination from earlier 
fuel leaks. at both loviisa and olkiluoto, fuel 
leaks have been very small. however, a leak in 
one fuel rod was detected at the loviisa 2 plant 
unit in november 2008. the fuel assembly was 
replaced with a fresh one during the 2009 refuel-
ling outage. in addition, a minor fuel leak was 
detected at the loviisa 1 plant unit after the 2009 
annual maintenance. the indicator a.iii.1 desc-
ribes fuel integrity. the noble gas releases from 
the loviisa plant are dominated by argon-41, an 
activation product of argon-40, found in the airs-
pace between the reactor pressure vessel and the 
main radiation shield. aerosol nuclides (including 
activated corrosion products) are released during 
maintenance work.
A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
releases of radioactive substances emitting gamma 
radiation into the environment from the loviisa 
and olkiluoto nuclear power plants were clear-
ly below the set limits. during 2001, 2004 and 
2009 the loviisa power plant discharged low-acti-
vity evaporation residues into the sea as planned. 
consequently, the releases of substances with gam-
ma activity were larger than average in those yea-
rs. the releases of substances with gamma activity 
into the sea from olkiluoto have been decreasing 
in recent years.
The calculated dose (µSv) of the most exposed individual 
in the environment of Loviisa NPP
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The calculated dose (µSv) of the most exposed individual 
in the environment of Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
the doses of the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity, calculated on the basis of releases from 
the plant, were below the set limit in loviisa and 
olkiluoto. as a result of the planned release of low-
level evaporation waste to the sea in loviisa, the 
dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity 
of loviisa was higher than usual. in olkiluoto, the 
dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity 
was the lowest in the plant’s history.
for both plants, the calculated doses of the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity were less than 
0.5% of the 100-microsievert limit established in 
the Government decree (733/2008).
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A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
investments in plant maintenance and modifica-
tions in the current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
the licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
the indicator demonstrates the relative fluctu-
ation of investments. the amounts given in euros 
are the confidential information of the utilities in-
volved, and not to be published here. furthermore, 
the scales of the loviisa and olkiluoto power 
plants’ investment and modernisation diagrams 
are not mutually comparable.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctu-
ations.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
tomi Koskiniemi
Interpretation of the indicator
the variation in the indicator distinctly shows the 
investments related to power upgrades and moder-
nisation projects of the plants. Both plants have 
paid much attention to life-cycle management, 
which also shows as continuous long-term invest-
ment plans. the renewal of the operation permit 
of the loviisa plant in 2007 and the intermediate 
assessment carried out at olkiluoto in 2008 have 
also had an effect on the investment plans. 
Loviisa
the increase in investments at the loviisa power 
plant during 2007–2009 was due to the i & c 
modernisation project (lara) that was by far the 
most significant single investment also in 2009. 
other investments have remained at the previous 
years’ level. other investments in 2009 include the 
replacement of fuel racks with a denser design, the 
basic overhaul of waste, storage and decontami-
nation facilities (VaJaKo), modernisation of the 
command centre used in potential emergencies, 
new boron analyzers for the primary circuit, repla-
cement of wind generator stators, maintenance of 
the operability of the refuelling machine (lamo), 
basic overhaul of the emergency diesels and gene-
rators, modernisation of the seawater inlet facility 
an improvement of the safety of secondary circuit 
(lara/Setu), and an improvement project for the 
control of primary circuit pressure.
Olkiluoto
in 2009, the investments remained at the previous 
years’ level in olkiluoto. the largest investments 
included the expansion of storage and workshop 
facilities completed in 2009, replacement of valves 
in the residual heat removal system, replacement 
of extraction steam lines 3, replacement of recti-
fiers (Simo), modernisation of the weather station 
and the still on-going projects for replacing the low 
pressure turbines and procuring new turbine gene-
rators for ol1 and ol2.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
as the indicators, the numbers of events reported 
in accordance with Guide yVl 1.5 are monitored. 
(events warranting a special report, reactor trips 
and reports on operational events.)
Source of data
data for the indicators is obtained from StuK’s 
document administration system.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
tomi Koskiniemi (loviisa)
Suvi ristonmaa (olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
in the past year, six events warranting a special 
report (five of which were non-compliances with 
the tech Specs, see section a.i.2) were observed. 
all events were classified as class 0 on the inter-
national ineS scale, and had little significance to 
safety. 
the first event related to the momentary ma-
nual control during the repair of magnetic loads of 
the safety valve control valves of the pressurizers 
at loviisa 2.
the second event was caused by a mistake made 
in the management of maintenance operations at 
loviisa 1 that led to a momentary inoperability of 
both external containment spray system trains.
the third event concerned the level of fuel for 
the diesel generator in the electrical system for 
controlling serious reactor accidents; the fuel le-
vel in the tank had at times been too low because 
of discrepancies between the tech Specs, testing 
instructions and alarms limits. the fourth event 
concerned an erroneous electrical isolation of the 
emergency feedwater control valve of loviisa 2, 
done during the annual maintenance of loviisa 1. 
the fifth event (the only one that was not in conflict 
with the tech Specs) took place at loviisa 2 when 
the control solenoid of a contactor in one emergen-
cy feedwater pump power supply unit overheated 
so that it had to be switched off and the plant fire 
brigade had to come and extinguish the fire. the 
sixth event concerned the periodic maintenance 
of flow meters of the emergency feedwater pumps 
common to both plant units. these were omitted 
during the 2009 annual maintenance.
there was only one reported operational tran-
sient where the reactor power was suddenly limi-
ted to 80% at loviisa 1 when the triggered circuit 
breaker of the reverse rotation control device of the 
main coolant pump was being reset. the fault was 
rectified immediately.
no reactor trips occurred in 2005–2009.
Number of Special Reports, 
Loviisa NPP
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Olkiluoto
no reactor trips occurred in 2009. Based on the 
data from the last ten years, an average of one 
reactor trip per year occured at the olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. the number of reactor trips 
has decreased from the previous decade 1990–1999 
when an average of four reactor trips occurred 
every year. 
Based on data from the last ten years, the ave-
rage number of annual events warranting a spe-
cial report or a transient report is five. hence, the 
number of events warranting a special report (five) 
and the number of reported transients (also five) in 
2009 were of average level. 
when considering the indicators, it must be 
noted that the number of reports does not give 
the correct conception of the division of events by 
plant unit since, for system technical reasons, the 
reports for both plant units have been entered for 
olkiluoto 1. in 2009, one event warranting a tran-
sient report and two warranting a special report 
concerned both plant units.
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Interpretation of the indicator
the indicators do not give cause for any particular 
conclusions concerning either utility.
Both technical and non-technical causes can 
be identified behind many events. in such cases, 
classification is done based on the most significant 
cause of the event.
A.II.2 Direct causes of events
Definition
as the indicators, the direct causes of events re-
ported in accordance with Guide yVl 1.5 are fol-
lowed. the causes of the events are divided into 
technical fai lures and erroneous operational and 
maintenance actions (non-technical, human er-
rors).
Source of data
data for the indicators are collected from special 
reports, reports on reactor trips and operational 
transient reports, and are entered into an event 
follow-up table maintained by oKa.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the division of the 
causes of reported events into technical and non-
technical causes. “non-technical causes” denote fai-
lures caused by erroneous operational and mainte-
nance actions. the indicator may be indicative of 
an organisation’s operation.
Responsible unit/person
organisations and operations (oKa)
Suvi ristonmaa and tomi Koskiniemi
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A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
as the indicators, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monito-
red. as the measure of risk, an increase in the 
conditional core damage probability (ccdp) as-
sociated with each event is employed. ccdp ta-
kes the duration of each event into consideration. 
events are divided into three categories: 1) una-
vailability due to component failures, 2) planned 
unavailability, and 3) initiating events. in ad-
dition, events are grouped into three categories 
according to their risk-significance (ccdp): the 
most risk-significant events (ccdp>1e-7), other 
significant events (1e-8≤ccdp<1e-7) and other 
events (ccdp<1e-8). the indicator is the number 
of events in each category.
unavailability caused by work for which StuK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. possible non-compliances with the tech Specs 
are in category 1, if they can be utilised for this 
indicator. non-compliances with the tech Specs are 
also dealt with under indicator a.i.2.
n.B.! calculations for the loviisa plant are 
based on a somewhat outdated internal-initiating-
event model, making them indicative only of a 
trend.
Source of data
data for the calculation of the indicators is col-
lected from utility reports and applications for ex-
emptions.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-
significant initiating events and planned unavaila-
bility. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
ccfs, simultaneously occurring failures and hu-
man errors. another objective of the event analysis 
is to systematically identify signs of a deteriorating 
organisational and safety culture.
Responsible unit/person
risk assessment (riS), Jorma rantakivi  
(pSa computation)
organisations and operations (oKa)  
(failure data)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
a brief description of the significant events is given 
below:
loviisa 1:
1) component failure: one of the two cooling de-
vices (B2) in the cooling system uV25 of the 
instrument facilities of the control room buil-
ding failed (faulty thermistor relay). the dura-
tion of faulty state was approximately 18 days.  
ccdp = 4.8e-7.
2) component failure: one of the two cooling de-
vices (B3) in the cooling system uV25 of the 
instrument facilities of the control room buil-
ding failed (valve uV25S219 leaky). the dura-
tion of faulty state was approximately 5 days. 
ccdp = 1.6e-7.
3) component failure: one of the two cooling 
devices (B2) in the cooling system uV25 of 
the instrument facilities of the control room 
building failed (base of compressor 1V1962 di-
sintegrates). the duration of faulty state was 
approximately 9 days. ccdp = 2.5e-7.
4) component failure: a diesel generator (ey01) 
did not start during a test drive. the diesel en-
gine remained faulty for approximately 16 days. 
ccdp = 1.9e-7. 
5) component failure: the inlet damper of redun-
dancy 2 of the control room building instrument 
facilities air conditioning system uV20 and all 
room outlet dampers (redundancy 2) were faul-
ty. cooling device uV25B02 was also faulty. the 
duration of faulty state was approximately 11.5 
days. ccdp = 5.9e-7.
6) component failure: the inlet damper of redun-
dancy 2 of the control room building instrument 
facilities air conditioning system uV20 and 
all room outlet dampers (redundancy 2) were 
faulty. redundancy 1 of uV20 was also faulty 
because blower uV20d01 was faulty. cooling 
device uV25B02 was also faulty. the durati-
on of faulty state was approximately 3 days.  
ccdp = 3.5e-6.
7) component failure: the inlet and exhaust blo-
wers of the control room building instrument 
facilities air conditioning system uV20 were 
faulty. the duration of faulty state was approxi-
mately 2 days. ccdp = 1.3e-7.
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8) component failure: the inlet damper of redun-
dancy 2 of the control room building instrument 
facilities air conditioning system uV20 and all 
room outlet dampers (redundancy 2) were faul-
ty. the duration of faulty state was approxima-
tely 4.5 days. ccdp = 1.2e-7.
9) preventive maintenance: the preventive main-
tenance of auxiliary feed water system rl97 
during lo2 revision increased the probability of 
a severe accident at lo1, as the auxiliary feed 
water systems rl 94/97 can also be connected 
to plant unit lo1. ccdp = 6.8e-7.
loviisa 2:
1) component failure: Valve rl94S0050 connec-
ting emergency feedwater pumps rl97 and 
rl94 (used when rl94 feeds rl97) was jam-
med. the valve had been jammed for approxi-
mately 15 days. ccdp = 1.0e-6.
2) preventive maintenance: the preventive main-
tenance of auxiliary feed water system rl94 
during lo1 revision increased the probability 
of a severe accident at lo1, as the auxiliary 
feed water systems rl 94/97 can be connected 
to either plant unit. ccdp = 8.7e-7.
3) component failure: diesel generator (ey02) faul-
ty due to a fault in cooling blower uV52d0091. 
the diesel generator remained faulty for appro-
ximately 16 days. ccdp = 4.2e-7.
4) component failure: primary circuit emergency 
feedwater pump tJ11d01 tripped as a result of 
over-current when started during yZ24 testing. 
Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7, 
Loviisa 1 (Total number of events)
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Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7, 
Olkiluoto 1 (Total number of events)
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the pump remained faulty for approximately 
10 days. ccdp = 1.5e-7.
5) component failure: emergency feedwater sys-
tem rl97 was faulty due to a fault in air con-
ditioning inlet damper rl97S120. tech Specs 
require this damper to be operable in order 
for rl97 to be operable. the damper remained 
faulty for approximately 23 days. the ccdp 
becomes 1.6e-6.
6) component failure: cooling device B2 in the 
cooling system uV46 of the instrument facili-
ties of the control room building failed due to 
a failure of the starting card. the duration of 
faulty state was approximately 4 days. ccdp = 
1.2e-7.
loviisa experienced plenty of air conditioning 
faults last year. attention must be paid to this in 
2010. the other events can be considered part of 
normal nuclear power plant operation and did not 
call for any further actions by StuK.
Olkiluoto
a brief description of the significant events is given 
below:
olkiluoto1:
1) preventive maintenance: the diesel package 
dip-d took more than 4 days. ccdp = 1.0e-7.
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
 LO1
 LO2
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
12 %
14 %
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 2.30 7.39 5.96 7.20 11.21 9.20 3.15 3.10 0.90 1.50 4.30
 6.80 8.23 12.39 3.30 10.90 3.70 4.14 1.60 1.95 2.40 3.00
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
 OL1
 OL2
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 2.47 30.30 5.28 10.90 4.68 5.10 9.64 7.60 6.00 26.10 4.00
 2.26 42.50 7.17   3.50 7.39 8.60 10.95 5.00 6.00   1.30 5.40
olkiluoto2:
1) preventive maintenance: the diesel package 
dip-c took more than 6 days. ccdp = 1.5e-7.
2) preventive maintenance: the diesel package 
dip-d took more than 4 days. ccdp = 1.1e-7.
3) component failure: Switch G201-S of diesel 
653G201 opened during the diesel load test. the 
diesel generator remained faulty for approxima-
tely 14 days. ccdp = 1.5e-7.
the risk caused by events in olkiluoto consisted of 
three diesel maintenance packages of long durati-
on and one latent diesel fault. the analysed events 
are considered to be part of normal nuclear power 
plant operation and did not give rise to any further 
measures by StuK.
the combined total ccdp of all three cate-
gories divided by the probability of a severe ac-
cident gives an overview of the risk-significance 
of operational events. to facilitate analysis, risk 
calculation is based on conservative assumptions 
and simplifications, which materially weakens the 
applicability of the results for trend monitoring. if 
the risk-significance remains at the target level on 
average for several years, the annual fluctuation 
does not warrant particular attention.
the risk due to operational events at the loviisa 
plants would seem to have increased slightly in 
2009 compared to previous years, but it still re-
mains lower than during the early years of the 
decade. the risk due to operational events at the 
olkiluoto plants has remained at the average level 
of previous years.
A.II.4 Accident risk of nuclear facilities
Definition
as the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is followed. the accident risk is 
presented per nuclear power plant unit.
Source of data
the data is obtained as the result of probabilis-
tic risk analyses (pra/pSa) of the nuclear power 
plants. the risk analysis is based on detailed cal-
culation models, continuously developed and com-
plemented. a total of 200 man-years have been 
used at finnish nuclear power plants to develop 
the models. as the basic data of the risk analy-
ses, the globally collected reliability information of 
components and operator activities, as well as the 
operating experience from finnish power plants, 
are used.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. the objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the nuclear power 
plant so that the accident risk decreases or re-
STUK-B 118
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mains stable. risk analyses can help detect a need 
to make modifications to the plant or change oper-
ating methods.
Responsible unit/person
risk assessment (riS), Jorma rantakivi  
(pSa computation)
organisations and operations (oKa) 
(failure data)
Interpretation of the indicator
when assessing the indicator, it must be remem-
bered that it is affected by both the development of 
the power plant and the development of analyses 
and the calculation model. plant modifications and 
changes in methods, carried out to remove risk fac-
tors, will decrease the indicator value. an increase 
of the indicator value may be due to the model 
being extended to new event groups, or the identi-
fication of new risk factors. in addition, developing 
more detailed models or obtaining more detailed 
basic data may change risk estimates in either 
direction. for example, the increase in the loviisa 
indicator in 2003 was due to the analysis being 
extended to cover exceptionally harsh weather con-
ditions and oil accidents at sea during a refuelling 
outage. in the following year, the indicator value 
decreased, partly as a result of a more detailed 
analysis of these factors.
loviisa power plant’s accident risk has conti-
nued to decrease over the last ten years, and new 
risk factors discovered as the scope of the risk 
analysis has been extended, have been efficiently 
removed. the indicator decreased in 2007 due to 
the new seawater line completed during the period. 
the new line allows for the alternative intake of 
seawater from the outlet channel to cool the plant 
in shutdown operation. the change will decrease 
risks in situations where algae, frazil ice, or an 
oil release endanger the availability of seawater 
through the conventional route. the decrease of 
the indicator in 2008 results from more detailed 
analyses performed in conjunction with the rene-
wing of the operating licence, as well as changes 
at the plant planned to be carried out earlier or in 
connection with the licence renewal. Such changes 
include: the i & c modernisation project, lara; 
the decrease in the probability of a criticality acci-
dent using, for example, boron analysers; moderni-
sation of the refuelling machine and the decrease 
in the probability of a high-energy leak in instru-
mentation facilities.
for the loviisa power plant, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal plant events during outages (such as the 
falling of heavy loads or a power surge caused by 
the sudden dilution of the boron used to adjust 
reactor operation), fire, a high level of seawater 
during power operation and oil releases during a 
refuelling outage.
the indicator for the olkiluoto plant decreased 
approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previous 
years’ relatively stable value. the decrease was 
mainly due to the more detailed modelling of 
earthquake events and the plant changes carried 
out to improve seismic qualification. in 2009, the 
indicator for the olkiluoto power plant increased 
because the new analyses indicated that the reac-
tor cleaning system can no longer be utilised as the 
ultimate means of residual heat removal. for the 
olkiluoto power plant, the most important factors 
affecting the overall accident risk include internal 
events during power operation (component failures 
and pipe ruptures leading to an operational tran-
sient).
Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
for Loviisa plant units during 2000–2009
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Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
for Olkiluoto plant units during 2000–2009
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A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
as the indicators, the number of fire alarms and 
actual fires are followed.
Source of data
data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. the licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at StuK.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
civil engineering and fire protection (raK)
heikki Saarikoski
Interpretation of the indicator
at the loviisa power plant, one event classified as a 
fire occurred in 2009. a fire started in one switchbo-
ard cabinet in the electrical facility of the loviisa 2 
control room building. the plant fire brigade quickly 
put it out using carbon dioxide extinguishers. the 
fire did not put the safety of loviisa 2 at risk. in 
addition, there were two events classified as fires 
in the terrain outside the plant perimeters. the fre-
quency of faults in the fire detector alarms of the 
loviisa power plants remained in 2009 at the same 
level as in 2008, but there were fewer genuine fire 
alarms during the year, partly because of less work 
done in annual maintenance and completion of the 
construction work of the new i & c buildings.
no events classified as fires occurred in the 
olkiluoto plant area (ol1/2) in 2009. outside the 
plant area, however, three events classified as fires 
occurred, two on the olkiluoto 3 site and one in the 
accommodation village. the fire events were of a 
minor nature (ol3: fires in an industrial vacuum 
cleaner and switchgear cabinet, and fire in a range 
hood in the accommodation village). no fire detec-
tion system failures were observed at the olkiluoto 
power plant in 2009. the situation was the same 
as in 2008. the 26 component faults shown in the 
table are failures of the sprinkler system, indicated 
by the fire alarm system. these failures did not, ho-
wever, cause inoperability of the sprinkler system. 
the number of genuine alarms raised by the fire 
detection systems has increased from 2008. this 
may be partly due to the repair and modification 
work carried out in 2009 during plant operation.
the fire alarm system was revised in 2000 
at the loviisa power plant and in 2001 at the 
olkiluoto power plant. after the revision of the fire 
alarm systems, the number of alarms increased at 
both plants due to more sensitive detectors. the 
distinct reduction in alarms at the loviisa plant 
since 2003 and at the olkiluoto plant since 2004 is 
due to pre-alarms no longer being included in the 
calculations.
on average, fire safety at loviisa and olkiluoto 
plants has remained at the earlier level, as no 
events classified as fires have occurred, with the 
exception of the minor fire in a switchboard cabinet 
at the loviisa plant. alarms from the fire alarm 
system have also been at a relatively low level. 
most of the alarms were caused by dust, smoke or 
humidity. fire alarm systems are not always dis-
connected in a wide enough area for maintenance 
work. the number of alarms from the fire alarm 
system is also affected by the amount of mainte-
nance and repair work performed at the plants, 
as well as construction work possibly done in the 
plant area.
Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1  Fuel integrity
Definition
as the indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (i-131 activi-
ty concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (start-up operation or power opera-
tion for loviisa and power operation for olkiluoto) 
are followed. as the indicator for the loviisa plant, 
the activity level of the primary coolant calculated 
as i-131 equivalent concentrations, as well as the 
maximum activity as the sum of iodine isotopes, 
were followed until the end of 2006. late in 2006, 
the technical Specifications limit concerning the 
iodine activities in primary coolant was defined as 
an i-131 activity concentration, instead of the sum 
of iodine isotopes used until then. at the same time, 
i-131 activity concentrations were adopted for the 
monitoring of the maximum activity level. loviisa 
power plant delivered the values for i-131 activity 
concentrations retrospectively from 1997–2006.
the maximum activity concentration of i-131 
during depressurisation while entering shutdown 
or after a reactor trip, as well as the number of 
leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, are 
also followed as indicators.
Source of data
the licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at StuK. 
the maximum activity levels are also available in 
the quarterly reports submitted by the utilities.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the operating cycle. the 
indicators for shutdown situations also describe 
the success of the shutdown concerning radiation 
protection.
Responsible unit/person
reactor and Safety Systems (rea)
Kirsti tossavainen
A.III.1a Primary coolant activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
loviisa 2 had leaking fuel in 2009. an increase of 
activity had been detected on 28 november 2008 in 
the gases released from the process systems. the 
activity concentration of the iodine isotopes in the 
primary coolant and the gaseous fission products 
dissolved into the primary coolant also increased. 
on 1 december 2008, the observation was confir-
med as a fuel leak. after the initial phases of the 
leak, the activity concentrations stabilised and the 
fuel leak remained small. one leaking fuel assemb-
ly was found in the search carried out during the 
annual maintenance outage and was removed from 
the reactor.
the limit set in the tech Specs for the i-131 con-
centration in primary coolant was exceeded when 
the plant unit was shut down for the annual main-
tenance outage. the limit was only exceeded for 
a short time. the sample from which the activity 
concentration exceeding the tech Specs limit was 
analysed was taken during plant operation mode 
(start-up operation) where the tech Specs limit 
applies. By the time the result of the analysis was 
available, the plant unit had moved to another ope-
rating mode (hot standby) for which no limit has 
been set in the tech Specs regarding the concentra-
tion of i-131 activity. the higher-than-normal i-131 
activity concentration of primary coolant is also 
reflected in the maximum i-131 activity concentra-
tion during plant unit shutdown. after shutdown, 
the i-131 activity concentration rapidly decreased. 
during the operating cycle started after the annual 
maintenance and after removal of the leaking fuel 
bundle from the reactor, the i-131 activity of pri-
mary coolant was almost at the level preceding the 
fuel leak.
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a minor fuel leak was observed at loviisa 1 on 
20 october 2009. the fuel leak had not caused a 
significant change in the i-131 activity concentrati-
on of primary coolant by the end of 2009.
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 8.98E+03 4.42E+02 2.90E+02 4.30E+02 1.90E+02 5.90E+01 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01
 2.14E+02 9.88E+01 2.37E+03 9.10E+01 3.12E+03 6.52E+03 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) during shutdown or after reactor scram, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.00E+00 3.60E+05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
 3.44E+04 3.08E+05 3.70E+04 2.52E+02 0.00E+00
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 9.00E+03 4.00E+02 2.00E+02 4.30E+02 8.20E+01 5.80E+01 2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01
2.00E+02 1.00E+02 1.50E+03 9.00E+01 1.49E+03 4.00E+03 4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 4.82E+02 4.45E+02 4.71E+02 4.32E+02 5.01E+02 3.89E+02 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02
 7.19E+02 6.40E+02 5.74E+02 3.22E+02 3.39E+02 2.91E+02 2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) during shutdown or after reactor scram, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 6.38E+02 5.48E+02 5.70E+02 1.40E+02 4.80E+02
 5.09E+02 2.93E+02 4.40E+02 4.30E+02 6.40E+06
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Loviisa NPP
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 2.40E+03 2.10E+03 3.00E+03 2.30E+03 2.10E+03 2.20E+03 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03
 1.40E+03 1.20E+03 9.30E+02 6.00E+02 5.80E+02 5.90E+02 5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85+06
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
the indicator shows that the fuel integrity of 
both loviisa 1 and loviisa 2 was impaired due to 
minor fuel leaks.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
the olkiluoto plant units had no leaking fuel in 
2009. the i-131 activity concentrations during ope-
ration at olkiluoto 1 have remained the same as in 
previous years. the concentrations at olkiluoto 2 
are on a downward trend, both during operation 
and shutdown. Based on the indicator, fuel integ-
rity has been good at the olkiluoto plant units in 
2009.
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Loviisa NPP
  I/08 II/08 III/08 IV/08 I/09 II/09 III/09 IV/09
  1.60E+02 1.70E+02 1.20E+03 1.20E+02 1.40E+02 1.61E+02 1.54E+03 1.89E+02
  2.00E+02 2.10E+02 1.30E+03 1.30E+05 1.20E+05 3.75E+04 3.85E+06 1.16E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
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A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel bundles
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
a minor fuel leak was detected at loviisa 2 late in 
2008. the leaking fuel bundle was removed from 
the reactor during the 2009 annual maintenance 
outage. a minor fuel leak was observed at loviisa 
1 in october after the annual maintenance outage. 
the leaking fuel will be removed from the reactor 
in the 2010 annual maintenance outage at the la-
test. the previous fuel leak occurred at the loviisa 
plant in 1999.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
in 2009, olkiluoto plant units had no leaking fuel. 
the last leaking fuel bundle was removed from the 
reactor of olkiluoto 1 in the annual maintenance 
outage of 2006 and from the reactor of olkiluoto 2 
in the outage of 2007.
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Olkiluoto NPP
0
1
2
3
 OL1
 OL2
 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
2
3
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 2001 1002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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A.III.2 Primary circuit integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
as the indicators, the water chemistry conditions 
for each plant unit are followed.
the water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
utilities, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
pwrs and in the reactor circuits of Bwrs. the 
indicator for olkiluoto is the international in-
dex used by the plant. the indicator for loviisa 
is a new index developed at the plant to be used 
together with the international index. the new 
index describes the water chemistry conditions 
in the secondary circuit at loviisa with a higher 
degree of sensitivity than the corresponding 
international index for VVer plants. this index 
observes corrosive factors and the concentra-
tions of corrosion products in the steam genera-
tor blowdown and the feedwater. for steam ge-
nerator blowdown, the calculation includes the 
chloride, sulphate and sodium concentrations 
and acid conductivity. for feedwater, it includes 
the iron, copper and oxygen concentrations. 
the new index has been used as an indicator 
since 2002. the chemistry index of the olkiluo-
to plant consists of the chloride and sulphate 
concentrations of the reactor water and the iron 
concentration in the feedwater. the indices for 
both plants only cover the aforementioned va-
lues during power operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown (loviisa) and the 
reactor water (olkiluoto) during operation com-
pared with the tech Spec limit in the monito-
ring period. at the olkiluoto plant, the maxi-
mum sulphate content of reactor water on even, 
steady-state operation is followed as well.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor circuit and the secondary circuit 
into the coolant. for the loviisa plant, the iron 
concentration of the primary coolant and the 
secondary circuit feedwater (maximum values 
for the monitoring period) are followed. for the 
olkiluoto plant, the iron concentration of feed-
water (maximum value for the monitoring peri-
od) is followed. in addition, the maximum co-60 
activity concentration in the reactor coolant 
while bringing the plant to a cold shutdown or 
after a reactor trip is followed for both plants.
Source of data
the licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at StuK. the concentration levels of corrosive 
substances and corrosion products can also be ob-
tained from quarterly reports submitted by the 
licensees.
Purpose of the indicator
the water chemistry indicators are used to moni-
tor and control primary and secondary circuit in-
tegrity. the monitoring is done by indices depicting 
water chemistry control and by following selected 
corrosive impurities and corrosion products. the 
water chemistry indices combine a number of wa-
ter chemistry parameters and thus give a good 
overview of the water chemistry conditions. StuK 
indicators are also used to monitor the fluctuati-
on of certain parameters in more detail. the cor-
rosive substances monitored include chloride and 
sulphate. the corrosive products followed are iron 
and radioactive co-60. the activity concentration 
of co-60 isotope while bringing the plant to cold 
shutdown is used to describe the access of cobalt-
containing structural materials into the reactor 
circuit, the success of the water chemistry control, 
and the shutdown procedures. in addition to the 
parameters described here, the power companies 
use several other parameters to monitor the plant 
units’ water chemistry conditions. 
Responsible units/persons
reactor and Safety Systems (rea) 
Kirsti tossavainen
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
the iron content in the primary coolant and the 
chloride content in the steam generator blowdown 
have complied with the license holder’s guideli-
nes. there was one brief period when the guide 
value (< 10 µg/l) set by the power company for the 
iron content of secondary coolant was exceeded at 
loviisa 1. at loviisa 2, the iron content of secon-
dary coolant has complied with the guide value at 
all times. the iron and chloride concentrations mo-
nitored in StuK’s indicator system refer to values 
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123
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2009
measured during operation. the concentrations of 
cobalt-60 activity are monitored during shutdown. 
they did not deviate from previous years’ values. 
the chemistry index of both loviisa plant units 
has remained at almost the best possible value.
the water chemistry of primary coolant was mo-
dified at both loviisa plant units in 2008. the ob-
jective of the modification was to achieve the high 
temperature ph (300 °c) already at the beginning 
of the operating cycle and to keep it stable throug-
hout the cycle. the purpose of optimising the high 
temperature ph is to minimise the corrosion of 
materials in the primary circuit and the deposition 
of corrosion products on the surfaces of fuel rods 
and the primary circuit. the corrosion products 
may become activated in the reactor core and as 
they migrate and become deposited on the primary 
circuit surfaces, cause radiation exposure to emp-
loyees, for example, during maintenance work. the 
power company has assessed the impacts of the 
modification on the chemical conditions and activi-
ty content in the primary coolant as well as on the 
surface contamination, the radiation levels present 
in the plant and the oxidation of the fuel cladding. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.00 1.45 1.19 1.18 1.11 1.08 1.03 1.06 1.03
 1.00 1.36 1.76 3.93 1.05 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.01
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator 
blow-down (µg/kg) during power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 3.33E+01 1.84E+01 1.43E+01 3.64E+01 2.90E+01
 5.28E+01 3.73E+01 3.19E+01 2.10E+02 1.14E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
Tech Spec limit after the annual maintenance outages 2008 100 µg/kg; 
before them 500 µg/kg
Integrity of primary circuit: 
Corrosion products; Maximum iron concentration in 
the feed water (µg/l) (RL30 / RL70), Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 16.6 13.1 13.6 11.4 15.1
 14.7 11.1 11.4 8.7 8.7
0
5
10
15
20
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fetot µg/l) 
during power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 15.1 44.9 8.9 11.0 19.4
 47.5 16.0 18.7 13.6 16.1
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Integrity of primary circuit: 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in primary 
coolant during shutdown or after reactor scram, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.50E+04 9.60E+03 1.09E+04 1.29E+04 1.03E+04
 2.30E+04 9.00E+03 2.30E+04 2.40E+04 1.71E+04
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
final conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of 
one operating cycle alone. however, no cause for 
making modifications to the current water che-
mistry has been found. no significant changes took 
place regarding the indicator “maximum values of 
iron concentration in primary coolant during po-
wer operation” monitored by StuK as an indicator 
of primary circuit corrosion.
Based on the water chemistry indicators, the 
primary circuit integrity of loviisa plant units has 
remained good.
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Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
the sulphate and chloride concentrations in reactor 
water and the iron concentration in reactor feed-
water have complied with the license holder’s tar-
get values apart from one brief incident where the 
target value for sulphate concentration (< 5 µg/l) 
was exceeded. the chemistry index has remained 
steady at the best possible value (1).
there were no significant changes in the ma-
ximum concentrations of co-60 activity measured 
during shutdown.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Integrity of primary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 1.28 1.09 1.00 1.09 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum sulphate concentration in primary coolant (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 4.1 7.2 7.0 2.2 3.2 
 6.3 5.5 4.9 2.1 5.6
0
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3
4
5
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in reactor feed water (µg/l), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.45 0.80 1.60 1.10 0.68
 1.55 1.83 1.20 0.90 0.67
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in primary 
coolant during shutdown or after reactor scram, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 6.24E+04 5.70E+04 7.08E+04 8.34E+04 7.83E+04
 7.63E+04 9.67E+04 1.46E+05 7.01E+04 7.54E+04
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration in primary coolant (µg/kg) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.0 0.9  0.5 0.5 2.1
 2.5 0.8 1.2 0.6 2.0
100.0
10.0
1.0
0.0
0.1
Tech Spec limit 100 µg/kg
 below detection limit
Based on the water chemistry indicators, the 
primary circuit integrity of olkiluoto plant units 
has remained good.
A.III.2b Primary circuit leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
the indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified primary circuit leakages at the 
olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3) of identified (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 t1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the control-
led floor drainage system, 345 t33) containment 
internal leakages during the operating cycle.
STUK-B 118
125
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2009
•	 Highest	 daily	 containment	 internal	 leakage	
volume during the operating cycle in relation to 
the allowed leakage volume in the tech Specs 
(outflow water volume of water condensing in 
the air coolers of the containment cooling sys-
tem 725/tech Specs limit).
Source of data
the licensee submits data on primary circuit lea-
kages at the olkiluoto power plant to the respon-
sible person at StuK.
Purpose of the indicator
the indicators describing primary circuit leakages 
are used to follow and monitor the leak rate of the 
primary circuit within the containment.
Responsible units/persons
organisations and operations (oKa)
Jarmo Konsi
Interpretation of the indicator
one of the purposes of controlled leakage drain 
system 352 is to collect seal box leakages from 
valves, pumps and other such components. the 
drains from the seal boxes of the valves within 
the containment are equipped with temperature 
sensors to locate any leaks. temperature sensors 
installed on the drains above the main lines will 
detect any leakage in the specific line. other met-
hods must then be used to locate the actual leaking 
object. during the operating cycle of 2008–2009, 
the number of leaks identified in the containment 
has decreased at ol2, continuing the trend of last 
four operating cycles. in contrast, the number of 
identified leaks at ol2 increased to some extent 
compared to the previous operating cycle. no single 
reason has been found for the increasing trend.
at the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit t33, which collects the 
drain water from the containment drywell floor 
drains and any leakage from the control rod ac-
tuator seals. the number of unidentified primary 
circuit leaks occurring during the operating cycle 
of 2008–2009 increased somewhat at both plant 
units, having been very small during the previous 
operating cycle. one reason for the number of leaks 
increasing was due to small valve seal leaks inside 
both plant unit containments. 
one of the purposes of containment gas coo-
ling system 725 is to remove moisture from the 
containment atmosphere. moisture may originate 
from steam leaking from the primary circuit. in the 
operating cycle of 2008–2009, the containment’s 
largest internal daily leak volume’s ratio to the 
maximum allowable volume, as specified in the 
technical Specifications, continued to be low for 
both plant units although there was some increase 
from the previous cycle’s figures. this was the 
sixth consequent operating cycle with very few 
leaks from the primary circuit to the containment 
atmosphere.
the primary circuit has been relatively leak-
proof in the 2008–2009 operating cycle.
0
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Identified leakages of primary circuit (352T1, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 3443 2678 2481 3716 3300 3004 4058 3805 4697
 3677 3262 3307 2908 2741 3862 3696 3502 3252
0
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Unidentified leakages of primary circuit (345T33, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 79.6 1.8 196.0 9.2 1.1 2.5 1.6 2.2 15.5
 5.4 1.8 14.0 18.6 53.0 3.8 1.3 2.0 16.5 
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the Tech Spec limit, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 4.05 0.46 9.40 0.70 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.21 1.27
 0.69 0.12 0.60 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.09 0.1 1.97 
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A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
as the indicators, the parameters below are follo-
wed: the total as-found leakage of outer isolation 
valves following the first integrity tests, compared 
with the highest allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves; the percentage of isolation 
valves tested during the year in question at each 
plant unit that passed the leakage test on the first 
attempt (i.e. as-found leakage smaller than the 
acceptance criteria of a valve and no exceeding of 
the so-called attention criteria of a valve without 
repair in consecutive years) and the combined as-
found leakage rate of containment penetrations 
and airlocks in relation to their highest allowed to-
tal leakage. the combined leakage rate at olkiluoto 
includes leakages from personnel airlocks, the 
maintenance dome and the containment dome. in 
loviisa, the combined leakage rate is comprised of 
the leakage test results of personnel airlocks, the 
material airlock, the cable penetrations of inspecti-
on equipment, the containment maintenance venti-
lation systems (tl23), the main steam piping (ra) 
and the feedwater system (rl) penetrations, as 
well as the seals of the blind-flanged penetrations 
of ice-filling pipes.
Source of data
data is extracted from the utilities’ leak-tightness 
test reports submitted by the licensee to StuK for 
information within three months of the completion 
of annual maintenance. StuK calculates the total 
as-found leakages, since the reports give total lea-
kages as they are at the end of the annual main-
tenance outage (i.e. after the completion of repairs 
and re-testing).
Purpose of the indicator
this indicator is used to follow the integrity of 
the containment isolation valves, penetrations, and 
airlocks.
Responsible unit/person
reactor and Safety Systems (rea)
päivi Salo
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
the total as-found leakages of outer isolation val-
ves have decreased at the loviisa 1 plant unit and 
increased at the loviisa 2 plant unit. the total as-
found leakages at both plant units are still below 
the limit set in the tech Specs. at loviisa 1, the 
largest leaks came via two valves in the fuel pool 
cooling system (approximately 24%). at loviisa 2, 
the largest leak came via the valve in the cooling 
system of the ice condensation system (approxima-
tely 26%).
the percentage of isolation valves which passed 
the leakage test at the first attempt has remained 
high.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves 
compared with the highest allowed overall leakage 
of outer isolation valves, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 2.15 0.45 0.39 0.71 1.10 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.54 0.47
 0.40 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.36 0.11 0.20 0.45 0.74
92 %
94 %
96 %
98 %
100 %
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 95.00 98.00 99.00 99.00 95.00 97.00 96.00 99.00 95.50 99.50
 100.00 99.00 97.00 99.00 97.00 99.50 98.60 99.50 98.60 97.70
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and 
air locks compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.18 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06
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the overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which at loviisa includes the leakage 
test results for the personnel airlock, the emer-
gency personnel airlock, the material airlock, the 
reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable penetrations 
and bellow seals (ra, rl, tl23), was small at both 
plant units.
Olkiluoto
the total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at the olkiluoto 1 plant unit exceeded the 
limit set in tech Specs and were also bigger than in 
2008. about 85% of the total is caused by a single 
leaking valve of the reactor pressure vessel. the 
leak was caused by poor alignment of the valve 
seat cone. this was also the largest single leak 
measured. after repairs, the total leakage met the 
requirements of the technical Specifications. 
the total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at the olkiluoto 2 plant unit exceeded the 
limit set in tech Specs and were also bigger than in 
2008. about 56% of the total is caused by a single 
leaking valve of the reactor pressure vessel cover 
spraying system. this valve is normally open and 
closes when the containment isolation signal is re-
ceived. the isolation valve fitted in the line inside 
the containment did not leak. the subject valve 
has leaked in many different years. the leak was 
caused by rocking of the valve disc. the leaky valve 
has been replaced. in other respects, the total of 
as-found leakages was made up of minor leaks in 
several outer isolation valves. after repairs, the to-
tal leakage met the requirements of the technical 
Specifications.
the percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak tightness test at first attempt has re-
mained high for both plant units. 
the total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which tVo includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, has re-
mained small for both plant units.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves 
compared with the highest allowed overall leakage 
of outer isolation valves, Olkiluoto NPP 
 OL1
 OL2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
 0.25 0.19 0.58 0.50 0.80 0.47 0.38 0.41 1.02 1.29
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 1.03 1.12 0.74 1.69 1.26 0.45 1.27 1.10 0.45 1.12
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and 
air locks compared to the leak limit, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
92 %
93 %
94 %
95 %
96 %
97 %
98 %
99 %
100 %
 99.51 99.51 98.00 98.00 95.00 96.10 98.60 97.50 98.00 99.40
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 96.45 98.00 99.00 98.00 97.00 97.00 97.40 97.70 98.30 95.80
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APPENDIX 2 Occupational radiation dose distribution 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 2009
According to the Radiation Decree, the annual ef-
fective dose from radiation work for a worker must 
not exceed 50 mSv while the average over any pe-
riod of five years must remain below 20 mSv.
The highest individual dose incurred at Finnish 
nuclear power plants was 13.5 mSv. This dose was 
accumulated from work at the Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant. The highest individual dose for a Finnish 
nuclear power plant worker in the five-year period 
from 2005 to 2009 was 54.6 mSv. The dose was ac-
cumulated at Loviisa and Olkiluoto, as well as at 
Swedish nuclear power plants.
dose range 
(mSv)
number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0.1 782 1107 1863
0.1–0.49 167 581 767
0.5–0.99 95 245 346
1.00–1.99 117 228 369
2.00–2.99 60 63 142
3.00–3.99 38 30 90
4.00–4.99 15 18 34
5.00–5.99 13 9 29
6.00–6.99 3 15 28
7.00–7.99 3 6 16
8.00–8.99 2 2 9
9.00–9.99 0 3 7
10.00–10.99 – 0 4
11.00–11.99 – – 0
12.00–14.99 – – –
15.00–24.99 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have 
received doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same 
person may have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants 
and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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APPENDIX 3 Significant operational events
Loviisa NPP
Oil leak in the reactor coolant pump
At Loviisa 2, a leak was detected on 9 January 
2009 in the cooling water hose leading to the oil 
cooler of the reactor coolant pump motor. The fault 
was repaired by stopping the pump and replac-
ing the hose connector. After the water leak was 
repaired, the motor generated an oil leak, and in 
all, 4.5 litres of oil had to be added during the week 
(the total oil volume is 20 litres).
The reactor coolant pump was stopped again 
for repairs on 17 January 2009, and the reactor 
power was reduced to 82%. The impurities found in 
the motor oil channel were removed and the hoses 
inspected, after which the pump was started and 
the plant power was ramped up towards 100%. 
The oil level kept decreasing, and a total of about 
four litres of fresh oil was added. Despite that, the 
plant power was increased. The oil leaking out of 
the pump began to generate fumes when it came 
into contact with hot surfaces, an indication of an 
obvious risk of fire. The plant power was reduced 
and the pump was stopped on the morning of 18 
January 2009. After which, one broken pipe in the 
oil mist suction device was replaced and another 
one straightened. The repairs were completed on 
19 January 2009. After this, the pump was started 
and the plant power increased again.
STUK wanted to review how the accident risk 
caused by the oil leak had been assessed at the 
plant and how the decisions regarding pump re-
pairs were made. The review included interviewing 
the persons involved in the event in order to as-
certain that the plant had been in a safe state and 
the actions taken had been appropriate. The result 
of the inspection was that plant safety was not at 
risk, but the procedures and decision-making con-
tained elements of ambiguity. Decision-making un-
der difficult circumstances, management of chang-
es in the situation, and supervision and oversight 
of work are areas in need of further development 
at the Loviisa plant. The results of the inspection 
were discussed with the employees and manage-
ment of the NPP. The Loviisa plant carried out a 
root cause analysis regarding the event.
Loss of magnetic loads of the pilot valves 
of pressurizer safety valves at Loviisa 2
At Loviisa 2, the power supply to the magnetic 
loads of the pilot valves of both safety valves of the 
pressurizer blowdown line was lost in conjunction 
with a repair operation on 21 January 2009. The 
interruption in power supply occurred when the 
circuit breaker protecting the power supply tripped 
after a tool fell on it.
The pressurizer safety valves prevent the pres-
sure in the primary circuit from rising in a tran-
sient situation. The purpose of the magnetic loads 
was to ensure the leak-tightness of the pilot valves 
and to ensure the operation of the pilot valve (to 
control the safety valve) at the correct pressure. 
The actual operation of the pilot valve is based on 
spring loading.
After the circuit breaker had tripped, the plant 
assessed the operability of the valves and took the 
line, with an emphasis on safety, that the valves 
are inoperable. The Technical Specifications re-
quire that the plant must be shut down in this 
situation. The plant began repairing the fault and 
preparing for a shutdown.
Some time after the fault occurred, more steam 
than normal started flowing into the blowdown 
tank and the temperatures at the leak lines of the 
safety valve pilot valves started to rise. In order 
to prevent the unnecessary opening of the safety 
valve, the decision was taken at the plant to switch 
the magnetic loads to manual control. This caused 
a common cause failure of the safety valves, and 
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the valves would not have automatically opened 
at the normal opening pressure. The generation 
of overpressure and opening of the safety valves 
is unlikely at a plant of the Loviisa type. It would 
have been possible to cancel manual control if 
required. Manual control was switched on for 16 
minutes until the circuit breaker was replaced and 
the power supply of the solenoids restored.
STUK is of the opinion that the overpressure 
protection of the plant was momentarily brought 
to an inoperable state contrary to the Technical 
Specifications by switching the magnetic loads of 
the pilot valves to manual control. On the other 
hand, the opening of a safety valve and in par-
ticular its erroneous jamming to the open position 
will result in a leak of the primary circuit and 
consequently a major load on the reactor pressure 
vessel. This was a case of a decision-making situa-
tion based on consideration, with conflicting safety 
implications that the instructions did not fully 
support.
Fortum has submitted a special report on the 
matter, with a proposal for corrective actions to be 
taken in the matter. The markings on and instruc-
tions for manual controls of power supplies have 
been made less ambiguous. Further modifications 
will also be made on manual controls in conjunc-
tion with the upcoming I & C modernisation 
project. The instructions for decision-making will 
be further developed. 
Incorrect flow rate readings for 
the vent stack at Loviisa 1
In April 2009, it was detected that one of the two 
flow meters at the Loviisa plant unit vent stack 
for exhaust air had become faulty. The fault had 
occurred in February 2009, but it was not detected 
immediately because the trends in air flow read-
ings were not monitored as a matter of routine, 
nor were there any alarms set for minimum flow or 
faults. The observations made in conjunction with 
repairing the flow sensor indicated that the sensor 
had given readings that were too low even before it 
failed. Test measurements taken in the flow chan-
nel at Loviisa 1 indicated a flow rate of 55 m³/s 
while the sensor had given a reading of 42 m³/s just 
before its failure. The said 55 m³/s is actually also 
the theoretical nominal flow rate at the vent stack 
of the plant.
The central air exhaust channel for the air 
conditioning and gas processing systems in the 
radiation control area of the Loviisa power plant is 
the vent stack that has two separate flow channels 
for the plant units. The exhaust air flowing in the 
vent stack channel has a flow measurement system 
with redundancy, and the measured data from one 
of them is used as the basis for determining the to-
tal air volume to be used for emission calculations. 
In this case, the vent stack flow meter used for 
emission calculations did not operate as expected. 
The radiation measurement monitors constantly 
monitoring radioactivity as well as the sampling 
and analysis of radioactive emissions operated as 
planned.
The incorrect reading of the flow rate sensor 
has resulted in a smaller amount of radioactive 
material released being reported from Loviisa 1 
ever since 2006, proportionally to the error in 
measurements. Compared to the total emissions of 
the entire plant, the releases of activity from the 
plant unit have been reported as five per cent too 
low since 2006. Since the releases of radioactive 
materials into the environment have been very 
small, the flow rate measurement error has not af-
fected the radiation exposure of local inhabitants. 
The Government has set 0.1 millisieverts per year 
as the limit for radiation doses received by indi-
vidual inhabitants in the vicinity of the plant as a 
result of normal operation of the NPPs. The radia-
tion dose caused by the Loviisa NPP to inhabitants 
in the vicinity has during recent years been less 
than one per cent of the set limit.
As corrective actions, changes will be made at 
the Loviisa power plant to the testing and inspec-
tion instructions for flow rate sensors. In addition, 
alarms have been set for the minimum flow rate 
readings so that any faults in the sensors could be 
better detected. The Loviisa power plant supplied 
STUK with a revised report of airborne releases 
in 2009.
Inoperability of the external containment 
spray system at Loviisa 1
A mistake was made at Loviisa 1 in the man-
agement of maintenance operations that led to a 
momentary inoperability of both external contain-
ment spray system trains on 28 April 2009.
The cooling fan of the switchgear supplying one 
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of the two trains of the external containment spray 
system was isolated for periodic inspection. This 
was not a permissible action because the spraying 
pump motor of the other train was already being 
inspected at the time. 
The external containment spray system is de-
signed to prevent the slow generation of overpres-
sure in the containment building during a serious 
accident and the uncontrolled release of radioac-
tive substances to the environment that might 
consequently result. The increase in containment 
building pressure is prevented by spraying cooling 
water on it to condensate the steam inside the con-
tainment and to reduce its pressure.
The simultaneous maintenance operations on 
the spray system should have been spotted in the 
inspection and approval of maintenance work. The 
database software intended for monitoring main-
tenance operations at the Loviisa plant should 
help with this. The simultaneous operations on 
the same system were not spotted by the software 
because certain system information was missing. 
The situation was not identified in the night and 
morning shift meetings either. The inoperability of 
the system was detected later during the morning 
meeting of the operating unit. 
The situation was rectified by discontinuing 
the periodic maintenance of the cooling fan and by 
restoring the operation of the isolated components. 
The spray pumps of the trains were inoperable for 
more than four hours. 
According to the Technical Specifications, the 
trains may be simultaneously out of operation for 
three days. In addition, the Technical Specifications 
allow maintenance on the system during plant op-
eration provided that the other train is operable. 
The event did not have a significant effect on the 
safety of the plant or its environment because a se-
rious accident at the Loviisa plant is very unlikely 
and the inoperability of the system only lasted for 
a short while.
As the immediate corrective measure, the in-
formation in the work management program was 
checked and the missing data added. The safety in-
spection process of work orders has been amended 
so that the progress of simultaneous operations 
leading to a similar state of inoperability is pre-
vented through work planning.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 0.
Low fuel levels in diesel generator fuel tanks
It was noticed at Loviisa 2 on 1 July 2009 in con-
junction with testing the diesel generator that the 
fuel level in the tank was too low. The fuel level 
had already sunk below the minimum level in con-
junction with the previous tests. This diesel gen-
erator backs up the power supply to the electri-
cal system of the Serious Accidents Management 
(SAM) system. The fuel level was also checked in 
the respective tank at Loviisa 1 and was also found 
to be low.
When the event was reviewed, it was found 
that the testing instructions and the Technical 
Specifications had conflicting requirements. The 
Technical Specifications require that the tank 
must be at least half full (1,500 litres). The testing 
instructions specified the half height of the tank as 
the limit after which more fuel must be ordered. 
The alarm limit for the tank level was also set 
below the limit set by the Tech Specs. Therefore, 
the level of fuel in the tank had at times been non-
compliant with the Tech Specs ever since the SAM 
system was introduced, i.e. the early 1990s.
The event only has minor safety implications 
because it is highly unlikely that these diesel 
generators actually would have to be operated for 
longer periods. 1,500 litres of fuel is enough for op-
erating one diesel engine for about 11 to 21 hours, 
depending on the load. The volume of fuel giving 
rise to the event would only have reduced the op-
erating time of the diesel generator by a few hours. 
The safety implications of the event are further 
mitigated by the fact that in a potential situation 
of needing more fuel, there would have been time 
to transfer it in a container from the tanks of other 
diesel generators or to connect the tanks of the 
SAM systems of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2.
As an immediate corrective measure, the fuel 
tanks of both diesel generators were filled up and 
their level measurements were checked. The oper-
ating and alarm limits were tested and the neces-
sary modifications were made in conjunction with 
the periodic inspection. 
Fuel measurements were modified so that in-
stead of showing the shortfall, they now indicate 
the amount of fuel in the tank. The testing instruc-
tions were amended so that the limits for ordering 
and the minimum level specified by Tech Specs 
are now clearly marked with the ordering limit set 
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above the Tech Specs limit. It was further ensured 
that a similar situation cannot arise with the other 
diesel generators. 
Erroneous isolation of power supply 
to the control valve of the standby 
emergency feedwater line at Loviisa 2
During the annual maintenance of Loviisa 1 on 25 
August 2009, the emergency feedwater system was 
disabled for planned maintenance and modifica-
tion operations. In this conjunction, an erroneous 
isolation of power supply was carried out when the 
control valve of the emergency feedwater line of 
the operating steam generator of the Loviisa 2 unit 
was isolated instead of the motorized shutoff valve. 
The erroneous isolation was spotted immediately 
when the system operation was being restored af-
ter completing the work on 3 September 2009. The 
power supply isolated for the work was switched 
back on and the operability of the valve of Loviisa 
2 was restored. 
The motorized shutoff valve of Loviisa 1 had 
been closed during the work, but not electrically 
isolated. However, no significant risk to personnel, 
the process or electrical safety was caused due to 
the nature of the work.
The control valve of Loviisa 2 was closed and 
electrically isolated which means that it would not 
have opened when required. The control valve is re-
quired for pumping standby emergency feedwater 
to the steam generators for ensuring the removal 
of residual heat in a situation where the normal 
feedwater system and emergency feedwater system 
are not available. There are four similar feedwater 
lines, and analyses have shown that at least two of 
them have to operate for sufficient cooling of the 
reactor. As a result of the erroneous isolation, three 
operable feedwater lines were available. 
The power outlets and fuses of the power sup-
plies of valves in Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 relevant 
for the work are located on top of each other in the 
same substation. The markings for the electrical 
isolation at this substation were incorrect and re-
ferred to the power outlet and fuses of the wrong 
valve. Elsewhere, such as in the work order system 
and control room markings, the markings and ac-
tions were correctly referred. 
In order to prevent a similar event from recur-
ring, the event and issues learned from it were dis-
cussed with the electricians carrying out this type 
of work at the Loviisa plants. 
The event had no significance to nuclear or ra-
diation safety and was rated at level 0 on the INES 
scale.
Fire in the power supply unit of the 
emergency feedwater pump at Loviisa 2
The personnel of Loviisa 2 noticed during annual 
maintenance on 13 September 2009 that smoke 
was emerging from the 400 V switchgear supply-
ing the safety system components. The electrical 
supply unit of the emergency feedwater pump was 
identified as the source of smoke. After that, the 
switchgear power was totally cut off and the fire 
was extinguished by the fire brigade. 
The emergency feedwater pump whose power 
supply unit caught fire had been de-energized due 
to annual maintenance operations even before the 
fire occurred. Besides the actual operating power 
for the pump, the outlet unit also has an auxil-
iary power connection (220 VDC) for controlling 
the outlet unit components. When the type of the 
main switch changed in 2006, the outlet unit had 
been modified so that turning the main switch to 
position 0 would only cut off the main power, not 
the auxiliary power. The pump received a start 
command from the I & C system during annual 
maintenance of the plant. The contactor switch-
ing the power of the pump closed in the normal 
manner because the open main switch no longer 
switched off the auxiliary power of the outlet 
unit. Knowledge of a closed contactor would have 
stopped the CLOSE command but the open main 
switch prevented this information from being con-
veyed to the I & C system. The contactor solenoid 
is not designed for a 100% duty cycle which is why 
it overheated and started smoking.
The fire was caused by the wiring that allowed 
the contactor to be controlled so that it overheated. 
As an immediate measure, Fortum will amend the 
instructions for isolation work so that the auxiliary 
power supplies of outlet units are always switched 
off when the main power supply circuit is switched 
off. The wiring of outlet units was modified so that 
the possibility for this fault occurring is elimi-
nated.
The event had little significance to safety be-
cause the reactor had been shut down for annual 
134
STUK-B 118 Significant operational eventS APPENDIX 3
maintenance of the plant. However, had the emer-
gency feedwater system been needed for cooling off 
the reactor, the redundant systems would still have 
been available.
Inoperability of the sprinkler system of the 
turbine lubrication oil tanks at Loviisa 2
It was found in conjunction with testing the sprin-
kler alarms of the turbine lubrication oil tank at 
Loviisa 2 that the regional sprinkler triggering 
valve does not trigger automatically or become re-
activated after forced triggering. Because of this 
fault, local fire extinguishing at the lubrication oil 
tank would probably have failed to operate. The re-
gional trigger valve was opened and the throttle of 
the trigger network was also inspected. The inspec-
tion revealed that the throttle diameter was 6 mm 
when it should have been 3 mm.
All regional trigger valves in the sprinkler sys-
tem of the turbine lubrication oil tanks of Loviisa 
2 were inspected, and three examples of throttles 
that were too large were found. The throttles were 
replaced and the systems were successfully tested. 
The equivalent valves at Loviisa 1 were inspected 
and tested immediately after the valves at Loviisa 
2 had been repaired and tested. One valve had a 
throttle that was too large and was replaced with 
a smaller one. 
The regional trigger valves were replaced in 
2005 at both plant units. The design documenta-
tion specifies 3 mm as the throttle size. The pres-
sure equipment associated with the system was in-
spected at the plant before commissioning the new 
components in line with the instructions applied 
at the Loviisa power plant. The other parts, such 
as the throttles, were not inspected at the plant. 
Instead, it was established in line with the instruc-
tions that the equipment supplier had inspected 
them in compliance with its own quality assurance 
procedures. 
The alarms and operation of the sprinkler sys-
tem for the turbine lubrication oil tank are tested 
twice a year: once during the annual maintenance 
and once during operation. A situation had oc-
curred earlier at Loviisa 1 in conjunction with the 
replacement of regional trigger valves where one 
regional trigger valve of the sprinkler system for 
the turbine lubrication oil tank had failed to oper-
ate. In that instance, the valve was opened and 
the gasket set was replaced. The valve operated 
correctly when tested after the repair. The fault 
was thought to be caused by too little usage that 
had resulted in parts of the valve jamming. Apart 
from this case, the valves have operated correctly 
in spite of the wrong size throttles. 
As a corrective measure, Fortum will assess the 
adequacy of its instructions regarding modification 
work. In addition, the testing frequency of alarms 
caused by the triggering of turbine sprinklers will 
be doubled from the present.
The event is of minor significance to safety be-
cause the different fire extinguishing systems and 
methods back up each other. In addition to local 
extinguishers, any fires in the lubricating oil tanks 
can be extinguished by using two water cannons of 
fixed installation and the fire hydrants in the tur-
bine hall. There is a fixed installation of a general 
sprinkler system below the main level of the tur-
bine hall which is designed for extinguishing any 
burning oil that is spilled from the oil tanks to the 
levels below. The operation of the general sprinkler 
system is independent of the sprinklers over the 
oil tanks.
Failure to carry out periodic 
maintenance on the flow meters of 
the emergency feedwater pumps 
At Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, all flow rate meas-
urement systems of emergency feedwater pumps 
were not calibrated. These calibrations are part of 
the preventive maintenance operations that are 
required by the Tech Specs and carried out every 
12 months. The flow measurements verify that the 
pumps are operating at low water flow rates and 
protect the pump motors from overloading in dif-
ferent situations. 
It was noticed at Loviisa 2 after annual main-
tenance that two flow meters had not been cali-
brated. The work had been incorrectly moved from 
the annual maintenance to be carried out during 
operation without taking the relevant require-
ments of the Tech Specs into account. The change 
had not been spotted in the inspection carried out 
at start-up.
When the event was investigated it transpired 
that three other flow meter calibrations had also 
been omitted at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 in 2009 
and 2007. These omissions occurred because the 
preventive maintenance operations had been cou-
pled with inspections of the protective logic of 
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emergency feedwater pumps which are only car-
ried out at two-year intervals. This coupling of 
operations was to do with the introduction of the 
new work order and condition monitoring database 
(LOMAX) in 2006. 
The plants have six flow metering units in all: 
two at Loviisa 1 and four at Loviisa 2. All calibra-
tions were duly carried out in 2008. In conjunction 
with other tests, Fortum verified that the uncali-
brated meters give correct readings. The calibra-
tions will be next carried out during the 2010 
annual maintenance. As corrective measures, the 
power company will review the Tech Specs and the 
preventive maintenance programmes and organise 
refresher training regarding the Tech Specs, con-
tents of work orders and administration of work. 
During start-up, work postponed during the an-
nual maintenance will be reviewed and the proce-
dural instructions regarding the postponement of 
work will be made more specific. 
The event is of minor significance to safety be-
cause in practice, the incorrect readings or inoper-
ability of the pump flow meters would have been 
detected in tests that are carried out at the plant 
at regular intervals. The event was rated at level 0 
on the international INES scale because it had no 
significance to nuclear or radiation safety.
Olkiluoto NPP
Stoppage of the pump of the shutdown 
service water system as a result of 
signal lamp failure at Olkiluoto 1
Periodic tests were carried out at Olkiluoto 1 on 
5 January 2009. They involved starting a pump 
which had stopped as a result of the failure of a 
signal lamp in the pump control circuit that indi-
cates that the pump is in operation. The significant 
issue here is that the failure of a signal lamp pre-
vented the pump, a component more significant to 
safety, from operating. The pump is part of a sys-
tem for pumping seawater to the plant for remov-
ing the residual heat from the reactor when the 
plant has been shut down (the shutdown service 
water system). The system consists of four identi-
cal and independent circuits. Each circuit has its 
own pump. The inoperability of one pump will not 
put the plant safety at risk.
The signal lamp had been in use since September 
2008 when the glow discharge lamps in the control 
circuits of ten different pumps were replaced with 
LED signal lamps in conjunction with preven-
tive maintenance operations. After the event, TVO 
analysed the causes for the fault and deliberated 
over whether this was a case of an individual com-
ponent failure or could the same fault occur in the 
other LED signal lamps as well. As a precaution-
ary measure, TVO decided to discontinue using 
these signal lamps on 8 January 2009. Similar 
pump tests are performed at four-week intervals, 
but this was the first occurrence of any faults.
TVO has initiated a project for replacing low-
voltage switchgear (SIMO). The project involves 
separating the signal lamp voltage from the actual 
control circuit voltage into a totally separate cir-
cuit. The signal lamp voltage is generated from the 
main voltage of the switchgear using a dedicated 
power supply. The signal lamps will be of an LED 
type.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 1.
The Technical Specifications regarding the 
determination of thermal margins in the 
reactor are open to different interpretations
TVO noticed that the requirement in the Technical 
Specifications regarding the frequency at which 
the thermal margins in the reactor are to be deter-
mined has been formulated in a less than precise 
manner. The Tech Specs require that the margins 
are determined at over 60% power whenever the 
drive pattern of control rods has been changed. 
This requirement is not appropriate when, for ex-
ample, operating at reduced power during periodic 
tests where the control rods are moved in while the 
main coolant pumps are operated using rev control 
and the control rods are moved through several 
drive patterns. In these situations, the margins 
have been determined before and after the change 
of power but not for each drive pattern during the 
change of power. The Tech Specs were revised so 
that the said procedure no longer is in formal con-
flict with the requirements of Tech Specs.
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Inoperability of an isolation valve in 
the containment vessel spray system 
in a periodic test using an external 
diesel generator for power supply
The testing of isolation valve of the containment 
vessel spray system using a portable diesel genera-
tor could not be successfully done during the peri-
odic tests carried out at Olkiluoto 1 on 23 March 
2009. When the fault was investigated, it tran-
spired that the contactor installation plates had 
been replaced during annual maintenance in 2008 
for the switchgear outputs controlling this isola-
tion valve and three other valves. In that modifica-
tion operation, two separate connectors on top of 
each other had been incorrectly connected together. 
This erroneous construction would have prevented 
opening the valves when supplied by a portable 
diesel generator. A situation like that may arise for 
example when a total loss of AC power occurs. The 
error was not detected in the tests carried out in 
conjunction with the modification work. The fault 
was rectified on 23 March 2009.
These valves are located in the flooding line 
at the lower drywell of the reactor containment 
building and in the water lines of the containment 
building. During the operating phase, the valves 
are closed. In case of serious accident, the valves 
would be opened to fill the containment building 
with water. The valves can also be opened in a 
situation of total loss of AC power because power 
supply is backed up by battery banks that are ca-
pable of supplying power for at least a few hours. 
The continuous power supply can also be ensured 
by switching to a mobile diesel generator. If the 
valves had not been opened before switching over 
to the mobile diesel generators, they could not have 
been opened at all because of the error made in 
modification work. If an attempt to open the valves 
manually using a hand wheel would also have 
failed, the containment building could not have 
been filled with water when required.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at level 0.
Malfunctions of the outer isolation valves 
of main steam lines at Olkiluoto 1
At Olkiluoto 1, malfunctions were observed in the 
isolation valves of steam lines during tests carried 
out after annual maintenance. The malfunctions 
were caused by a gear in the actuator opening and 
closing the valve which had failed due to fatigue 
from its long history of use.
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 both have four 
steam lines for conveying the steam generated in 
the reactor to the turbine plant. Each steam line 
has two isolation valves, one inside the contain-
ment wall and one on the outside. Their purpose 
is to close the steam lines in certain transient and 
accident situations, thus isolating the reactor and 
its containment building from the outside world 
so that radioactivity stays inside the containment 
building.
The damage was detected in the reduction gear 
between the motor and the actuator of the outer 
isolation valve at Olkiluoto 1. At worst, the dam-
age could have prevented the closure of the outer 
isolation valve in a situation where the steam line 
had for some reason ruptured inside the contain-
ment building. In case of a pipe rupture outside the 
containment, both the inner and the outer isolation 
valves close automatically driven by steam pres-
sure which means that in these situations both 
valves would have closed irrespective of the fault 
in the motor-driven actuator. During normal plant 
operation, the steam line isolation valves are open, 
and are only actuated in periodic tests carried out 
at two-month intervals.
All of these gears were replaced with new ones 
at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Some of the gears removed 
showed early signs of cracks due to fatigue. The 
torque values applicable to the actuators have been 
reviewed following the event.
STUK required that TVO should establish the 
appropriate dimensioning of gear wheels and the 
reasons for the damages by the end of the year.
On the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES), the event was rated at level 1.
Jamming of the fuel transfer machine 
during transfers of spent fuel at Olkiluoto 2
At Olkiluoto 2, the refuelling machine developed 
a malfunction during annual maintenance when 
spent fuel was being transferred out of the reac-
tor on 17 May 2009. The element of spent fuel had 
already been lifted completely out of the reactor 
when an excessive need for lifting force triggered 
the overload limiter of the refuelling machine and 
prevented the lifting operation from being contin-
ued.
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It was found that the malfunction was caused 
by the compressed air hose of the refuelling ma-
chine jamming between the tubes of the telescopic 
mast of the refuelling machine which prevented the 
telescopic mast tubes from moving normally. TVO 
tried to remove the jammed compressed air hose by 
lifting and lowering the fuel assembly attached to 
the telescopic mast but failed to remove the hose. 
During the event, there was some uncertainty as 
to how much load the telescopic mast could carry 
which meant that there was a risk of parts of the 
mast falling, together with the fuel bundle attached 
to the gripping device, in the reactor core on top of 
other fuel elements. Because of this, TVO installed 
a special plate to the fuel transfer machine to sup-
port the jammed telescopic tubes. After the event, 
TVO analysed the durability of the telescopic mast 
with VTT. The results indicated that the telescopic 
tube could not have fallen on top of the fuel even if 
the securing plate had not been not installed.
STUK classified the event as an anomaly (INES 
level 1) due to the defects identified in fuel han-
dling. The Technical Specifications prescribe that 
fuel may only be handled using a refuelling ma-
chine in full operating condition. The alarms gen-
erated by the refuelling machine were not appro-
priately reacted to during the early phases of the 
lifting operation, and fuel handling was continued 
even after the jamming of the compressed air 
hose between the telescopic mast tubes had been 
noticed. The risk of falling tubes was not taken 
into account during the early stages of the event, 
and fuel handling was continued using a faulty 
transfer machine without a comprehensive safety 
assessment of the situation.
The corrective actions taken following the event 
include installing a camera on the refuelling ma-
chine and making amendments to procedures and 
instructions. The needs for modernising and devel-
oping the transfer machines will be assessed tak-
ing this event into account.
Incorrect settings in the thermal 
relays of pump motors in the 
shutdown service water system
On 29 June 2009, TVO notified STUK of the in-
correct settings detected in the thermal relays of 
electrical motors driving the pumps in the system 
required for residual heat removal. The pumps are 
part of a system pumping seawater to the plant for 
removing the residual heat from the reactor when 
the plant has been shut down (the shutdown serv-
ice water system). At Olkiluoto 1, two pump motors 
and at Olkiluoto 2, one pump motor had wrong set-
tings in the thermal overload relays. They were set 
for an operating voltage of 690 V when the nominal 
voltage of the supply bus was 660 V. TVO corrected 
the settings on 30 June by changing the thermal 
relay setting from 76 A to 81 A.
TVO had already detected the incorrect settings 
more than a year ago when these motors were re-
placed and the company carried out an operational 
assessment on the thermal relays as required by 
STUK. Incorrect settings were detected in four 
pumps in the tests carried out in conjunction with 
the assessment. One incorrect setting was correct-
ed on 19 September 2008 when this pump outlet 
was replaced in conjunction with some modifica-
tion work. The rest of the settings were corrected 
on 30 June 2009. The investigation also revealed 
that three motors only had the voltage 690 V (not 
660 V) embossed on their plates, and two of them 
had wrong thermal relay settings. The plates were 
replaced with new ones showing the voltage 660 V.
The incorrect thermal relay settings would not 
have been significant in normal operating condi-
tions but they would have resulted in the pumps 
stopping more easily than planned during und-
ervoltage conditions. The probability of such un-
dervoltage conditions is small, but this is a case 
of a systematic error in procedures because the 
thermal relay settings were incorrectly based on 
the new standard voltage of 690 V while the plant 
unit still used the smaller voltage (660 V) of the old 
standard as the nominal voltage. The significance 
of the event is amplified by the fact that a very 
long time elapsed between detecting the incorrect 
settings and taking the comprehensive corrective 
measures.
Actuator faults in the strainers 
of the seawater systems
The seawater system of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
as well as the spent fuel interim storage of Olkiluoto 
plants have screens that are called strainers. They 
are used to remove the clams carried by seawa-
ter that might cause blockages in different compo-
nents, such as heat exchangers.
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The strainer has two actuators that operate the 
strainer and the rinsing valve (open-close). TVO 
replaced one faulty actuator during annual main-
tenance in May. The actuator removed from the 
component location was opened in September, and 
its planetary gear had signs of wear and tear that 
prevented its operation. Consequently, TVO de-
cided to inspect more actuators in conjunction with 
the annual maintenance operations in progress 
at Olkiluoto 1. Two actuators at Olkiluoto 1 had 
only been in operation for one year so they were 
thought to be in good condition. The other ten ac-
tuators in use at Olkiluoto 1 and at the spent fuel 
storage were inspected during September–October. 
A fault was detected in the planetary gear of one 
actuator. It was of a different type than in the first 
faulty actuator and did not affect the operation 
of the device. The actuators of Olkiluoto 2 will be 
inspected and replaced with new ones during the 
preventive maintenance operations of spring 2010. 
Until then, their operation will be monitored with 
extra vigilance.
The actuator fault was not significant to safety 
because the strainers still let enough water through 
to cool the components important to safety.
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APPENDIX 4 Licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2009
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 C214/313,	 26	February	2009.	Transfer	 of	 sam-
ples made of depleted uranium to the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority. Valid until 31 
December 2009. 
•	 C214/314,	3	March	2009.	Import	of	control	rods	
from Sweden. Four rods weighing approximate-
ly 130 kg each. Valid until 31 December 2009.
•	 C214/315,	3	March	2009.	Import	of	control	rods	
from the United States. 14 rods weighing ap-
proximately 130 kg each. Valid until 31 Decem-
ber 2009.
•	 C821/97,	 8	 April	 2009.	 Handover	 of	 waste	 oil	
(approximately 8.4 m³) released from regula-
tory control to Ekokem Oy to be used as raw 
material for chainsaw chain oil. Valid until 31 
December 2009.
•	 1/C42214/2009,	 10	 September	 2009.	 Import	 of	
nuclear fuel of Australian origin from Spain. 
100 assemblies, a total of 17,700 kg (maximum) 
of low-enriched uranium. Valid until 31 Decem-
ber 2010. The licence was cancelled on 27 Octo-
ber 2009.
•	 3/C42214/2009,	16	October	2009.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S”, 
from Sweden. 10 assemblies, a total of 1,750 
kg (maximum) of low-enriched uranium. Valid 
until 31 December 2010.
•	 4/C42214/2009,	16	October	2009.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S”, 
from Sweden. 108 assemblies, a total of 18,900 
kg (maximum) of low-enriched uranium. Valid 
until 31 December 2010.
•	 2/C42214/2009,	27	October	2009.	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S”, 
from Spain. 100 assemblies, a total of 17,700 
kg (maximum) of low-enriched uranium. Valid 
until 31 December 2010. 
•	 5/C42214/2009,	 19	 November	 2009.	 Import	 of	
fuel channels manufactured of a zirconium al-
loy from the EU, Japan or USA. A maximum to-
tal of 110,000 kg of zirconium (3,000 channels). 
Valid until 31 December 2020.
•	 4/C46201/2009,	11	December	2009.	Transport	of	
two radiated fuel rods to Sweden. Valid until 31 
March 2009.
•	 6/C42214/2009,	 16	 December	 2009.	 Export	 of	
spent nuclear fuel rods to Sweden. Two rods, 
3.98 g. Valid until 31 March 2010. 
•	 7/C42214/2009,	 16	 December	 2009.	 Import	 of	
computer software and its updates from Japan. 
Valid until 31 December 2018. 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 A214/113,	 13	 January	 2009.	 Import	 of	 equip-
ment, related to I & C modernisation work at 
Loviisa 1 and 2, from Germany. Valid until 31 
December 2009.
•	 A214/115,	 3	March	2009.	Loviisa	 1	 and	2;	 im-
port of neutron flux sensors from Russia. A total 
of 10 ionisation chamber sensors. Valid until 31 
December 2009.
Others
•	 Y214/170,	9	January	2009.	Platom	Oy;	posses-
sion of data imported from the United States of 
America, to be used in the design of autoclaves. 
Valid until 31 December 2017.
•	 Y214/175,	24	January	2009.	VTT;	the	extension	
of	 licence	Y214/164	 granted	 for	 export	 of	 ura-
nium samples (2 uranium pellets and 2 crushed 
uranium samples) for research purposes to Ger-
many, and to Sweden until 31 May 2009.
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APPENDIX 5 Periodic inspection programme
Inspections contained in the periodic inspection 
programme focus on safety management, opera-
tional main processes and procedures, as well as 
the technical acceptability of systems. The com-
pliance of safety assessments, operations, mainte-
nance and protection activities (radiation protec-
tion, fire protection and security) with the require-
ments of nuclear safety regulations are verified by 
the inspections. The annual inspection programme 
is brought to the attention of the licensee at the 
beginning of each year, and inspection dates are 
agreed upon with the licensee’s representatives.
Basic programme
Inspections in 2009
Loviisa 1 and 2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
Management, management system and personnel
A1 Management and safety culture 17.4.2009 14.1.2009
A2 Personnel resources and competence 2.6.2009 
10.6.2009
2.–3.9.2009
A3 Functionality of the management system 30.11.–1.12.2009 5.–6.11.2009
Plant safety and its improvement
B1 Assessment and improvement of safety 3.11.2009
B2 Plant safety functions 16.6.2009 16.11.2009
B3 PSA and safety management 9.11.2009
B4 International operating experience feedback 23.11.2009 22.10.2009
Operational safety
C1 Operation 23.2.2009 
5.5.2009 
7.5.2009 
7.–8.12.2009
3.–4.2.2009 
14.–15.4.2009 
27.–28.8.2009 
10.–11.11.2009
C2 Plant maintenance
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 17.–18.11.2009
C4 Mechanical engineering 24.11.2009 1.–2.6.2009
C5 Structures and buildings 18.11.2009 14.10.2009
C6 Information management and security
C7 Chemistry 15.–16.4.2009 6.–7.10.2009
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection 27.–28.10.2009 9.–10.3.2009
D2 Fire protection 17.3.2009 10.6.2009
D3 Emergency response 9.10.2009 
14.10.2009
23.–24.6.2009 
29.5.2009
D4 Security
Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Reactor waste 3.–4.6.2009 21.–22.10.2009
E2 Final disposal facilities 14.12.2009
Special items
F1 LARA 19.5.2009
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Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Main functions
Project management and the management of safety 3.–4.2.2009
Project quality management 1/2009 27.–28.4.2009
Development of safety culture on the site, follow-up inspection 27.8.2009
Work processes
Quality assurance 1/2009: Supervision of installation 23.–25.2.2009
Chemistry 19.3.2009
Quality assurance: Supervision of installation, follow-up inspection 2.6.2009
Quality assurance, supervision of installation, follow-up inspection 21.8.2009
Preparations for commissioning 11.9.2009
Training of OL3 operating personnel 17.9.2009
Quality control of construction work 1.10.2009
Air conditioning systems 28.10.2009
I & C, Organisation and management of TVO’s inspection activities 5.11.2009
Utilisation of PRA 19.11.2009
Radiation safety 10.–11.12.2009
APPENDIX 6 Periodic inspection 
programme during construction
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction-time 
inspection programme is to verify that the oper-
ations required by the construction of the plant 
ensure a high quality implementation according 
to the approved plans and compliant with official 
regulations, without endangering the plant units 
operational within the plant site. The inspection 
programme assesses and oversees the licensee’s 
operations in building the plant unit, implemen-
tation procedures in various technical areas, the 
licensee’s expertise and use of that expertise, the 
handling of safety issues and the quality manage-
ment and control. STUK prepares an inspection 
plan for Olkiluoto 3 every six months.
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Subject of inspection Time of inspection
Management system
ONP-A Management system
Planning and management
ONP-B1 Project management and control
ONP-B2 Safety management 26.–27.5.2009
ONP-B3 Project quality management
ONP-B4 Planning and management of the research and monitoring programme
ONP-B5 Design of Onkalo 3.–4.3.2009
Implementation
ONP-C1 Site inspection and monitoring procedures 10.9.2009
ONP-C2 Drilling and modelling 6.8.2009
ONP-C3 Foreign substances 9.12.2009
ONP-C4 Excavation and EDZ 26.3.2009
ONP-C5 ONKALO in-flows 27.10.2009
ONP-C6 Monitoring and research methods 16.10.2009
APPENDIX 7 Inspection programme 
during the construction phase of Onkalo
The objective of the construction-time inspection 
programme is to verify that high-quality imple-
mentation of approved plans is ensured in the con-
struction of the underground research facility, with 
compliance with official regulations and without 
jeopardizing safe final disposal. The inspection pro-
gramme includes assessment and monitoring of 
Posiva’s operations in building Onkalo, the pro-
cedures applied to various parts of the construc-
tion work, the management of Onkalo research 
and monitoring, the management of safety and the 
quality assurance of the implementation. STUK 
prepares annual plans for Onkalo inspections.
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APPENDIX 8 Commissions regarding the 
regulatory oversight of safety in nuclear power 
plants funded by STUK, completed in 2009
Reports supporting regulatory decision making
Olkiluoto 3
Fortum, Erik Westerlund: Statement regarding 
the document containing an update of documenta-
tion related to the instructions of SIAG Stahlblau 
Ruhland Gmbh & co. KG, the manufacturer of the 
reactor island for OL3 
Fortum, Erik Westerlund: Statement regarding the 
document containing surface treatment instruc-
tions 1S-06-00028.136 for the SPC safety door (SC 
3) of the OL3 safeguard building 
VTT-M-00117-09;	 Heikki	 Keinänen:	 Inspection	 of	
the stress and resilience analyses of Safety Class 1 
and 2 piping at the OL3 NPP 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 4, design documentation from level 
+16.800 to level +21.000, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 1, design documentation from level 
+16.800 to level +21.000, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, structural plan 
of the cladding of JDH pools (JDH10, JDH40) in 
the Fuel Building 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
design documentation from level +14.100 to level 
+19.500, inspection of design documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, supplement to 
the structural plan of the cladding of KAA pools 
(KAA10–40) in the Safeguard Buildings 
Space	 Systems	Finland	 STUK-SSF-RP-003;	 Juha	
Jokipii, Timo Latvala: Audit report, Olkiluoto 3 
reactor protection system
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
design documentation from level +14.100 to level 
+19.500, inspection of design documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 2 and 3, overall stability analyses, in-
spection of updated documents 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, update to the 
structural plan (Batch 1) of the cladding of pools 
(30FAB01, 30FAB11 and 30FAB12) in the Fuel 
Building 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Reactor 
Building, update to the structural plan of the clad-
ding of IRWST pool 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 4, design documentation from level 
+16.800 to level +21.000, inspection of design docu-
mentation update 
VTT, J. Mangs, S. Hostikka: preliminary research 
plan: Assessing fire safety of FRNC-cables for 
Olkiluoto 3, Paret 2B, further research on specific 
cable
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 1, design documentation from level 
+16.800 to level +21.000, inspection of design docu-
mentation update 
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Fortum, Erik Westerlund: Olkiluoto 3, review of 
paint coating of steel liner assembly. 81-82 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, inspection of 
the update to the structural plan of the cladding 
of pools (30FAE01, 30FAF01 and 30FAF02) in the 
Safeguard Building 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
design documentation from level +19.500 to level 
+26.300, inspection of design documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, inspection of de-
sign documentation for bedrock tunnels 37-38UQZ 
VTT-M-00680-09-Rev2;	 Heikki	 Keinänen:	 OL3	
NPP unit, Inspection of the stress and resilience 
analyses of Safety Class 1 and 2 piping 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 2 and 3, design documentation from level 
+21.000 to level +26.800, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
VTT-R-02489-09;	 Johan	 Mangs,	 S.	 Hostikka,	 A.	
Matala: Assessing fire safety of FRNC-cables of 
Olkiluoto 3 – Part 2
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 1 and 4, design documentation from level 
+16.800 to level +21.000, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
response to STUK decision G3920/151 regarding 
design documentation from level +14.500 to lev-
el +19.500 and design documentation from level 
+19.500 to level +26.300, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 1, design documentation from level 
+21.000 to level +24.700, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 2 and 3, design documentation from level 
+21.000 to level +26.800, inspection of supplement 
to design documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 4, design documentation from level 
+21.000 to level +24.700, inspection of design docu-
mentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 2 and 3, design documentation from level 
+21.000 to level +26.800, inspection of update to 
design documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
design documentation of internal structures 
of stairways 1 and 4 from level +14.500 to level 
+36.500, inspection of design documentation 
VTT-R-04563-09;	Antti	Timperi,	Markku	Hänninen,	
Jarto Niemi, Arja Saarenheimo: OL3 loop analyses, 
pipe break at steam generator inlet nozzle
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 1, design documentation from level 
+24.700 to level +29.300/+30.000, inspection of de-
sign documentation 
VTT-R-04506-09;	 Antti	 Timperi,	 Kim	 Calonius,	
Markku	Hänninen,	Jarto	Niemi,	Arja	Saarenheimo:	
OL3 Structural Integrity Study on Piping 
Penetration of Steam Line due to Pipe Breaks
VTT-M-05372-09,	 Rev.	 0;	 Heikki	 Keinänen:	 OL3	
NPP unit, inspection of the stress and resilience 
analyses of Safety Class 1 and 2 piping 
VTT-M-05372-09,	 Rev.	 0;	 Heikki	 Keinänen:	 OL3	
NPP unit, inspection of the stress and resilience 
analyses of Safety Class 1 and 2 piping 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Buildings 1 and 4, overall stability analyses, in-
spection of updated documents 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Fuel Building, 
update of design documentation from level +26.300 
to level +32.200 and response to STUK decision 4/
G43UFA/2009, inspection of documentation 
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, Safeguard 
Building 4, design documentation from level 
+29.300 to level +34.800/+36.000, inspection of de-
sign documentation 
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VTT-R-06181-09;	Tuomo	Sevón,	Esko	Pekkarinen:	
Transport of Debris to Olkiluoto 3 Core in a Loss of 
Coolant Accident
Pontek, Keijo Saloviin: Olkiluoto 3, inspection of 
the update to the structural plan of the cladding 
of pools (30FAE01, 30FAF01 and 30FAF02) in the 
Safeguard Building 
Olkiluoto NPP
VTT-R-04881-09;	 Hanna	 Räty:	 Stoppage	 analysis	
of main coolant pumps of Olkiluoto 1 reactor using 
TRAB-3D computer software 
VTT-R-06182-09;	Tuomo	Sevón,	Risto	Lautkaski:	A	
Summary of Research on Steam Explosion Risk in 
Nuclear Power Plants
Loviisa NPP
VTT-R-08253-09;	Seppo	Hillberg:	Stoppage	of	main	
coolant pump with the TRACE model of Loviisa 1 
VTT-R-08267-09;	Seppo	Hillberg:	 Jamming	 of	 the	
turbine bypass valve with the TRACE model of 
Loviisa 1 
VTT-R-08105-09;	 Seppo	 Hillberg,	 Pasi	 Inkinen,	
Malla	Seppälä:	TRACE	model	 of	Loviisa	 for	 acci-
dent analyses 
Others
VTT-R-00015-09;	 Johan	Mangs:	VTT	 publications	
on fire safety of nuclear power plants
Finflo	Report	F-44;	Timo	Siikonen:	Developments	
of the cavitation model of the Finflo code
VTT-R-02694;	Topi	Sikanen,	Simo	Hostikka,	Jukka	
Vaari: Simulation of flame spread in cable room of 
Leningrad nuclear power plant
Avaplan Oy, Tuomas Mankamo: Conditional State-
Dependent CCF Modeling in FinPRA
ÅF-Consult	 EXP-500;	 J.	 Saari,	 P.	 Heikkinen,	 P.	
Varpasuo, M. Malm, E. Turunen, K. Karkkulainen, 
O. Valtonen, M. Uski: Estimation of seismic hazard 
in territory of Finland
ÅF-Consult	EXP-500/1;	Attenuation	curves	of	spec-
tral acceleration for longitudinal and transversal 
components of the Saguenay and Newcastle data-
sets
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APPENDIX 9 International co-operation of the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in 2009
IAEA
IAEA working groups
•	 Board	of	Governors,	participation	through	pre-
pared addresses in meetings discussing the 
future operational strategy of the IAEA, Jukka 
Laaksonen (2 days, 2 meetings), Tero Varjo-
ranta (2 days, 2 meetings), Esko Ruokola (1 day, 
1 meeting) (A)
•	 INSAG,	International	Nuclear	Safety	Group	–	A	
group that assists the IAEA Director General 
in nuclear safety issues and issues instructions 
on the development of nuclear safety for Mem-
ber States, Director General Jukka Laaksonen, 
Deputy Chairman (6 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 SAGSI,	 Standing	 Advisory	 Group	 for	 Safe-
guards Implementation – A group that assists 
the IAEA Director General in the control of 
nuclear materials and issues instructions on 
the development of nuclear materials control 
for Member States, Tero Varjoranta. (20 days, 4 
meetings) (A)
•	 Expert	 groups	 preparing	 IAEA	 safety	 stand-
ards:
• Safety Guide DS 424, Establishing a Safety 
Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power 
Programme, Director General Jukka Laak-
sonen, Chairman (3 days, 1 meeting) (B3) 
• Safety Guide DS 367, Safety Classification of 
Structures, Systems and Components in Nu-
clear Power Plants, Keijo Valtonen (6 days, 3 
meetings) (A) 
• Preparatory work for the Safety Require-
ment NS-R-2 Safety of NPPS, Timo Eurasto 
(5 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 CSS,	Commission	of	Safety	Standards	–	a	body	
steering the preparatory work for IAEA’s safety 
standards, Jukka Laaksonen (6 days, 2 meet-
ings), Mari Andersin (1 day, 1 meeting), Lasse 
Reiman (3 days, 2 meetings) (A).
•	 NUSSC,	Nuclear	Safety	Standards	Committee,	
Pekka Salminen (6 days, 2 meetings) (A), Keijo 
Valtonen (1 day, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 IAEA/International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES)	
system, Workshop on Train-the-trainers, meet-
ing of national INES coordinators, Tomi Ko-
skiniemi, Finland’s contact person for INES, 
22– 25 September 2009 (A) 
•	 Technical	 meeting	 for	 the	 IAEA	 Nuclear	 Se-
curity Fundamentals recommendation, Paula 
Karhu (5 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	Meeting	of	national	contact	persons	for	IAEA’s	
Illicit Trafficking database, Finland’s contact 
person, chairing of one partial session, Paula 
Karhu (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 IAEA	Steering	Committee	on	Human	Resources	
for Regulatory Bodies with NPPs, Kaisa Kosk-
inen (7 days, 3 meetings) (A)
•	Working	group	preparing	guidelines	for	IAEA’s	
OSART inspection to be carried out during the 
construction phase of nuclear facilities and the 
Safety Guide, Construction Activities at Nu-
clear Installations, Jouko Mononen (5 days, 1 
meeting) (A) 
•	 IAEA/Technical	 Meeting	 IGALL,	 Pentti	 Kout-
aniemi (3 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
•	WASSC,	 Waste	 Safety	 Standards	 Committee,	
Kaisa-Leena Hutri (a half-day meeting) (A)
•	 RASSC,	 Radiation	 Safety	 Standards	 Commit-
tee, Mika Markkanen (A) 
Each item on the list bears a marking that shows how the participation was financed:
A All travelling costs were borne by STUK.
B1 The airfare was paid by the inviting party while the other travelling costs were borne by STUK.
B2 The airfare and accommodation were paid by the inviting party while the other travelling costs were borne by STUK.
B3 All travelling costs were borne by the inviting party while STUK paid the participant’s salary.
C All travelling costs and the participant’s salary were borne by the inviting party. The trip was made on the participant’s 
own leisure time.
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•	 ASTOR,	Application	of	Safeguards	to	Geological	
Repositories, Elina Martikka and Olli Okko (2 
days) (A)
•	 GEOSAF,	International	Project	on	Demonstrat-
ing the Safety of Geological Disposal, Ari Luuk-
konen (3 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 IAEA	 Early	 Notification	 and	 Assistance	 Con-
ventions, meeting of the competent authority, 
Hannele Aaltonen (4 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
•	 IAEA	Action	plan	2004–2009,	strengthening	of	
the international preparedness system, Han-
nele Aaltonen (15 days, 3 meetings) (A)
•	 IAEA	Response	Assistance	Network	 (RANET),	
Anne Kiuru (5 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Recommendations	on	Nuclear	Security.	Partici-
pation in the preparatory work in the capacity 
of an expert and representative of the State of 
Finland. Vienna, Austria, Harri Toivonen (10 
days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 EMRAS	II	(Environmental	Modelling	for	Radia-
tion Safety), Iisa Outola (3 days, 1 meeting) (A), 
Kai	Hämäläinen	(5	days,	1	meeting)	(A)
•	 IAEA	Regional	Workshop	on	Combating	 Illicit	
Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive 
Material,	J.	Rautjärvi	(4	days)	(B2).
IAEA’s expert duties
•	 IRRS,	International	Regulatory	Review	Service,	
IAEA expert group to assess national nuclear 
safety regulation
• Preparatory meeting for the audit of Japa-
nese authority Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency, 2–3 September 2009, Jukka Laakso-
nen, Deputy Team Leader (B3)
• Preparatory meeting for the audit of British 
authority Health and Safety Executive’s Nu-
clear Directorate, 4–13 October 2009, Jukka 
Laaksonen, Deputy Team Leader (B3)
• Preparatory meeting for the audit of Russian 
authority Rostechnadzor 25–27 August 2009, 
Jukka Laaksonen, and the actual audit 5–27 
November 2009, Jukka Laaksonen, Team 
Leader, Heikki Reponen, (B3)
• Audit of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Com-
mission (CNSC) 1–12 June 2009, Heikki 
Reponen (B3) 
• Audit of the Peruvian authority 9–30 April 
2009, Ritva Bly (C)
• Follow-up meeting of the audit of the French 
authority 28 March–3 April 2009 in Paris, 
Tero Varjoranta (B2)
• First part of the audit of the Iranian author-
ity 20–23 April 2009 in Vienna, Tero Varjo-
ranta (B2)
•	Meeting	“To	 revise	 the	Control	 of	Medical	Ex-
posure Thematic Question Set of the IAEA 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)”, 
26–30 January 2009, Ritva Bly (C).
•	 RER9093	9002/Regional	Coordination	Meeting	
on Medical Exposure, 22–24 June 2009, Ritva 
Bly (C).
•	 RER9093	9005/Radiation	protection	in	dentist-
ry, 28–30 September 2009, Ritva Bly (C).
•	 The	INES	meeting	 to	discuss	 the	applicability	
of INES to overexposure of patients, Paris 4–6 
February 2009, Eero Kettunen (A)
•	Workshop	 on	 capacity	 building	 and	 strength-
ening of nuclear regulatory framework in con-
nection to new nuclear activities, Bratislava, 
Slovakia,	Janne	Nevalainen,	Pekka	Välikangas,	
Keijo Valtonen (3 days) (C)
•	 IAEA’s	Operational	Safety	Review	Team	(OSA-
RT) inspection at the Oskarshamn NPP, Seija 
Suksi (16 days) (B2)
•	Meeting	 of	 IAEA	 consultants	 ”Generic	 Issues	
relevant to the Operation, Maintenance, and 
Upgrading of Protection and Control systems in 
Nuclear Power Plants”, Heimo Takala (4 days) 
(A)
•	 Technical	meeting	 on	Regulatory	Oversight	 of	
Licensees’ Activities during Major NPP Projects, 
Kaisa Koskinen (5 days) (A)
•	 IAEA-Foratom	 Joint	 Workshop:	 Practical	 Im-
plementations of IAEA Safety Standards on 
Management System, Kaisa Koskinen (3 days) 
(C) 
•	 Regional	 Meeting	 on	 the	 Harmonisations	 of	
Licensing and Regulatory Capacity Building, 
Kaisa Koskinen (5 days) (C)
•	Meeting	 organised	 by	 IAEA	 for	 potential	 new	
NPP countries, Lecturer Pentti Tiippana (3 
days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Expert,	 IAEA	 Biodosimetry	 application	 in	 ra-
diation emergencies – a manual, working group 
meeting 2–6 November 2009, Vienna, Carita 
Lindholm (A)
•	 RANET,	 IAEA’s	 Response	Assistance	Network	
for radiation hazard situations. Anne Kiuru (5 
days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 IAEA	 Technical	 Meeting	 on	 Revisions	 of	 the	
BSS, Newest Recommendations on Health Ef-
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fects from radon, The impact on Regulatory 
Requirements, 15–16 December 2009 Vienna, 
Mika Markkanen, Hannu Arvela (A)
•	 IAEA	Technical	Meeting	on	Uranium	from	Un-
conventional Resources 4–6 November 2009 
Vienna,	Tarja	K.	Ikäheimonen	(A)
•	 Training	organised	by	IAEA	for	authorities	and	
operators of different countries: ”State System 
of Accountancy and Control” with training or-
ganised in particular for Indonesian authori-
ties 1–10 June 2009, Columbia, Missouri, USA, 
Tapani Honkamaa in the capacity of an expert 
(B3)
Other IAEA events
•	 Joint	 Convention	 on	 the	 Safety	 of	 Spent	 Fuel	
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management 
• Officers’ Meeting, Tero Varjoranta (1 meeting) 
(A)
•	 International	audit	meeting;	Chairmanship	of	
the Country Group Tero Varjoranta (11 days), 
Deputy Chairman of the Country Group, Kai-
sa-Leena Hutri, Country Coordinator (8 days), 
Risto Paltemaa (5 days), Jussi Heinonen (5 
days), Mika Markkanen 10–22 May 2009 (A)
CTBTO
•	Working	Group	B	and	meetings	of	the	Expert	Team	
on Radionuclides, Vienna, 16–27 February 2009 and 
24–28 August 2009, Mikael Moring, Chairman of 
the Expert Team on Radionuclides (A)
•	 Evaluation-NDC	Workshop,	 18–23	 May	 2009,	
Beijing, China, Mikael Moring, Chairman of the 
meeting group (A)
•	 Laboratory	Workshop,	Seattle	USA,	7	Septem-
ber 2009, Mikael Moring (B1)
•	Meeting	of	the	Technical	Working	Group	B	and	
meeting of the Expert Team on Radionuclides, 
16–19 February 2009, Paula Karhu, member of 
the Finnish delegation (4 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	Working	Group	B	and	meetings	 of	 the	Expert	
Team on Radionuclides, Tommi Renvall (A)
•	 Laboratory	Workshop,	FIL07,	Tommi	Renvall	in	
the capacity of Head of Laboratory (A)
OECD/NEA
•	 CNRA, Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Ac-
tivities, Petteri Tiippana (2 days, 1 meeting) (A), 
Lasse Reiman (2 days, 1 meeting), Kirsi Alm-
Lytz (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
• WGOE, Working Group on Operating Expe-
rience workshop, (1 day), participation in the 
5th meeting of the group with a prepared 
address, Seija Suksi (2 days) (A)
• Sixth meeting of the operating experience 
working group of OECD/NEA/CNRA, Seija 
Suksi (3 days) and meeting of the Trending 
Methodology Working Group, Seija Suksi (1 
day) (A)
• WGRNR, Working Group on Regulating New 
Reactors, Pentti Tiippana (8 days, 2 meet-
ings) (A)
•	 CSNI, Committee on the Safety of Nuclear In-
stallations, Keijo Valtonen (4 days, 2 meetings), 
Lasse Reiman (2 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
• Programme Review Group of the SETH-2 
Project, Eero Virtanen, Chairman (4 days, 2 
meetings) (A)
• WGAMA, Working Group on Analysis and 
Management Accidents 14–18 September 
2009, Nina Lahtinen (4 days) (A)
• Management Board of the PKL-2 Project, 
Eero Virtanen, Chairman (4 days, 2 meet-
ings) (A)
• Management Board of the ROSA Project, 
Eero Virtanen (4 days, 2 meetings) (A) 
• WGRisk Bureau, Reino Virolainen (2 days, 2 
meetings) (A) 
• WGRisk, Working Group on Risk Assess-
ment, Jorma Sandberg (3 days, 1 meeting) 
(A), Reino Virolainen (2 days, 2 meetings) 
(A)
• WGHOF, Working Group on Human and 
Organisational Factors, Milka Holopainen 
22–25 May 2009 (4 days) (A), Nina Koivula, 
(3 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
• Task Meeting of the WGHOF with Swiss 
authority ENSI, Milka Holopainen (2 days, 1 
meeting) (A) 
• WGFS, Working Group on Fuel Safety, Risto 
Sairanen (1 meeting, 2 days) (A)
• SCAP, Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable 
Ageing Project, Rauli Keskinen (2 days, 1 
meeting) (A)
•	 DIDELSYS,	 Defence	 in	 Depth	 of	 Electrical	
Systems and Grid Interaction with nuclear 
power plants, Kim Wahlström (4 days, 2 
meetings)
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• IAGE, Working Group on Integrity and Age-
ing of Components and Structures, Sub-
Group on the Integrity of Metal Components 
and Structures, Rauli Keskinen, (3 days, 2 
meetings) (A)
• IAGE, Preparatory meeting for Missiles/IRIS 
2010,	Pekka	Välikangas	(2	days,	1	meeting)	
(A)
• IAGE, Concrete, Metal, Seismic, Missiles, 
Pekka	Välikangas	(5	days,	1	meeting)	(A)
• COMPSIS, Exchange of Operating Experi-
ence Concerning Computer-based Systems 
Important to Safety, Steering Group, Heimo 
Takala (3 days, 1 meeting) (A)
• OECD NEA’s WPNCS (Working Party on 
Nuclear Criticality Safety), Presentation on 
topical projects related to criticality safety in 
Finland and participation in the production 
of a manual on the subject. Riku Mattila, (1 
day, 1 meeting) (A)
• OECD/NEA/CSNI research project, Meeting 
of the Program Review Group of the OECD 
THai project, Meeting of the Management 
Board of the OECD THai project, Minna 
Tuomainen, (3 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 CRPPH, Committee on Radiation protection 
and Public Health, Olli Vilkamo (3 days, 1 meet-
ing) (A)
• WPNEM, Working Party on Nuclear Emer-
gency Matters, Hannele Aaltonen (6 days, 2 
meetings) (A)
• EGBAT, Expert Group on Best Available 
Technologies for Discharge Abatement from 
New Build of Nuclear Power Plants, Lauri 
Pöllänen	(3	days,	1	meeting)	(A)
• ISOE, Information System on Occupa-
tional Exposure, ALARA symposium, Antti 
Tynkkynen (3 days, 1 meeting) (A)
• HRP CCF Workshop, Heimo Takala (2 days, 
1 meeting) (A)
• OECD/NEA/NDC – PoW 2009–2010 – Activ-
ity 7.4 – Education, Training and Knowledge 
Management ad hoc expert group, Kaisa 
Koskinen (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	RWMC, Radioactive Waste Management Com-
mittee, Esko Ruokola (3 days, 1 meeting) (A)
• RF, Regulators Forum, Esko Ruokola (1 
meeting) (A)
• IGSC, Integration Group for the Safety Case, 
Petri Jussila (3 days, 1 meeting) (A).
ICNIRP
•	 ICNIRP,	 International	Committee	on	Non-Ion-
ising Radiation Protection, Main committee, 
Kari Jokela (6 days, 2 meetings) (B3).
EU
•	 ENSREG,	European	Nuclear	Safety	Regulator’s	
Group – Jukka Laaksonen (3 days, 3 meetings) 
(B1)
• WG 2, Safety of the management of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste, Tero Varjoranta, 
Chairman (2 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 European	 Clearinghouse	 on	 Operational	 Ex-
perience Feedback – Director General Jukka 
Laaksonen, Chairman of the steering group (3 
days, 2 meetings), Seija Suksi (3 days, 2 meet-
ings) (A)
•	 ENSRA,	European	Nuclear	Security	Regulators	
Association, Ronnie Olander (2 days, 1 meeting) 
(A)
•	 Six-Country	Information	Exchange	Meeting	on	
Fire Safety, Jouko Marttila (3 days, 1 meeting) 
(A)
•	 EU	Clearinghouse	on	NPP	Operational	Experi-
ence Feedback, Jukka Laaksonen, Chairman of 
the Technical Board (1 day) (A), Seija Suksi, As-
sistant to the Chairman and National Contact 
Person (1 day) (A)
•	 EU	Clearinghouse	 on	NPP	Operational	 Expe-
rience Feedback, 2009 annual meeting of the 
Technical Board, Seija Suksi (1 day) (A)
•	 EU	Clearinghouse,	Juha	Häikiö	(1	day,	1	meet-
ing) (A)
•	 Joint	 Research	 Centre	 Decommissioning	 and	
Waste Management Expert Group (JRC D & 
WM Expert Group), Risto Paltemaa (2 days, 1 
meeting) (B2)
•	 EURATOM	–	Group	of	Experts	Referred	 to	 in	
Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, Eero Ket-
tunen;	Olli	Vilkamo	(B3)	
• Article 31 subgroup – Medical Exposures, 
Chairman Eero Kettunen (B3)
•	 EUTERP	(European	Training	and	Education	in	
Radiation Protection Platform), Ritva Havukai-
nen (A).
•	 EURADOS,	European	Dosimetry	Group,	Hannu	
Järvinen	(A)
• WG 9 Radiation protection in medicine, Han-
nu	Järvinen,	Chairman	(A)
• WG 2 Harmonisation of Individual Monitor-
ing, Timo Ansaranta (A)
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•	 EAN	 (European	 ALARA	 Network)	 Steering	
Group, Maaret Lehtinen (A)
•	 EURATOM	–	Group	of	Experts	Referred	 to	 in	
Articles 35–36 of the Euratom Treaty, Raimo 
Mustonen, National Representative (B1)
•	 EURATOM	–	Consultative	Committee	Euratom	
– Fission, Expert Member (B1)
•	Meetings	of	the	European	Regulators	for	Radia-
tion Protection, Eero Kettunen (A) 
•	WG	 1	 Working	 group	 on	 Outside	 Workers	 &	
Dose Passports, Ritva Havukainen (A)
•	WG	3	Working	Group	New	Medical	Techniques	
& Patient Release, Ritva Bly (A)
•	WG	5	Working	Group	Stakeholder	Involvement	
& Medical Practices, Eero Kettunen (A).
•	 EURADOS,	 European	 Dosimetry	 Group,	WG3	
(Environmental Radiation Monitoring), Kaj 
Vesterbacka (B3) 
•	 EURANOS	Rodos	User’s	Group	(RUG),	Michael	
Ammann (A) 
•	 High	Level	Group	on	Low	Dose	Risk	Research,	
Member of the MELODI Mapping Group, Stutt-
gart, 28–29 September 2009, Virpi Launonen 
(A)
•	 EC,	 DG	 TREN,	 Nuclear	 safeguards	 regarding	
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, Working 
Group meeting, Elina Martikka, Olli Okko and 
Marko	Hämäläinen	(1	day)	(A)
•	 EC,	 DG	TREN,	 Meeting	 with	 MS	 representa-
tives on implementing Euratom Treaty Safe-
guards, Luxemburg 18–19 March 2009, Elina 
Martikka	(B1)	and	Marko	Hämäläinen	(A)
•	 EC	JRC,	International	Human	Capital	Develop-
ment Workshop in Nuclear Safeguards, Ispra 
Italy, 2–4 September 2009, Elina Martikka (A)
•	 EU	CBRN	Task	Force	Concluding	Meeting:	Con-
ference on Enhancing CBRN Security, 29–30 
January 2009, Paula Karhu (2 days, 1 meeting) 
(B2). 
Nordic cooperation
•	 Nordic	Chefsmöte	–	Working	Group	for	the	Di-
rectors of Nordic nuclear and radiation safety 
authorities, Jukka Laaksonen (A)
•	 NKS	Nuclear	 Safety	 Seminar,	Olli	Vilkamo	 (2	
days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 NORDFYS,	 Fysiskt	 skydd	 i	 Nordisk	 kärnte-
knisk verksamhet (Physical protection in the 
Nordic nuclear environment), Ronnie Olander 
(2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Advisory	groups	for	the	OECD	Halden	project’s	
I & C and control room research, Harri Heim-
bürger (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	Meeting	 of	 the	 Management	 Group	 of	 Nordic	
Nuclear Research (NKS), Risto Sairanen (1 day, 
1 meeting) (A)
•	 NKS,	Nordisk	kärnsäkerhetsforskning	 (Nordic	
Nuclear Research), Board of Directors, Raimo 
Mustonen, Member (A)
•	 Nordic	 Work	 Group	 on	 Emergency	 Prepared-
ness (NEP), Hannele Aaltonen (4 days, 2 meet-
ings), Anne Weltner (4 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 Training	 course	 for	 staff	 of	 Nordic	 Secondary	
Standard Dosimetry Laboratories, STUK 7–8 
May 2009 (Antti Kosunen, Ilkka Jokelainen, 
Markku Tapiovaara, Teemu Siiskonen, Arvi 
Hakanen) (A)
•	 Evidence-based	 quality	 in	 radiographic	 imag-
ing. Development of dose and image quality 
optimisation, syllabuses and web-based learn-
ing package. Teuvo Parviainen, Member of the 
Steering Group of the Nordic project (A)
•	 NKS-B;	 Measurement	 Strategy,	 Technology	
and	 Quality	 Assurance;	 GammaSem	Working	
Group, Seppo Klemola (A)
•	 Nordic	physicians	responsible	for	preparedness	
to treat RN injuries, Wendla Paile (A)
•	 NORPLA,	 Cooperation	 group	 of	 Nordic	 radia-
tion protection libraries and archives, Armi 
Länkelin.	(A)	
•	 Nordic	meeting	on	lasers	and	IPL	devices,	Reijo	
Visuri (1 day) (A)
•	 Preparatory	work	for	a	statement	on	RF	back-
ground radiation, 2 Nordic meetings, Tommi 
Toivonen (2 days) (A) 
•	 Preparatory	 work	 for	 a	 statement	 regarding	
age recommendations on the use of solariums, 
teleconference, Reijo Visuri (1 day) (B3).
Other multinational working groups
•	WENRA,	 Western	 European	 Nuclear	 Regula-
tor’s Association, Jukka Laaksonen (4 days, 2 
meetings), Pentti Koutaniemi (2 days, 1 meet-
ing), Kirsi Alm-Lytz (4 days, 2 meetings) (A)
• WENRA/RHWG, Reactor Harmonization 
Working Group, Kirsi Alm-Lytz (8 days, 2 
meetings), Lasse Reiman (4 days, 1 meet-
ing)
• WENRA-WGWD, Working Group for Waste 
and Decommissioning, Esko Ruokola, (2 
meetings) (A)
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•	MDEP,	 Multinational	 Design	 Evaluation	 Pro-
gramme – Cooperation project of 10 countries 
aimed at achieving global harmonization in the 
construction of new nuclear power plants, 
• Policy Group, Jukka Laaksonen (2 days, 2 
meetings) (A)
• MDEP STC, Meeting of the Technical Man-
agement Group, Lasse Reiman (9 days, 3 
meetings) (A)
• MDEP Safety Goals Expert Group, Lasse 
Reiman (5 days, 2 meetings) (A)
• VICWG, Vendor Inspection Co-operation 
Working	 Group,	 Yrjö	 Hytönen	 28	 Septem-
ber–2 October 2009 (A), Martti Vilpas (2 
days, 1 meeting) (A), Jouko Mononen (6 days, 
2 meetings) (A)
• Inspection of equipment manufacturer 
by	 VICWG;	 Audit	 of	 the	 operations	 of	 the	
Doosan engineering works in Busan, South 
Korea by the South Korean authority, Jouko 
Mononen (5 days) (A) 
• CSWG, Codes and Standards Working Group, 
Yrjö	Hytönen	(6	days,	2	meetings)	(A)
•	 Joint	IAEA	/	NEA	Meeting	of	IRS	National	Co-
ordinators to Exchange Experience on Recent 
Events in Nuclear Power Plants and Technical 
Committee Meeting of the IRS National Co-or-
dinators. Seija Suksi (4 days, 2 meetings), Erja 
Kainulainen (4 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 VVER-Forum,	 working	 group	 for	 the	 authori-
ties of countries operating VVER plants, Jukka 
Laaksonen (3 days, 1 meeting), Timo Eurasto (3 
days, 1 meeting) (A), Reino Virolainen (3 days, 1 
meeting) (A) 
• VVER Forum PSA Working Group, Chair-
man Reino Virolainen (3 days, 1 meeting)
• VVER Forum PSA Working Group, Compari-
son of the PSAs of VVER plants, WG Secter-
ary	Ilkka	Niemelä	(4	days,	1	meeting)	(A)
• VVER Forum WG on organisational issues, 
Chairman Timo Eurasto (4 days, 1 meeting) 
(A)
•	 ESREL	2009	+	annual	meeting	of	ESRA,	Reino	
Virolainen (2 days, 2 meetings) (A)
•	 Carnegie	Endowment	Group	for	writing	Nucle-
ar Power Plant Export Code of Conduct, Jukka 
Laaksonen (8 days, 3 meetings) (B2) 
•	 Board	 of	 Directors	 of	 the	 International	 Asso-
ciation for Probabilistic Safety Assessment and 
Management (IAPSAM), Reino Virolainen (3 
days, 2 meetings) (B2)
•	 ICG-EAC,	 International	 Collaborative	 Group	
on	 Environmental	 Assisted	 Cracking,	 Yrjö	
Hytönen, 19–27 April 2009 (A) 
•	 Annual	international	follow-up	meeting	on	the	
risks of operational events – lecture on events 
in Finnish NPPs, Jorma Rantakivi (3 days, 
1 meeting) (A)
•	 ESARDA	31st Annual Meeting, Elina Martikka, 
Olli Okko, Tapani Honkamaa, Mikael Moring, 
Marko	 Hämäläinen,	 Antero	 Kuusi	 and	 Harri	
Toivonen (3 days) (A)
•	 ESARDA,	 Integrated	 Safeguards	 Working	
Group, Anna Lahkola and Olli Okko (2 days, 
1 meeting), Elina Martikka (1 day, 1 meeting) 
(A)
•	 ESARDA,	Verification	Technologies	and	Method-
ologies Working Group, Elina Martikka (1 day) 
(A)
•	 ESARDA,	Containment	and	Surveillance	Work-
ing Group, Elina Martikka (1 day) (A)
•	 31st ESARDA ANNUAL MEETING Vilnius, 
Lithuania	 26–28	 May	 2009,	 Juha	 Rautjärvi	
(2 days) (A)
•	 G-8	Nuclear	Safety	and	Security	Group.	ITWG,	
International Technical Working Group to 
Counter Illicit Nuclear Trafficking, Antero Kuu-
si (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 European	 Pilot	 Group	 on	 Regulatory	 Review	
of the Safety Case for Geological Disposal of 
Radioactive Waste (EPS), Jussi Heinonen (sub-
group 1) (3 days, 3 meetings), Risto Paltemaa (1 
day, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 CBSS,	Council	of	the	Baltic	Sea	States,	Expert	
Group for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Raimo 
Mustonen, National Representative (A)
• Participation in the meeting of the CBSS Ex-
pert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety 
(EGNRS),	Juha	Rautjärvi	(2	days)	(A)
•	 PROCORAD,	Association	 for	 the	 Promotion	 of	
Quality Control in Radiotoxicological Analysis, 
Tarja Heikkinen (A)
•	 ICRM	 (International	 Committee	 for	 Radionu-
clide Metrology), Gamma Spectrometry Work-
ing Group, work on measurement standards for 
the activity parameters of ionizing radiation, 
Seppo Klemola (A)
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•	 HELCOM-MORS,	maintenance	 of	 the	 register	
for radioactive emissions into the Baltic Sea, 
Tarja	K.	Ikäheimonen,	Iisa	Outola,	Vesa-Pekka	
Vartti (3 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
•	 CBSS	 EGNRS	 (Council	 of	 Baltic	 Sea	 States),	
Working Group on Gamma Spectrometric Anal-
ysis, Tommi Renvall and Kaj Vesterbacka (meet-
ing hosted by STUK)
•	 Statens	Strålskyddsmyndighet:	SSM	Independ-
ent Expert Group on Health effects of Electro-
magnetic Fields, Anssi Auvinen (B3)
•	 EURAMET,	 the	 European	 Association	 of	 Na-
tional Metrology Institutes, Antti Kosunen (A)
•	 ESOREX	(European	Study	of	Occupational	Ra-
diation Exposure), Maaret Lehtinen (member) 
(A).
Lectures given at training events
•	MIT	Nuclear	 Plant	 Safety	 Course,	 Cambridge	
Ma. USA, 23 June 2009, Jukka Laaksonen (B2)
•	 Nuclear	Manager	Training	Course,	 St.	 Peters-
burg, 25 May 2009 Jukka Laaksonen (C)
•	 Elforsk	 Seminar	 –	 Competence	 needs	 in	 the	
Nuclear Industry, Kaisa Koskinen, 28 January 
2009 (A)
Participation in international meetings 
in the capacity of a lecturer, panel 
member or session chairperson
•	 USNRC	 Regulatory	 Information	 Conference,	
Washington DC USA, 10–12 March 2009, Jukka 
Laaksonen (A)
•	 2009	 International	 Congress	 on	 Advances	 in	
Nuclear Power Plants, Tokyo, Japan, 11–12 May 
2009, Jukka Laaksonen (B2)
•	MDEP	Workshop,	Paris,	France,	10–11	Septem-
ber 2009, Jukka Laaksonen, Lasse Reiman, Pet-
teri Tiippana (A)
•	 IAEA	Conference	on	Effective	Nuclear	Regula-
tory Systems, Cape Town, South Africa, 14–17 
December 2009, Jukka Laaksonen, Jussi Hei-
nonen (A) 
•	Workshop	of	 the	public	authority	 forum	of	 the	
NEA nuclear waste committee entitled “To-
wards Transparent, Proportionate and Deliver-
able Regulation for Geological Disposal”, To-
kyo 19–22 January 2009, Esko Ruokola, Risto 
Paltemaa (A)
•	 Pilot	WS	 on	Nuclear	Forensics	Analysis,	 JRC-
ITU, Karlsruhe, Germany, 18–20 November 
2009, Mikael Moring (C)
•	Workshop	 organized	 by	 NNSA	 (USA)	 and	
MEXT(JPN), entitled “2nd International Meet-
ing on Next Generation Safeguards”, Tokai-
mura 26–28 October 2009, Tapani Honkamaa 
(A)
•	 INMM,	Institute	of	Nuclear	Material	Manage-
ment, 50th Annual Meeting, Tapani Honkamaa 
and Elina Martikka, Tucson, Arizona, USA, 
12–16 July 2009 (A)
•	 IAEA	Nuclear	Security	Symposium,	Vienna,	30	
March–3 April 2009, Paula Karhu (A)
•	Workshop	 jointly	 organised	 by	 the	 IAEA	 and	
the EC Institute of Energy, Joint Research 
Centre in Petten for the public authorities of 
Eastern European counties and Russia regard-
ing national operating experience procedures, 
event interpretation and analysis methods for 
operational events, Seija Suksi (5 days) (A) 
•	 G8-NSSG-IAEA	International	Workshop	on	Nu-
clear Safety and Security Education and Train-
ing in Countries Embarking on or Expanding 
Nuclear Programmes, Bologna, in the capacity 
of an invited lecturer, Paula Karhu, 7–9 October 
2009 (A)
•	World	 Nuclear	 Harmonization	 Forum,	 Keijo	
Valtonen, 1–3 September 2009 (A)
•	 Eurosafe,	Lasse	Reiman,	2	November	2009	(A)
•	 Fortif,	Lasse	Reiman,	19	November	2009	(B1)
•	 Kärnteknik	 seminar,	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 an	 in-
vited lecturer, Martti Vilpas, 22–23 April 2009 
(2 days) (B2)
•	 Eighth	 International	 Conference	 on	 Methods	
and Applications of Radioanalytical Chemistry 
(MARC VIII), 5–10 April 2009, Kona, Hawaii, 
USA.	 Tarja	 K.	 Ikäheimonen,	 Iisa	 Outola,	 Roy	
Pöllänen	(A)
•	 7th Symposium of CBRNE threats, meeting the 
future	 challenges	 (NBC2009),	 Jyväskylä,	 Fin-
land	2009.	Roy	Pöllänen,	Petri	Smolander	(A)
•	 Nuclear	 Security	 Expert	 Meeting	 on	 Nucle-
ar Forensic Awareness and Development and 
Implementation of a National Response Plan, 
14–16 October 2009, ITU, Karlsruhe, Germany. 
Kari	Peräjärvi	(A)
STUK-B 118
153
APPENDIX 9 international co-operation in 2009
•	 CTBTO	 –	 International	 Scientific	 Studies,	 In-
ternational Conference, 10–12 June 2009, Vi-
enna,	 Austria.	 Kari	 Peräjärvi,	 Harri	 Toivonen	
(A)
•	 31st ESARDA Annual meeting, 26–28 May 2009, 
Vilnius, Lithuania. Harri Toivonen (A)
•	 Nuclear	 Security	 Expert	 Meeting	 on	 Nucle-
ar Forensic Awareness and Development and 
Implementation of a National Response Plan, 
14–16 October 2009, ITU, Karlsruhe, Germany. 
Kari	Peräjärvi	(A)
•	 IGSE	 Workshop	 (Independent	 Group	 of	 Sci-
entific Experts on the detection of clandestine 
nuclear weapons-usable materials production), 
2–4 November 2009, Vienna, Austria. Jani Tu-
runen (B2)
•	 GammaSem:	Nordic	seminar	for	users	of	gam-
ma spectrometry 16–17 September 2009, Kjel-
ler, Norway, Seppo Klemola (A)
•	 EURANOS	Rodos	User’s	Group	 (RUG),	 22–23	
June 2009, Madrid, Spain, Michael Ammann, 
Chairman (A) 
•	 EURANOS	 concluding	 meeting,	 24–26	 June	
2009, Madrid, Spain, Michael Ammann (A)
•	 Late	 health	 effects	 of	 ionizing	 radiation,	 4–6	
May 2009, Washington, USA, Carita Lindholm 
(B2)
•	 NKS-R	 and	 NKS-B	 Joint	 Summary	 Seminar,	
Stockholm, 26–27 March 2009, Carita Lindholm 
(B3)
•	 1st International Radiation Proteomics Work-
shop 27–28 May 2009 (2 days), Munich, Ger-
many, Reetta Nylund, scientific lecture (B3)
•	 US	 HUPO	 (Human	 Proteome	 Project)	 meet-
ing on “Integrative Proteomics for the Future”, 
22–25 May 2009, San Diego, CA, USA, Dariusz 
Leszczynski (A) 
•	 Guangbiao	 Professor	 duties	 in	 China	 15	
March–20 April 2009, Dariusz Leszczynski 
(B3)
•	 5th	 International	 EMF	 Seminar	 in	 China;	 Co-
Chair member of the Scientific Committee, 
Hangzhou,	 China,	 17–19	 April	 2009;	 Invited	
speaker, Session Chair, Dariusz Leszczynski 
(B3)
•	 1st International Radiation Proteomics Work-
shop	2009;	co-organizer	&	member	of	the	Scien-
tific Committee, May 2009, Munich, Germany, 
Invited speaker, Session Chair Dariusz Leszc-
zynski (B2) 
•	 BioEM	 2009:	 the	 Joint	 Meeting	 of	 Bioelectro-
magnetics Society (USA) and European Bio-
Electromagnetics Association, 14–18 June 2009, 
Davos,	 Switzerland;	 Co-Chair	 Technical	 Pro-
gram Committee, Session Moderator, Invited 
speaker, Dariusz Leszczynski (B2)
•	 U.S.	 Washington	 Conference	 on	 “Cell	 Phones	
and Health: Science and Public Policy Ques-
tions”, 14–15 September, 2009, Washington, DC, 
USA;	Member	 of	 Steering	Committee,	 Session	
Chair, Invited speaker (opening lecture), Dar-
iusz Leszczynski (B2) 
•	 EU	COST	Action	BM0704	meeting	in	Paris	3–5	
November 2009, Dariusz Leszczynski (B3) 
•	 Radon	–	DACH	meeting,	Capolago,	Switzerland,	
16–18 September 2009, Hannu Arvela, Olli Hol-
mgren (A) 
•	 Bioelectromagnetics	 Society	 (BEMS)	 Annual	
meeting, Davos, Switzerland, invited plenary 
lecture, Anssi Auvinen (B3)
•	 International	 Topical	 Conference	 on	 Po	 and	
Radioactive Pb isotopes, Sevilla, Spain 26–29 
October 2009, Dina Solatie, Tuukka Turtiainen 
(A)
•	 Barents	 Sea	 Expedition	 (22	 days),	 Ari-Pekka	
Leppänen	(A)
•	 Seminar	 on	 gamma	 radiation	 measurements,	
organised by NKS GammaSem, NKS, Ari-Pekka 
Leppänen,	Pertti	Niskala	(A)
•	Meeting	 of	 the	 Nordic	Working	 Group	 on	 UV	
and	ozone,	Pärnu,	Estonia,	Reijo	Visuri,	Lasse	
Ylianttila,	(4	days)	(A)
•	 BEMS	 conference,	 Davos,	 Switzerland,	 Sami	
Kännälä,	Tim	Toivo	(8	days)	(A).
Standardisation working groups
•	 CEN	 TC	 351	 Workshop	 on	 Radiation	 from	
construction products, 31 October 2009, Mika 
Markkanen (C)
•	 IEC/TC45/SC45A/Working	Group	A3,	A8,	prep-
aration of nuclear power plant I & C standards, 
Harri Heimbürger, (1 day, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Sub-committee	 WG4	 (Radiological	 Measure-
ments) of ISO Technical Committee TC147 (Wa-
ter Quality), Pia Vesterbacka (A)
•	 IEC	/TC61/MT16	UV	Radiation	WG	(solariums),	
Reijo Visuri (2 day, 1 meeting) (A3)
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Participation in foreign committees
•	 Advisory	 committee	 on	 nuclear	 safety	 to	 sup-
port	the	Swedish	nuclear	authority	(SSM,	Strål-
säkerhetsmyndigheten),	Lasse	Reiman	(4	days,	
4 meetings) (B3)
•	 Advisory	committee	on	nuclear	safety	in	France	
(Groupe Permanent d’Experts pour les Réac-
teurs Nucléaires), Nina Lahtinen (7 days, 3 
meetings) (A)
•	 Strålsäkerhetsmyndighetens	 (SSM)	 Nämd	 för	
Frågor	on	Radioaktivt	Avfall	och	Använt	Kärn-
bränsle,	 Advisory	 committee	 of	 the	 Swedish	
radiation and nuclear safety authority on radio-
active substances and spent nuclear fuel, Tero 
Varjoranta (1 day, 1 member) (B1)
•	 Nuclear	 Safety	 Committee	 of	 Lithuania,	 Tero	
Varjoranta (1 day, 1 meeting) (B2)
•	 Bioelectromagnetics	Society	Board	of	Directors	
meeting in Zurich, Switzerland, 4–8 February 
2009, Dariusz Leszczynski (B2) 
•	 Annual	 Meeting	 of	 the	 American	 Society	 for	
Cell Biology, San Diego, CA, USA, 5–10 Decem-
ber 2009, Dariusz Leszczynski (A).
Bilateral cooperation between authorities
•	 STUK	 –	 Swedish	 Nuclear	 Safety	 Authority	
SSM: exchange of information on the work of 
public authorities and on the operational events 
at the Forsmark and Olkiluoto NPPs, Suvi Ris-
tonmaa, Jukka Kupila (4 days, 2 meetings), Veli 
Riihinluoma (2 days, 1 meeting) (A) 
•	Meeting	of	public	authorities	at	SSM;	radiation	
safety of nuclear power plants, Olli Vilkamo, 
Veli Riihiluoma (1 day, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Nordic	meeting	on	dose	monitoring,	Olli	Vilka-
mo, Veli Riihiluoma (2 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 ASN	(France)	Jukka	Laaksonen	(3	days),	Pekka	
Välikangas	(3	days),	Jukka	Myllymäki	(3	days)	
(A)
•	 NRC	 (USA)	 Jukka	 Laaksonen	 (1	 day),	 Risto	
Paltemaa (2 days), Petteri Tiippana, Lasse Kuo-
sa (A)
•	 ENSI	(Switzerland)	Jukka	Laaksonen	(2	days)	
(A)
•	 Rostechandzor	 (Russia)	 Jukka	 Laaksonen	
(3 days) (A), Antero Kuusi (2 days) (A), Henri 
Niittymäki	(4	days)	(A)
•	 Bilateral	meeting	USA-Finland	on	Nuclear	Se-
curity, Ronnie Olander (1 day, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 CNSC–STUK	 cooperation	 meeting;	 Civil	 en-
gineering,	 Fire	 protection,	Missiles,	 Pekka	Vä-
likangas (3 days, 1 meeting) (A)
•	 Swedish	Nuclear	and	Radiation	Safety	Author-
ity SSM (2 days), Swiss Nuclear and Radiation 
Safety Authority, Kirsi Alm-Lytz (1 day), Lasse 
Reiman (1 day) (bilateral meetings with the 
nuclear and radiation safety authorities in their 
countries and hosting in Olkiluoto) 
•	 Visit	 of	 B.	 Hessu,	 Consultant	 for	 BMU,	 the	
Federal German Ministry for the Environment, 
Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Bun-
desministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit) regarding pipe rupture cri-
teria, Rauli Keskinen (1 day, 1 meeting)
•	 Attending	 the	 preparedness	 exercise	 of	 Ro-
satom, Moscow, Russia, Timo Eurasto (1 day) 
(A)
•	 BfS	 (Germany)	Antti	 Kosunen,	 Teemu	 Siisko-
nen, Markku Tapiovaara (1 day) (A)
•	 BfS	 (Germany)	 Kaj	 Vesterbacka	 (3	 day)	 (no	
travel expenses)
•	Workshop	on	“International	Emergency	Prepar-
edness and Crisis Communication” Sevastopol, 
Ukraine,	2–4	September	2009,	Juha	Rautjärvi	
(3 days) (B3)
•	 Program	of	the	Summer	School	“Ukraine	in	glo-
bal nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: 
political and technical dimensions”, 5–10 July 
2009,	Odessa,	Ukraine,	Juha	Rautjärvi	(4	days)	
(B3).
Others
•	 Empire	2009	exercise	on	actions	after	the	deto-
nation	 of	 a	 dirty	 bomb,	Albany,	NY,	USA,	 2–4	
June 2009, Hannele Aaltonen and Antero Kuusi 
(A)
•	 EU-27	Peer	Review	 of	 nuclear	waste	manage-
ment issues at STUK (5 days)
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ALARA	(as	low	as	reasonably	achievable)
radiation protection optimisation principle, ac-
cording to which exposure must be limited to 
being as low as reasonably achievable
BWR
boiling water reactor
CBRN	(chemical,	biological,	radiological	and	
nuclear)
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear 
weapons or hazards, for example: ”protective 
measures taken against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”
Euratom
for nuclear material safeguards, Euratom refers 
to the European Commission units responsible 
for nuclear material safeguards: Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport, Directorates 
H and I
FSAR
Final Safety Analysis Report
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSAG
International	Nuclear	Safety	Group;	 organisa-
tion called by the Director General of IAEA
IRS
Incident	Reporting	System;	nuclear	power	plant	
operating experience reporting system main-
tained by the IAEA and NEA
ITDB
Illicit Trafficking Data Base, an IAEA database 
to which member states deliver data on de-
viations observed as regards nuclear substances 
and radiation sources.
KYT
Finnish nuclear waste management research 
programme
LARA
I&C renewal project at the Loviisa power plant
MDEP
Multinational	 Design	 Evaluation	 Programme;	
a multinational cooperation programme evalu-
ating the practices and requirements of au-
thorities related to the licensing of new nuclear 
power plants
NKS	(Nordisk	kärnsäkerhetsforskning)
Nordic safety research programme
OECD/NEA
OECD Nuclear Energy Association
Onkalo
underground research facility for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel
PRA
Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
PWR
pressurised water reactor
SAFIR
Safety	of	nuclear	power	plants;	Finnish	publicly	
funded national nuclear power plant research 
programme
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SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation;	 an	 international	 team	 of	 nu-
clear material safeguard experts called by the 
Director General of the IAEA
STUK-YVL Guides
Working title for the new restructured regula-
tory guides on nuclear safety during the renew-
ing process in 2006–2009
TechSpec
Technical Specifications, Operational Limits 
and Conditions
WANO
World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association
VVER	(Vodo-Vodyanoi	Energetichesky	
Reactor)
Russian	 pressurised	 water	 reactor;	 Loviisa	 1	
and Loviisa 2 are VVER-440 reactors
nuclear material 
special fissionable material suitable for the 
creation of nuclear energy, such as uranium, 
thorium or plutonium
nuclear	commodity	(or:	nuclear	material)
nuclear material referred to above or another 
material referred to in Section 2, Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (deu-
terium or graphite), device, system and infor-
mation (Section 1, paragraph 8 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree). 
nuclear material accounting and control 
manual
manual to be used by an organisation in pos-
session of nuclear commodities, describing the 
nuclear commodity safeguards and accounting 
system
nuclear non-proliferation manual
manual to be used by a future possessor of nu-
clear commodities, describing the measures to 
secure the requirements of nuclear safeguards
regulatory control of nuclear non-
proliferation
monitoring operations to prevent the prolifera-
tion	 of	 nuclear	 weapons;	 operations	 consist	 of	
nuclear safeguards and the monitoring of the 
nuclear test ban
EIA procedure
Enviromental Safety Assessment
YVL Guides
STUK guides containing detailed requirements 
set for the safety of nuclear power plants. 
There’s a large restructuring project going on, 
the	new	YVL	Guides	should	replace	old	ones	by	
the	end	of	2011.	The	last	old	style	YVL	Guides	
with number-only id’s were issued in 2008.
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